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A B S T R A C T 
The develooment of Arab Nationalism ov^ es much to the 
TurkiBh r^ ule over the Arab land. Thouoh Arab Nationalism 
waB a verv old conceot for the Arabs in the mid I'^ th 
Century, it was aoain revived bv the Arab christian and 
MuBllm thin^(ers like Michael Aflaa and Jamal Abdul Nasir of 
Syria and Eoypt respectively. In the name of Ba'thism and 
Nasirism this movement was orooaoated throuoh out the Arab 
World. 
The catalyst for the rise of Arab Nationalism i.e. 
Qawmmiyya was undoubtedly the growth of the Zionist movement 
in Palestine, culminatino in the establishment of Israel in 
1948. The cry for Arab Unity came in to Arab conciousness 
and was mainly directed aoainst the Israelis. 
Regardless of the practical inability of the Arabs to 
unite or to defeat the Israelis, Arab Nationalism became the 
political force of the Arab World. Hence, the uneven drive 
for Arab Unitv can be seen in a number of attempts at the 
croBB national political integration in the Arab World. 
Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic in Februarv 
1958 ( to be dissolved in 1961), a few davs later the Arab 
Federation \Df Jordan and Iraa) was formed ( to last until 
Julv 1958). 
Ba'thism is another version of Arab Nationalism which is 
based upon Arab Unity, Freedom and Socialism. Since the 
founder of this ideolooy. Michael Aflaq and Salah al Bevtar 
were influenced bv the Western ideolDgues durinq their 
education in France, thev tried to implement Ba'thist 
ideoloqy m Syria yiz-a-yiz in the Arab World. Before Hafiz 
al-Asad. there was political instability in Syria. After 
Asad came into power in 1970 he not only proyed himself to 
be a strono leader but also oave an ideolociv of Greater 
Syria, which include Lebanon and a portion of Jordan and 
Palestine. This expansionist tendency of Asad coincided 
with the nationalist identity of Syria. Therefore. under 
the Asad's efforts Ba'thist rules, are yery much close to 
Syrian Nationalism. 
In the case of Iraa, after independence it became a 
Western ally, when General Nun al-Sazd made an aoreement 
with Turkey as a result of Baghdad Pact in 1955. In the 
wake of 1955 pact Arab reaction took place amonci oro-
Nasirities who became agressiye towards Monarchical regime. 
Since the Arab masses responded actiyely aoainst the Iraai 
regime. Therefore, from 1958 to 1968 many regimes in Iraa 
were overthrov^n. 
In 1963 Abdul Salam Arif oyer threw Oasim and began to 
implement the policies of the Ba'th with intellectuals 
support from the military elements, the intellectuals and 
the middle classes. A number of efforts were made during 
the year 1963-65, for Arab unification, but agreement made 
between Syria and Iraa and between Egypts, Syria and Iraa 
had littl» practical effect. However, the exoerience of both 
Svria and Iraa in civil-mi1itarv CDOoeration have 
demonstrated that the milltarv often tended to imoose their 
own decisions and run the business of the Government in 
accordnace with their own imperatives rather than with oartv 
Dnnciples and Guidelines. Thouoh civilian leaders voiced 
criticism of military control, the increasino civil military 
tension remained unresolved. 
In July 1968 in a bloodless coup Arif was overthrown by 
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr who was a staunch supporters of the 
Ba'th. Within months of Bakr's accession to power Irao was 
confronted with a new problem i.e. the uprisino by Kurdish 
QU»rrill««. E<ut the demise of the Kurdish revolt and the 
oraintlnQ of limited autonomy to the f-urds in Iraa can be 
viawad *« a victory for the Ea th Party and a step toward 
intra-regional accomodation and stabilitv. It is also an 
indication of Iraq s arowinp strenoth, of the country s 
consolidation of power, and of the need for foreion powers 
to refrain from exploitinQ minority problems for their own 
interests. 
After the Ba'th Party came to power in Syria in 1963, it 
discussed the relations of the party and ciovernment and of 
party and populace, as well as, the problem penerated by the 
establishment of the national ciuard. It affirmed the rioht 
of the people to criticize the party and made a special 
point that such oroanirations as those of labour. students 
and professional people should not be sub.iect to state 
control. 
However at a later stage, the Ba' th Partv Conference 
decided, that the socialist goals of the oartv should be out 
into operation immediately. Such a move would have been a 
reversal of Aflag's traditional attitude that independence 
and unity were necessary pre-conditions for the successful 
implementation of Ba'thist (Arab) Socialism. It represents 
the strong influence e;certed during the conference by the 
"extremist' wing associated with Ali Salih Sadi and Nun al-
din al-Atassi, Secretaries General of the Iraoi and Svrian 
regimes respectively. Specifically, the sixth, conference 
statement considered the establishment of collective forms 
on 1«nd processed under the agrarian reforms measures as a 
goal to be striven for uroently. 
In the case of Irag, radical agrarian reform was one of 
the main tai'S which the Ba' th revolutionary taH'ed in the 
early stage. As a preliminary, changes had to be made in 
the institutions concerned, and the party's control of them 
had to be strengthened. Under the revolution, the party's 
leadership and democratic practices were extended and 
developed in rural areas, and the peasants contribution to 
the political life of the country has grown. Peasant 
association have acquired political and economic importance. 
New patterns of production have emerged, and the old ones 
are in decline. 
Despite the orerat achievements made in industrial 
sector durinQ the period 1974-81, it still suffers from 
certain obstacles and drawbacks which neoativelv affects its 
course of proqress and the achievement of the objective 
assioned to it. Some of these obstacles and drawbacks, are 
caused bv the levels of economic progress of the country, 
the lake of experience in industry and the problem of 
socialist application. 
In the Arab World, inter-Arab relations on bilateral as 
woll at on the basis of Pan-Arab level of both of the 
CDuntri»» have remained concentrated laraelv on tv^ o basic 
issues I.e. Palestine and Arab Nationalism. 
But there are other factors in inter-Arab relations 
which, despite the lac^ of visible short term results, olav 
a fundamental part in strenqtheninQ lin^s with the masses 
in other Arab countries and in layinci the foundations for 
Arab Unity. However, in the Fertile Crescent relations 
especially between Syria and Iraq have assumed a significant 
importance especially after 1^70 where the issues of 
0 
nationalism vs. localism have been repeatedly debated and 
discussed. 
/Wltf the coup of November 1^70 in Syria. Baohdad more 
often ionored the new rules continuous. thouph slowly 
abatlncj insiBt;ance on Ba thi leaitimacy. And when voicino 
it» critism viz-a-vir Syria it aoain acknowledged the 
e;;i5tence there of a Ba' th Party. 
However, motives m the aroument over Ba'thi leoitimacv 
were differences over what Ba'thism should stand for an 
Dersonal hostilities. The COUD fo 23rd February 1«?66 in 
Syria advocated a different version of Ba'thism than that 
of the Qauwmmiyva, and a few of them lif-e Jadid, seemed to 
have some ideolooical motivation, their main ob.iective was 
simoly to take oower. The stronoer emphasis on socialism 
presumably served laroelv to mobilise supporters who could 
not be raached with more moderate arouments. The Iraqi 
Ba'th, for its part, had no actual Drogramme at all, and 
indulqcid in complete ideoloqical vagueness. As far as 
ideolociical differences had a bearing on the conflict this 
was laraely due to the preferences of the Syrian nationalism 
for the rulers in Iraq which threatend to erode the basis of 
Syrian reqime. 
Ba'thism in Iraq and Syria certainly diverged at the 
verbal level : where as the Iraqi party continued to sticf' 
to the traditional Ba'thi discourse and vocabulary, Jadid 
and his supporters borrowed Marxist-Leninst terms and 
concepts. Both sides, however, claimed to recognise the 
constitution of the Ba'th Party, passed by its first 
Congress in Damascus in i<?47. as the theoretical basis of 
thoflr political practice. 
HowBveir, due to their reoional competition relations 
betwB«n Syria and Iraq greatly deteriorated till the process 
in the aftermath of the Camo David accord seemed to be 
reversed in an almost spectacular volte-face. 
Svro-Iraai relations, in 1=?80 returned to the state of 
open conflict that had characterized them prior to l<^ 78-79 
rapproachment. Though the means resorted to laroelv 
resembled the pre-rapproachment period, a few differences 
can be distinguished. Foremost amona these differences was 
thH 0«t«blishment of a firm alliance between one of conflict 
parties Syria - and another regime in the region-Iran that 
served to combat Iran as the^r common enemy. 
The current phase thus has witnessed the intensification 
of the ideological conflict aiming the Iraa and Syria on the 
lines of the political independence of its branches, thus 
ending for its existence all practical purposes as a Pan-
Arab Organisation. 
Throughout the 1<?505, the Ba' th conceived the idea of 
the Arab Nation as an organic whole entrusted with the tas^ ' 
of national regeneratiori. However, with the failure of the 
Arabs first experiment in unity in 1961, and their defeat as 
a united force in 1^67 Arab-Israel War, the experience of 
the Iran-Iraq war, the Ba' th conception of the nature and 
role of the Arab Nation suffered a great deal. 
In a pragmatic fashion, the Ba'th Movement both in Syria 
aftd Iraa realized that a decisive change in the status DUD 
of the Arab countries was not lively to occur in the 
foreseeable future unless it was ciccomDanied bv a orocess of 
reoional transformation. The kev to Arab reqeneration in 
the form of a unified socialist state was not to be found in 
an idealistic attempt to harmonize the efforts of 
conflicting political systems and social interests, but lav 
an first preparing the social and political conditions in 
each Arab country for such an eventuality. 
The impracticability of a comprehensive Arab Movement 
under the unstable political conditions in the Arab World. 
Consequently, its Pan - Arab character qavw way to an 
increasino tendency to participate in reciiomal politics. 
The new Ba'thist oovernments were more ssurrasBftil ly in 
accommodating bv compromise and more often bv cois'rcion tha 
political ambitions and economic interets of the more 
influential segments of society, such as the landed gentry, 
royal families and more recently army officers and 
bureaucrats generating the feeling of Wataniyya over 
Qaummivya. Consequently the call to abolish boundaries 
between Arab States, and the demand to eradicate social and 
economic differences were fiercely countered by the adamant 
resistance of those who had vested interests in preserving 
the state of political fragmentation in the Arab World. 
Today the conflict between the Ba'th Government in Syria and 
Iraq cannot be entirely attributed to ideological 
differences. Underlying this conflict aro the concretes 
state interests of the two countries, in which no amount of 
rhetoric on Arab Unity and brotherhood can dispel. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Arab" Nationalism arose within the context of Muslim 
Civilization at a time when the later had been senouslv 
chailenoed and weakened bv the encroachments of the West. 
Considered as the belief in the national identity of the 
Arab peoole and the wish to see them United m a sinole 
Dolitv, it is the source of the Arab Unitv movement in West 
Asia. It has had an immense impact on Arab oolitics even 
with the most traditional leadership Davino homaoe to its 
ideals. Arab nationalism has thus been viewed as ooDOsed to 
feudalist social structures, capitalist eiioloitation and the 
persistence of privileqed classes. 
Most of the ideolociical trends that appeared specially 
in Syria and Iraq advocated this revolutionary doctrine of 
Arab Nationalism leadmo to the doctrines of socialism, 
basically motivated aqainst foreion involvement in the area. 
The Palestinian debate in 1948 further boosted the 
revolutionary trends of nationalism, in place of liberal 
nationalism which was bv then prevalent in the Arab World. 
The revolutionary Arab Nationalism in this phase re-
dedicated itself to fundamental chanoe in order to achieve 
their desired objectives of Freeaom and Unity. Freedom was 
to be achieved from the colonial powers and Unity had to be 
enshrined amono tne Arab States. 
(11) 
Founded in the early 1940s in Svria. the Arab Socialist 
Ba'th Party has esDOUsed a Pan-Arab ideolooy but has 
achieved only a measure of oolitical success. It ha£> 
reoeatedly been turn apart by ideoloQical arouments, and 
power conflicts. Since 1963 it has been controllinQ party 
in both Syria and Iraq. 
As for the Ba'th ideolooy is concerned, the emphasis has 
been fixed more on Arab Nationalism than to Arab Socialism. 
The party constitution deals first with the Unity and 
Freedom as the mission of the Arab Nation. Only after 
considering these issues does it speak about socialism. 
Accordinq to Michael Aflaa one of the fundamental principles 
of the party is the eternal mission of the Arab Nation. One 
aspect of the mission is to fioht colonialism. Another is 
to extend the fraternal hand to other nations m order to 
collaborate with them for the establishment of "Just 
institutions" which will brino "prosperity and peace", as 
well as moral and spiritual advancement. 
The Ba'th works towards a complete change. It will be a 
total psycholoQical transformation of every individual, and 
not simply a change of qovernments and institutions- The 
Ba'th declares that all the natural resources, big 
industries and means of transportation should be owned and 
managed by the state. No owner of agricultural lend should 
till' 
posses more than he can farm, and all farmino should be 
SLibiect to the over all economic oianninD of the state. 
Civil liberties must not become a cover under which the aoe 
old Arab concern for self thrives: such liberties should be 
provided, but within the national interest. 
The issue of Nationalism has been discussed and debated 
time and aoain the United Arab World. For some Arab 
Nationalism has been a force dividino the Arabs. Even Pan-
Arabism was divisive when it threatened the privileoed 
classes which had vested interests in the oeroetuatioti of 
each of the autonomous states. More fundamentally, strono 
national feelings e;;ist in individual Arab countries on the 
levels of both the people and the elites. Havino led a 
separate e;;istence for two or three decades. these states 
have became the normal point of reference for their 
citizens. It has proven difficult to utilize feelinos of a 
broader unity to stimulate effective action. As a result, 
Arab Unity can only be accomplished if each p.articipant 
state gains in terms of its local interests. The failure to 
meet this difficult requirement was the major cause of the 
collapse c* the Union of Syria and Egypt in 1961. 
The Union failed to meet Ba'ths expections. and in the 
coup of 28th September 1961 the Nationalist regime came to 
power in Syria and put an end to the Unitary experience with 
<1V) 
Eoypt. The nationalist reoime led to a new low in Svro-
Egvptian relations, it meant normalization. even 
raoprochement in relations with Iraa. The reoime in Svria 
found itself by radical Arab nationalist advocatino Arab 
Socialism, whether the Ba thist version, both of which had 
considerable appeal within Syria itself. And indeed on the 
March 1<?63, the Syrian reoime fell to a coalition of 
nationalist and Ba'thist officers. The purges led to 
continued Ba'th rule in Syria, albiet of different factions, 
to the present dav. 
During the period of 1963-70, there was continued 
struggle for power and influence among several groups and 
individual in Syria. In this situation, the Ba'th took 
control of Syria. The party had been formally dissolved 
from the beginning of the UAR period until 1962. Thouoh, 
the Ba'th Party's founders, Michael Aflag and Salah al~ 
Beytar continued to advocate Arab Nationalism, most of the 
leaders however had been turned away from Arab Nationalism 
by the UAR experiment. Thev had come to focus their 
energies and interests on Syria and its immediate 
environment. 
The Nationalist <Syria) responded in February 1966 bv 
seizing power in a violent coup that drove the party's 
founders into e^ ;ile and split the Arab Nationalist Ba'th 
(V) 
Party into two, one centered in Syria and one in Iraq. The 
Syrian oroup was headed by the Alayi Officer Salah Jadid, 
alonci with some ciyilians who dominated Syrian cabinets from 
1966-70. It was ideoloQically committed to a collectiyist. 
state run economy and to support of a national liberation 
struQCile by Palestinians. The forward policy of this 
faction helped cause the 1967 war with Israel. The defeat 
in 1967 led to the oradual erosion of Jadids power base and 
in 1970 he was oyer thrown in a bloodless coup by Hafis al-
Asad. Asad's moye to the too of the Syrian pyramid of power 
Graphically demonstrated the reality of military 
predominance of the party. 
After dismissing the rulino Ba'th body in Noyember 1970, 
Asad appointed a proyisional Regional Command. The people 
loyal to him, had oained sufficient control of the party 
branches in the election. Asad became the secretary general 
of the party, the President of the Soyernment and the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He appointed a 
permanent Reoional Command m place of Proyisional Regional 
Command by the addition of new members. Asad also became 
the regional Secretary gene'-ai. In mid vear, the National 
Congress met; it too chose Asad to head the National (Pan-
Arab) Command. He has been re-elected to those posts at 
suceeding regional and National Congress in 1975 and 1979-80 
(vi) 
The notion of Greater Syria has been revived once aoain 
by Asad. The term BILAD ASH-SHAH <the land of Syria) is a 
oeociraphical historical term, a region l^in^ 'inci the two 
parts of the Arab homeland'. BILAD ASH-SHAH was divided 
after the First World War into four "mini-states (DUWAVLAT) 
namely Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, and in 1967 it 
lost territory to Israel. It was openly propaoated over 
Damascus Radio and in Ba'th daily AL-THAWRA for several 
months in 1976-77. 
ReaardinQ the notion that Palestine is an inteoral part 
of Syria, Asad said in his speech in March 1974: 'Palestine 
IS not only a part of the Arab homeland, but constitutes the 
major part of southern Syria. Other Syrian leaders also 
stated on various occasion that Palestine was part of Syria. 
Despite these statements, it is conceivable that Asad, 
the realistic and cautious politician has been aware of the 
enormous difficulties involved in unifyina the countries of 
Greater Syria under his leadership. It is more likely that 
his strategic goal has been <and still is) to achieve a 
(federal) union of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan ano Palestine 
under his leadership. Bearing in mind that Syria would be 
the biggest and strongest party in such a union, Damascus 
could maneuver among her partners and take the predominant 
role in shaping its political and military strateoy. 
(VI 1 ) 
Indeed, it would be seen that Asad's more concern of Greater 
Syria is to serve his two interrelated cioals of creatine a 
new reqional power centre, or sphere of in-fluence which can 
make its impact in intei—Arab politics vis-a-vis his two 
stronc) Arab rivals, Eaypt and Iraq, and of CDordinatino 
military and political struQole with Israel. 
The LeaQue of Arab states and UAR are two of the manv 
unsuccessful attempts towards Arab Unity. The First, 
association of member states, never intended nor achieved 
real unity. The Second, while quite serious at first, 
proved both limited and temporary as the union collapsed in 
1961. In addition to these, there have also been concerted 
efforts on the part of the independent Arab nations to 
acquire defense arrangements aqainst any threat from the 
out-side. 
Nun al-Said, the Prime Minister, was convinced that 
Iraq's best interest could be served by .loininq a Western 
sponsored security system. 
Prime Minister Nun made concrete move towards closer 
collaboration with Turkey. A Tur^l5^ — Iraqi pact was 
siqned in Baghdad on February 24, 1955 by the President of 
Turkey and Ping of Iraq. It stipulated that the two 
countries would cooperate for mutual security and defence 
and would refrain from interference in each other's internal 
(Vl11) 
affairs! On April 4, 1955. Enciland and Iraq concluded 
special Aareement in Baohdad where bv 
U^  acceded to February 24 pact to mutual cooperation 
between Iraq and Turf'ey. 
The dramatic development in the West Asia durino the 
period 1956-58 e-iposed Iraq to further attacks from Arab 
states hostile to the pact which were now rallvmo around 
Nasir as a result of the ill-fated invasion of suer in 1956. 
The Suez crises of October -November, 1956. created the 
fear in Iraq that Egyptian - Israeli hostilities miaht 
expand beyond Sinai. The Suez crises pave the leader of the 
opposition full opportunity to embarrass the oovernment of 
Nun al-Said internally and public opinion was aroused 
aqainst western imperialism. This led to protest 
demonstrations and serious riots in Mosul, Najef and Put. 
Despite the stern measures taken by the Ciovernment 
Nun's opposition oained strenoth when President Nasir of 
Eqypt turned military defeat into political victory, by 
becoming a symbo: of anti-western imperialism. Opposition 
forces in Iraq found considerable support from Nasir and the 
Iraqi government had no choice but to combat this Cairo-
inspired Pan-Arabism and Allies were sought in this struqqle 
from amonci the monarchical regimes remainino in the Arab 
World. 
The Monarchy in Iraa was however over thrown in Julv 
1<?58 and Iraq became a republic with Abdul Kareem Oasim as 
the Prime Minister and Abdus Salam Arif as his deoutv 
Col.Arif was associated with the influential Ba'th Partv and 
had shown himself to be a suDporter of union between Iraa 
and the UAR. 
In 1<?63 Arif over threw Qasim and beoan to implement 
the policies of the Ba'th with support from the military 
elements the intellectuals and the middle classes. A number 
of effort were made durino the year 1963-65, for Arab 
unification, but agreements made between Syria and Iraa, and 
between Eovpt. Sv^ 'le and Iraa had little practical effect. 
In i'^ oo Abdus Salam Arif was f'llled in an air crash and 
was succeeded by his brother Abdur Rahman Arif. In Julv 
1^68 in a bloodless coup A.R. Arif was over thrown by Ahmad 
Hasan Al-Bakr who was a staunch supporter of the Ba th. 
Within months of Ba^cr's accession to power Iraa was 
confronted with a new E*-oblem i.e. the uprising by f urdish 
Bauerrillas. Direct confrontation between the Iraai 
oovernment and the Kurdish movement became inevitable 
foilDWina the non-Ba'thist regime, the new regime emphasized 
the need to create a strong centre and advocate Arab 
Nationalism to supersede local and parochial feelinos. The 
threat of direct control bv Baghdad instilled a sense of 
unity amonci the Kurds. The tribal and traditional elements 
viewed the central authority as a threat to their way of 
life, and the secular nationalist saw it as a threat to 
their Qoal of establishino an autonomous or separate Kurdish 
entity. 
The failure of the central ooyernment to defeat the 
Hurdish reyolt became a major source instability of the 
reoime and contributed in no small measure to the oyer throw 
of three Iraqi ciovernments since 1958 to 68. The situation 
becian to chanae with the return of the Ba'th Party to power 
in 1968. Adyocatinci what is considered to be perhaps the 
most attractive ideoloqy in the West Asia, the Ba'th 
combined the appeal inci principles of Arab Unity and Arab 
socialism. The Ba'th leaders learned a lesson from their 
former regime. Thoucih, praomatic and secular in outlook, 
they were convinced of the righteousness of their cause and 
determined to ma^ 'e Iraq a model, if not a leader of a modern 
state in the Arab world. Beset with social, political and 
economic difficulties, the Ba'th party realized that tr.e 
establishment of a stable reoime had to be ensured before 
its ideolociv could be transformed into a reality. 
The present studv attemots to identify the issues that 
have determined Svno-Iraai relation since Ba' th oartv came 
into e;!istence. It aims to oive the comorehensive account 
and BjJDlanation of the major events and develooments in 
Svro-Iraai relations over the last two decades. 
The studv is based on historical descriotive method. 
Materials both of primarv and secondarv nature have been 
oroanired in a systematic order and rendered into the 
analytical framework. The variables and events have been 
compared and conclusions derived. 
In this conte;;t. the first and second chanters deals with 
the ideoloDies propounded bv the different political 
thin^-ers reoardino the Arab Unitv. Arab Socialism in the 
Arab East (Fertile Crescent). The impact of these ideoiooies 
on Arab Nationalism depended upon the Question of Arab 
Unitv. the Palestinian cause and the issue of the social 
transformation. After the creation of Israel. the 
ideolooical oroups of the vounq Arabs used Palestinian 
Question as an instrument of the development of the Arab 
Nationalism. 
The third chapter gives an analytical account of not 
onlv instability in Syria due to the freauent COUPS but 
also hiohliQhts the differences amono the ideoioQical oroups 
operatino in the country itself. The study also hiDhliohts 
(/Ill) 
the develooments of Partv status under Hafir al-Asad since 
1V70 which leoitimises and consolidates the oovernments 
position in Svria. 
The fourth chanter analyses as to how and whv the 
Monarchical ciovernment in Iraq was overthrown bv the 
revolutionary auards (Ba'thist) who were aDamst the 
Northern Tier alliance. The studv further hiohliohts in 
detail Ba'th Parties stand on the Kurdish Question. This 
alliance was imposed bv the imperialist power. 
The fifth and final chapter of the thesis evaluates and 
examines the nature of conflicts between the same 
ideoloQical countries i.e. Svria and Iran. The issue of 
ideoloQical perceptions alwavs has created a feelinos of 
confusion amono the people as well as the regime. Svro -
Iraqi bilateral relations are not onlv tense but often have 
led to open conflict. Hence to maintain their heoemonv in 
the Arab World particularly in the Arab East (Fertile 
Crescent^, thev have independently wori'ed for their own 
nationalism using the slooan of Arab Nationalism as mark to 
cover the realitv. The final chapter also raises question 
regardinci the futures of Ba' th ideoloov its validity in the 
chanced circumstances viz-a-viz to the question of Arab 
Nations. 
ARAB NATIONALISM IN WEST ASIA 
^ BA'THISM IN 
SYRIA a IRAQ 
Arabian 
Sea 
Cartographic Lab. CWAS (AMU) Aligarh. 
Chapter I 
Contemporary Political Ideologues 
McHaeC Slfiaq 
joMot Mini 9{fisir 
1.1 Michael Aflaq : 
Virtually no independent school of Arab political 
thouQht existed until nationalism emercied as an ideolociical 
force towards the end of the nineteenth century. Muslim 
liberal thinkers who advocated the idea of nationalism did 
neither demand that Arab lands be detached from the Ottoman 
Empire nor indeed that relioion be separated from the state. 
"Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) , the most radical 
thinker who attacked Ottoman rule, called for the 
restoration of the Caliphate from Turkish to Arab hands, but 
not for a break in Ottoman unity. He failed, however, to 
define his frequent references to the Arab nation in clear 
nationalist terms, and his idea of nationalism represented 
but a transition from the ecumenical to the national stage. 
To the Arabs, Islam came into being in Arabia, the 
cradle of the Arab race, and Muhammad(PBUH) was an Arab 
Prophet and a national hero. The Qur'an was not only 
revealed in Arabic language but all believers, Arabs as well 
as non-Arabs, had it as their obligation to recite it in 
Arabic. The Arabs were the first believers of Islam and 
they st-^aqgled to spread it and establish tb« Islamic 
Empire. Perhaps the representative thinker whose primary 
loyalty was to Islam but who accepted nationalism as a basis 
for the Islamic state was the reformer Rashid Rida (1865-
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1935) . Infused with the Arab nationalism Rashid Rida often 
showed more concern about Arab problems than those of other 
Islamic countries. 
Arab Nationalism certainly meant somethmcj different to 
Christian than to Muslims. Some West Asian Christians see 
nationalism as a secular movement. Arab nationalism does 
not mean Arab Unity or Pan-Arabism to most Christians. They 
accept the Islamic backqround as part of a civilization in 
which they have participated since immemorial times, 
speaking the same language, living as separate millets in 
the same framework of laws. In fact Christians have played 
an enormous role in the initial stages of the birth of Arab 
nationalism and some Christians, like Michael Aflaq, are 
still recognized as the leader of nationalist movement." 
The idea of nationalism had begun among Christian 
intellectuals before it did among Muslims. The Christians 
had been more strongly exposed to Western cultural 
influence, and they had read Arab history through the lenses 
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of modern Western Scholarship . The impact of the Ba'th 
ideology in the political thought of the Arab world is 
enormous and Michael Aflaq deserves much credit for the 
compelling way in which he placed his beliefs before the 
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citizenry and attracted many to his cause . Michael 
Aflaq was a co-founder (with Salah al-din Beytar) of the 
Ba'th movement. As both a theory and a political 
organization, the Ba'th has played a crucial part in the 
contemporary politics of the Arab world, particularly in 
Syria, and Iraq. 
Aflaq was born in Damuscus in 1910 or 1912 and died in 
1989, to a Greek Orthodox Arab family that dealt in cjrain. 
He studied in paris, and got inspired by the idBoloqy of 
communism. After his return he began his carrier as 
Secondary School teacher in Syria. Unlike most other Arab 
politicians, Aflaq was an ineffective public speaker, vet he 
early achieved great popularity among Arab intellectuals. 
Aflaq's early success, and that of the Ba'th generally 
stemmed chiefly from the timing of the movement and its 
ability to place within an ideological framework the major 
problems facing Syria and the Arab World. 
In 1939, Aflaq founded with Beytar a group i.e. Arab 
renaissance whose political and theoretical debates on Arab 
Nationalism provided a forum for Aflaq's revolutionary 
ideas. He denounced both the anti-national character of 
communism and the softs stand taken by the national 
government against French domination . 
The Ba'th movement was launched in 1940. It emerged 
into the open in 1943, when Sysa gained formal 
independence, began publishing the journal al-Ba'th in 1946, 
and held its first congress in 1947. Those years 
corresponded to Syrias gaining of independence and attempts 
to devise for itself a new role and a new identity within 
the Arab World. The nationalist currents that had developed 
in Syria since the turn of the century made it clear that 
Syria would become a fountainhead of the Arab renaissance 
and a natural leader in future developments . 
The Ba'th, therefore, provided the Arab national 
movement with a dynamic, full grown ideology and with 
specific moral and political aspirations at a time when it 
was beguiled by other creeds. In Syria the Ba'th faced a 
touqh competition with two other ideological parties, the 
communists and the Peoples party of Syria (PPS). The first 
was thinly disguised agents of a foreign power, the second 
dictated a mystical Syrian Nationalism, fiercely opposed to 
the claims and assumptions of Arab Nationalism. The Ba'th 
had also declared war on the national and people's parties, 
which it considered the entrenched forces of conservatism 
and stagnation. Its achievement was to join radical ideas 
of social justice and democratic political procedures only 
through which dream of Arab Unity could be realized. Aflaq 
declared in noble and eloquent terms that this was the main 
stream of Arab Nationalism a claim which, whatever the 
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party's setbacks, is probably still true today . 
Later the Ba'th administration launched a series of 
development measures and worked closely for a time with 
Akram Howrani and his Socialist Party, which was founded in 
1950. Private enterprise was still, recognised as the chief 
element of the economy. The Ba'th's ideology closely 
followed these developments. The Nationalism dictated by 
Aflaq adopted social goals which were generally defined as 
social ism. 
In fact, Aflaq in early fifties, went so far at one 
point as to equate it with Nationalism. "The Arab 
nationalists are the socialists, 'hence there is neither in 
compatibility nor contradiction nor war between Nationalists 
and socialists. Further Aflaq wrote in 1950, Socialism in 
the Arab Ba'th is limited to economic organization that aims 
to reconsider the distribution of wealth in the Arab father 
land and to layout economic bases which would guarantee 
equality and economic justice amonq the citizens. Again in 
1955 after explaining that socialism could be defined as a 
doctrine or a system with specific origins, he wrote that 
all of these were reducable to the simple statement that 
socialism is the sharing of the resources of the country by 
its citirens . 
In his writings Aflaq defined Arab Socialism as a 
indigenous movement based on an Arab heritage which rejected 
both the commu'-ist ano western philosophies. The communist 
ideology was found unacceptable because, among other things, 
it negated Arab Nationalism, dictated an economic theory and 
presented a threat to individual. Western socialism, 
according to Aflaq, not only turns against capitalism, but 
aqainst its allies Arab Nationalism and religion 
Meanwhile, "Aflaq had overcome the most difficult 
ideological hurdle of the place and role of Islam in his 
Nationalist theory. As early as 1943 Aflaq had described 
Islam as part of the foundation of Arab nationalism and a 
response to the Arab soul's permanent search for noble and 
higher spiritual pursuits. Consequently, the relation of 
Arab Nationalism to Islam was unique and Islam could be 
considered, even by Christian Arabs, a National culture. 
This interesting view was in part a preparation for further 
identifying Islam with Arab Nationalism and thus removing 
the popular distrust shown by the masses, towards secular 
nationalism and Secular Socialism. The distrust-naturally 
was toward socialist theory itself and not towards it's 
fruit. In expressing his views on social ism,however, "Aflaq 
seemed to be far more secularist than he might have 
intended 
Aflaq adopted the moto, 'one Arab Nation with an eternal 
mission' as the central slogan of his ideology. A strong 
dose of metaphysics was injected into his three objectives 
C-* 'Jrzty, Freedo* and Socialism. The struggle for unity is 
not conceived simply in straight forward Pan-Arab terms as 
the elimination of divisive political boundaries, it is seen 
as a regenerative process leading to the reform of Arab 
character and society. This can only come about when Arabs 
free themselves from all regional, religious and communal 
loyalties, liberate themselves from all "ambivalence", and 
submit to the eternal values of mankind. Unity therefore, 
IS not merely a clear cut political objective, it is a 
search for the treasure of hidden vitality the moral and 
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spiritual founts of Nationalism "^ . 
The Arab Nationalist doctrine dictated by Aflaq had at 
its hearts a call for revitalization of Arab Society. This 
was the essence of the sacred mission of the ideology and is 
what Aflaq intended to convey when he used the word INQILAB. 
Thus m a talk given to a party branch in February i*=?50 he 
said : 
Revolution (INQILAB), then, before being a 
political and social programme is that Prime 
propelling power, that powerful psychic current, 
that mandatory struggle, without which the re-
awakening of the nation is not to be under stood. 
This IS what we understand by revolution ". 
Thus, to Michael Aflaq INQILAB means orientation of the 
masses rather than of the system. Since the change m the 
system would allow automatically with the change in the 
interior transformation of the masses. This interpretation 
of INQILAB as transformation brought a considerable 
influence on the Ba'th party in the forties. The draft 
constitution of Ba'th party in its article 6 states : "The 
Arab Ba'th party is a revolutionary party; it believes that 
its chief aims of resurrecting Arab Nationalism and building 
socialism can only be achieved by transformation and 
struggle Hence the party decides in favour of 
the transformation of the present rotten situation, a 
transformation which is to include all sections of life, 
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intellectual, economic, social and political 
Aflaq's ideal of Arab unity made the Ba'th appear as 
its natural instrument and Syria as its centre. The Union 
with Egypt in 1958 collapsed in 1^61, and the second union 
undertaken with Iraq and Egypt in 1963 remains so far on 
paper. The chief cause for the failure of the Union was 
Ba'th's insistence on preserving its organization and 
freedom of activity and its implicit refusal to surrender 
completely to Egypt, Syria's potential leadership of the 
Arab world, even though Egypt seemeo to be politically more 
capable of achieving unity "". 
Aflaq's popularity came in 1°63, when the Ba'thist wing 
of the military in Iraq acquired power. But the Ba'thist 
National command, established ove"- pe^-ties in bcth Syria and 
Iraq, was torn apart by successive zoups led by officers in 
each country. The records of Union taU with Egypt in 1963 
reflect a rather dismal picture of Aflaq and of the Ba'ths 
intellectual theories. Soon after the popularity of both 
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Aflaq and the Ba'th seemed to be declining rapidly. Their 
ideas failed to meet the test of time and of practicality-
In the later years as an old Quard Michael Aflaq was no 
lonqer insisted to consult on important matters although the 
group in power in Syria was Ba'thist but in reality it had 
come to be confined by the domination of the military. It 
might be turned that the Ba'th era was over. 
Thus, Aflaq and his party have helped speed up the 
social and political synthesis in the Fertile Crescent. 
They have mobilized the masses for Nationalism, Socialism 
and Unity. 
According to Aflaq Society is a living organic being 
and not a dead mechanical he wrote, thus it defies abstract 
analysis. Aflaq attaci'ed abstract thmi'ing and theoretical 
definition as stripping reality of its essence. The true 
"idealist IS not the opposite of the realist. For the 
realist is not the one who surrenders to the present but who 
understands it". The true idealist then, in Aflaq's 
thinking, is the one who understands his surroundings and 
attempts to change them. Aflaq asserts that Arab 
nationalism is not the ::r-odact of thought but gives rise to 
thought. "It IS not the slave of art, but its mainspring 
and spirit. There is no contradiction between it and 
liberty,, for it is liberty if it pursues its natural course 
and fulfills U s capabilities."^*^ 
1.2 Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz : 
Perhaps the most forceful expression of this blend of 
Islam and nationalism by Muslim th^n^'ers is to be found in 
the writings of Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz. In his 
distinguished career first as a teacher and scholar and 
later as a diplomat and statesman, al-Bazzaz remained 
faithful to his fundamental conception of Arab nationalism 
in terms of a humanistic perspective of individual 
emancipation within the framewor^ of revolutionary social 
progress 
Abdul-Rahman al-Bazzaz was born m 1913 in sl-Karkh, a 
Sunni section of Baghdad, of a family well known for its 
attachment to religion and Islamic learning. Like other 
young Iraqi leaders, he studied in Government school and 
graduated from the Baghadad Law college in 1934. While 
still a student, he became an advocate of Arab Nationalist, 
but did not abandon the religion and ethical values of his 
early upbringing. He grew up to be a young man imbued with 
lofty ideas combining religious and nationalism although 
most of his classmates adopted nationalism and '"ejected 
religious .slues. He spent the ne>;t four years ir England 
where he received a sound education in law at King's 
College, University of London. Moderate in life and 
temperament, education in England added depth to his views 
on public affairs and prompted him to combine what he 
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conBidBred the best in Islamic and European traditions. 
Upon his return to Baghdad in 1939 he immediately became 
active with other younci men in nationalist circles 
Bazzaz received the first-check from his participation 
in nationalist activities when Pan-Arabs supported the 
Rashid Ali uprising in 1941. After the war, he worked in 
the Department of justice for a shortwhiie before becoming 
Dean of the law college, which enhanced his stature in 
nationalist circles. For almost a decade he wrote and 
lectured on Arab Nationalism. The main purpose of his 
writings was to interpret Arab Nationalism on an Islamic 
basis. Islam, as a cultural heritage, he asserted, was not 
opposed to Arab Nationalism, but on the contrary, it was a 
component of nationalism 
According to him, the apparent contradiction between 
Islam and Arab Nationalism which is still present in the 
minds of many people, is in the first place, due to 
misunderstanding, misrepresentation and misinterpretation, 
involving both Islam and Arab Nationalism. 
This mis-understanding of Islam is due to the wrong 
significance attributed to the word "religion". We are 
influenced here - as a result of the intellectual 
imperialism under which a group of Us still labour - by the 
Western concepts which restrict religion within narrow 
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limits not extendinQ beyond worship, ritual, and the 
spiritual beliefs which govern a man in his behaviour, in 
relation to his God and to his brother man, in his capacity 
of an individual independent of society. Islam does not 
admit this narrow view of religion, but opposes it and the 
1^ purpose it serves to the utmost 
Thus one may arque, that there is absolutely no 
contradiction between Arabism and Islam. The two converge 
on many points, yet Islam can not be included as a 
'necessary' element in the formation of Arab Nationalism. 
What IS interestinC) in Bazzaz's view that : 
"If we equate religion and nationalism we would 
exclude one tenth of the Egyptian population, and 
one fifths of Syria, and about one half of the 
population of Lebanon from Arab nationalism we 
would also exclude a sizable proportion of the 
Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Sudanese, as 
well as a great number of Arabs who have immigrated 
to America, Africa and other continents " 
He further argues, when we lose there millions <of 
Arabs), the theory (that Islam is an essential 
element) would have in consideration every Muslims 
in Asia, Africa !< Europe as brother to the Arab 
Muslims brothers in the national sense, 
which means that the sons of the same nationality 
will have the same political destiny and one 
ultimate national interest, and requires the 
establishment of a social and political solidarity 
and association amonq them the consequences of 
this type of thinkinci and .... the responsibilities 
and obligations, which are beyond our power and 
resources. 
To illustrate why nationalism should not be founded on 
one particular reliQion, al-Barrar expands al-Huzri's 
theory, givincj as e/iamples the casses of Israel and 
Pakistan. 
The principal aim of his thought was not to arouse 
traditional religious ::eal, as some have suspected but to 
temper the spirit of young men who advocated secular 
nationalism by the re-introduction of religious and ethical 
values into Arab nationalism. 
After the July revolution, Ba::2ar resumed the duty to 
the Deanship of the law college, very soon, however, he fell 
into disfavour with president Qasim, because he supported 
the Pan-Arab group of which Arif had become the Spokesman, 
calling for union with Egypt. Under communist pressure, he 
was first transferred to the Department of Justice, as a 
judge in the court of Cassation, but after the Shawwaf 
uprising in February 1<?5<=?, he was arrested with other Pan-
Arabs and sent to an internment camps in Abu Ghurayb. For 
over si>; months he was subjected with other Pan-Arabs to 
various kinds of indignities unparalalled under the old 
regime before he and others were released. By that terms he 
lost faith in the Qasim regime and resigned from his post as 
judge. After that short vocation in Lebanon later on he 
shifted to Cairo and served as a Director of the Institute 
of Arabic Studies - an institute for training young men in 
Arab affairs under the auspices of the Arab League - and 
remained their until the overthrow of the Qasim regime 
The Ramadan Revolution of February 1<?63 mari'ed a turning 
point m Bazsaz's life. No sooner Arif become President 
Bazzaz was appointed as Iraq's Ambassador to the (JAR. It is 
held that what prompted the newly formed Ba'th government to 
appoint him as Ambassador in Cairo was the need for his 
services in the forthcoming Arab unity talks with Nasir, 
since he was known to have supported Arab Union on a federal 
b _- -*-1 asis 
Some of Barzzaz's friends in Cairo wanted him to remain 
as Director of the Institute of Arabic Studies. Since the 
Institute, falling in lesser hands after Husris resignation, 
needed an able administration, but Bazzaz, anxious to return 
he resigned to resume his personal contacts with Arif, which 
led to his swift elevation as premier two years later. 
Before he was ready to serve in that capacity, he had yet to 
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spend the next two years in London and Geneva as Ambassador 
at the Court of St. James in 1963-64 and as Secretary 
General of the organization of petroleum exportincj companies 
on 1964-65, in each post he gained practical experience 
invaluable for the head of the Government. No one doubted 
that once Arif decided to invite a civilian to form a 
Government, he could think of no more suitable candidates 
than Barza::. From the moment Arif became President in 1963. 
Bazzar's star began to rise.'^ "^  
Much of al-Bazzar's early writings are concerned with 
defining the relation between islam and Arab Nationalism. 
In 'Min Rohal Islam (From the spirit of Islam) published in 
Baghdad in 1959, he advanced the thesis that 'there is no 
real opposition between Islam and Arab nationalism : the 
Arab nation is the core of the Islamic community, most of 
Muslims are also Arabs; the Quran is in Arabic and embodies 
the traditional morality of the prophet was an Arab; Islam 
15 the medium through which the Arabs made their 
contribution to history"^ "'. 
This conception of the essential unity of Arab 
Nationalism and Islam runs through his early formulation of 
the *3»_' basis r-' Arab nationalism; language, history, 
literature and customs and character. 
Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz thus revived the old arguments 
when he asserted that nationalism and Islam went hand in 
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hand in many respects. In the course of so doinci he was to 
expose the nature of Arab Nationalism as a divisive and 
elitist movement and so to provide on affirmation of the 
nationalist belief in the necessity for the prominent 
position of the sunni community in Islam. To him 
nationalism had to taJ'e on the activist nature of Islam 
since nationalism was an assertion by the Arabs of the 
resumption of the mission of Mohammad <PBUH). Thus the 
Prophet becomes the founder of the Arab nation, and Islam is 
the product of the Arab national cjeneous. This kind of 
analysis leaves out the non-Muslims Arab, the christian and 
the Jew, the non-Arab Muslim, the Kurds and Berber, and the 
heterodox Muslims, Shi'ite Druze Alavi and Ismaeli. But 
Bazzaz claims to provide a solution for this dilemma too. 
These groups become true Arabs when they recognize Mohammed 
as the hero of Arab nationalism and venerate Islam as the 
religion that entitled the Arab nation to assert its place 
in the world. This seems to be an open invitation not only 
to the non-sunni Muslim but to the christian, and jews to 
acknowledge that the Muslim Sunni Arab had the right 
ordained in orthodoxy to enjoy a position of primacy and 
presuBiably rule over all non-sunni communities" . 
Strangely as it may seem to a number of christian 
ideologues of Arab nationalism have accepted Bazzar's thesis 
and condoned his pretensions. Indeed Zuraiq - whom Bazzaz 
cites as a model christian nationalist thinker, in contrast 
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to the early christian advocates of nationalism <Who 
advocated the separation of religion and State), has also 
emphasised the compatibility between Islam and Nationalism 
and called on his fellow christians to accord Islam a 
special veneration'^'". 
1.3 Jamal Abdul Nasir : 
The personality of Jamal Abdul Nasir becomes a point of 
departure in Arab history when he successfully led the 
Egyptian Arab revolution of July 23, 1952. He announced the 
radical and forward loo^ 'lnc| movement all over the Arab 
world. His revolution was not merely a routine change of 
government but a basic and historical change which inspired 
the Arab masses both in traditionalist, conventionalist Arab 
countries as well as in republican and left-oriented 
countries. 'Nasirits' as a party continue until this day in 
almost all Arab countries and they are likely to continue 
for as long as one can see. The principles for which Nasir 
stood did not concern Egypt arlone but the Arab world at 
1 24 large 
Nasir was born in Alexandre on January 15, 1918 and 
obtained his primary education in Cairo 8< subsequently his 
secondary education in Alexandra Saad Zaghlul the leader of 
the Wafad party and the hero of the 1919 revolution died on 
23rd August 1927, Nasir was 9 years old and observed much of 
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heated Dolitical discussions which raoed all round. rtt this 
time EclVDt was undercioinci a oeriod of crisis and confusion 
because of the tussle between its ancient reiioious 
traditions and the modern European trends of thouahr and 
life under the British Suzerainty-. Nasir took oart in 
Dolitical demonstrations while a school bov and was the 
victim of a baton attach ieavino a scar on his forehead. In 
1939 Nasir moved to Cairo from Ale-jandria where he ^eenlv 
followed the leaders of Eovotian Nationalism and r^elioious 
reform such as Jamaluddin al Afohani. Shaikh Mohd. Abduh. Bv 
now Nasir s nationalist ideas had ta^  en a concrete shaoe.'^ 
President Nasir was not a relioious bioot. He had a broad 
mental horizon and was able to lool- at the world staae in 
the laroer settino of oeo-Strateov. Nasir s effort was to 
create Arab strateaic unitv and not unitv on the basis oT 
reliDion. Nasir felt that reiioion could not be a buinDino 
force between countries of different cultural identities 
with differono oeo-Dolitical interest. In his view Arab 
unitv had certain uniaue feature in that relioion, lanouaoe 
as well as cieo-Dol itics all combined together ma^ e it a 
viable and workable concent."^ 
The political a^-'C sor-si ideas of Jamal Abdul Nasir 
derived basicallv from the practical needs of a chanciino 
societv. Nasir s social oriQins and bacJaround helped in 
e-;plaininQ his abilitv to understand the soirit of the Arab 
masses. to identifv himself with them, and to manipulate 
itj 
them for his political purposes. 
After completinc) his law education, he joined the 
lieutenant commission from in Military Academy of Cairo in 
1937. He later became an instructor in the Military Academy 
and participated in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The 
defeat of the Arabs, Crystalized his thoughts about the need 
of the time and to restore self confidence. His 
revolutionary activity, which began after 1948, brought him 
into contact with the Muslim brotherhood and he oroanised a 
free officer committee, out of which grew the Council of 
Revolutionary Command, which later on over threw the regime 
of i'lng Faruq in July 1*^ 52. In 1<?54, Nasir emerged as the 
leader of the revolution after General Mohd Naguib, its 
nominal leader, was ousted. He was elected president of 
Egypt in 1956 and subsequently he was re-elected within 
uncontested elections. After the Israeli forces de-^eated 
those of the UAR m June, 1967, Nasir resigned the 
presidency out on popular demand, reassumed office the 
29 foi lowing, day •^  . 
To him that ideology of Pan-Arab movement was a protest 
against three t^ elated political situation. The most ofc.ious 
target of Pan-Arab protest was the division of Arabic -
speaking peoples into a number of independent states. 
Second, it was a protest against the existing economic and 
social systems of ail the Arab countries and against the 
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political power structure of some. The third protest 
against the bipolarization of international power. 
The basis of Arab nationalism as was characterized by 
these three protests were sometimes referred to as 
'Nasirism with the implications that the policies of the 
United Arab Republic had substantial support beyond the 
boarders of that country and that they were an accurate 
reflection of Pan-Arab ideoloQy. 
Thus Nasirism does not refer to a single individual, and 
does not refer to a specific qovernment such as that of the 
UAR. It refers clearly and precisely to the national 
revolutionary force - in its ideoloQical position, its 
principles, its goals of nationalism liberation, unity and 
in the economic and social spheres of life." 
The policy of Nasirism was opposed by the Ba trust 
because they attempted to isolate President Nasir and his 
government of the UAR from the Arab people, while what they 
really oppose were the aspirations and the interest^ of the 
-eople. 
He'^ ce trhe situation was such that those opposing Nssir 
did not o;;z»ose the legitimacy of his leadership, they 
opposed the Arab Nationalist Movement. These opponents 
number more than a few, they included the Syrian 
Nationalists, the Lebanese Confessionalists, the Hashemites, 
the communist infiltrated government of Iraq and the 
traditional Arab rulers. With so many opponents, claiming 
to speak for the interests of the Arab people, or for parts 
of them, it was probably not correct to assume that there 
was a Cfood deal of interaction between policy formation in 
the UAR and expectations about popular reaction throughout 
the Arab world. The policy of the UAR, therefore, miqht be 
seen as an adaptation of the practical choices of the 
Egyptian political military elite to the exigencies of the 
opinion of the (politically) participant Arab classes. •" . 
The views of President Nasir were borne out in most 
conversations with informed Egyptians. In answer to 
inquiries about the ideology of UAR government, an 
admittedly unfair question, two sorts of answers were 
forthcoming. Either people say that there was none, or they 
referred the inquirer to president Nasir's published 
speeches. If one inquired more specifically about certain 
policies of the UAR, then the answer was almost invariably 
that the policy was not regid it did not stern from any 
fixed idea, it would be tested pragmatically and discarded 
if found wanting. Of course, opposition nationalist groups 
• .5^-it have their favourite ideologues. IT you as^ 'ed 
Ba'thists about the ideology of the Arab Nationalist 
Movement, they would no doubt refer to Michael Aflaq and 
several others. 
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The primary promise had become the identity of the 
policy of the UAR°and the interest of the Arab nation. Once 
this had been established building the theory of Arab 
Nationalism become a process combining exegesis, 
justification, and generalination. 
Despite the lack of ideological limitation the policy of 
the UAR can be shown to be more or less fixed at the present 
time and to had gone through a sort of rational growth. 
This growth, no doubt was due to a gradually increasing 
awareness of the attitudes of the broader Arab public, as 
well as to the effect of international pressures and the 
blind logic of history, which never permits an act to be 
completely erased from the consciousness of man. 
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Chapter 2 
Development of Arab Nationalism 
in Syria and Iraq 
Creation of Israel 
fBa'tH and the TalesHnian Qj^tion 
The Impact of iS(sLsinsm in Syria & Iraq 
2.1 Creation of Israel : 
The early part of the twentieth century witnessed a 
dramatic qrowth in both Jewish and Arab Nationalism. Arab 
nationalism sought independence from Ottoman rule and latter 
from British and French rule. Jewish nationalism sought a 
homeland for the Jewish people. Both peoples were to 
quarrel over the territory of Palestine. 
During World War I the British made a series of 
ambiguous and contradictory promises to both Arabs and Jews 
in support of their national aspirations. Thus the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 promised a national home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine, which the Arab maintained was 
inconsistent with the McMahon-Hussain pledge of 1915 whereby 
the Arabs would be given independence in Palestine subject 
to certain conditions. 
The British military forces occupied Palestine during 
1917-18, by an agreement between the victorious allied 
powers, Palestine was placed under British Mandate. The 
terms of the Balfour Declaration were incorporated in the 
British Mandate for Palestine, which was ratified by the 
council the League of ^iations on 24 July 1922. 
The ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate 
for Palestine caused increasing strife between the Arab and 
Jewish communities in Palestine, each of which interpreted 
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the ambiguities to support its vision of the future of 
Palestine. The Jewish people interpreted the mandatory 
obliQation as leading towards a Jewish state. The Arabs on 
the other hand, interpreted the obligation as creating only 
a Jewish national home within Palestine. Further Arabs were 
profoundly convinced that the Mandate was an injustice to 
the Arab people of palestine, and a violation of the league 
promise. These differences, and resentment of continued 
Jewish immigration into Palestine provoked Arab riots in 
Palestine in the twenties and thirties. A royal commission 
chaired by Lord Peel was appointed in 1936 in response to 
the Arab revolt earlier that year. Its report in 1937 
contended that the Arab desire for national independence and 
their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine were the principal causes of the noting. 
Finding the Arab and Jewish positions irreconcilable under 
the terms of the Mandate, it recommended the partition of 
Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish States. The Peel 
commission plan was opposed by the Arabs, and although the 
Jewish Agency approved the idea of partition, it opposed the 
details of the plan. With the opposition of both Jews and 
Arabs, the plan was not innslemented. 
With the failure of the Peel proposals the London 
Conference of 1939 was convened to work out an agreement 
between the two sides. During the conference the British 
Government adopted a more restrictive policy towards Jewish 
immiQration and announced that an independent Palestine 
state would be created withm ten years. The Jewish 
community opposed this shift in British policy, which had 
been announced in a white paper of 17 May 193'?, particularly 
in view of the events taking place in Nazi Germany, which 
made it urgent for special efforts to be made for the 
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establishment of a Jewish national home. 
The Nazi persecution of European Jews both before and 
during World War II forced Jews to emmigrate to Palestine in 
greater number than ever before, especially after 1^45. As 
Jewish emmigration into Palestine accelerated after 1945, 
conflicts between the Arab and Jewish communities, together 
with restrictive British immigration policy grave rise to 
increase terrorism and civil strife. During this post-war 
period, several additional British proposals for a 
compromise plan were rejected by both sides. Thus in 1947 
the British Government had had enough of the situation and 
handed ov€?r the problem of Palestine to the United Nations.^ 
One of Arab group viewed Zionism as an extension of 
European crusades, whose object had been to humiliate the 
Arabs and Islam. Exponents of Secular Arab national;**. or. 
the other hand, considered sectarian politics a threat to 
the Lnity of the Arab nation, and a divisive factor which 
tended to 'weaken the position of the Arabs internationally, 
and paralyze their civil and social activities'. The 
views of the latter groMp gained momentum among the rising 
middle classes, including the army and increasincj "fol lowing 
among the University students and intellectuals of Beirut, 
Damascus and Baghdad. In later years, this tendency was 
reinforced by the rise to power of the Ba'th party in Syria 
and the pragmatic conversion of the Egyptian military regime 
5 
to the ideas of Arab nationalism . 
The Zionist question, at the same time, aroused their 
serious concern and determined their attitude toward the 
west and their own governments. Almost without exception, 
the new generation of Arab nationalist, better known as the 
"generation of the disaster", viewed the establishment of 
the State of Israel as a major threat to the existence of 
the Arab nation. The events of 1948 seemed to confirm the 
worst fears entertained by the Arabs (since the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917) that the newly founded Jewish state was 
bent upon annihilation of its neighbors. The Zionists had 
not satisfied themselves with the realization of Jewish 
sovereignty in Palestine, but had sought successfully to 
displace the indigenous Arab population. Thus the 
development of the political situation which emerged after 
1948 was the manner in which the new exponenrs of Arab 
nationalism interpreted the causes of imp! icc\"cion5 of the 
de"feat . 
R^ 
The establishment of Israel was seen by the Arabs as a 
phase, an initial step, in the advance of Zionism to is 
ultimate objective — the subjection of the whole Arab 
nation to the worst '^lnd of imperialism. Arabs further 
realized that the success of Zionism in Palestine was 
closely related to the interests of the West in the West 
Asia. The dominant view among the radical Arab nationalists 
was that Israel formed the spearhead of Western imperialism 
in the area on the other hand, a moderate oroup who in most 
cases had spent some years in institutions of higher 
education in the United States and Europe, attempted to show 
that the West was as much the victim of Zionist schemes and 
conspiracies as was the Arab world. They claimed that 
international Zionism could not only muster the votes D1 a 
large section of the electorate in the United States, but 
also wielded an enormous influence over the economies of 
Western nations . 
The major change which occurred in the Arabs attitude 
towards the West in 1948 was that their antagonism to the 
traditional imperialists powers, France and Britain, was 
e^ ttended to include the United States. Active American 
suDOort for the Zionists m 1^47 and 1^48 appeared to have 
been instrumental in the process of the establishment and 
consolidation of the position of Israel. Arab moderates were 
thus left with no substantial grounds to defened the policy 
of the US in the region, and their efforts were limited to 
occasional pleas to American officials to adopt an even 
handed approach to the Palestine problem. They pointed out 
that it was in America's lonq term political and economic 
interest to reecn a friendly understandinp with the Arabs 
rathe<" than with Israel. By and large, though, the impact 
of 1^48, tended to intensify and perpetuate Arab feelings of 
hostility and suspicion toward the Western powers and 
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especially the US . 
Thus, a more practical form of Arab cooperation and a 
greater measure of political integration were adyocated. A 
number of proposals were made, ranging from a league of Arab 
peoples to a federation, and finally to an organic union of 
the Arab countries from the Gulf to the Atlantic. Since the 
beginning of the first world war such schemes had been the 
subject of controyersy througnout the Arab world. The 
events of 1948 gave more weight to a new political tendency 
which appeared in the early l<?40s. The new drive for 
unification was now based on the concept of the solidarity 
of the Arab peopleles rather than on the agreement of their 
governments or ruling dynasties. The political structure of 
the suggested unified A>-ab states was to be democratic, 
popular and progressive. Its aim was to mobilize Arab 
political economic and military capabilities to free 
Palestine from Zionism and liberate the rest of the Arab 
world from the Yo^e of Western imperialism. 
2.2 Ba'th and the Palestinian Question : 
For the Ba th, the issue of palestme has been viewed 
within the conte>;t of the advancement and consolidation oi 
the Arab revolution at the Pan-Arab level. After Arab 
Israel war in 1948, the Palestinian question was taken up as 
the main issue before the Arabs. The Ba'th constitution 
draft in 1^47 had no mention of the palestme question. 
However, the party orQanized volunteer units that 
participated in the Palestinian war of 1948 and opened a 
permanent Palestinian Bureau in the same year 
The struggle against Zionist colonialism in palestme 
was considered the inteoral movement by the Arab Ba'th 
socialist party (ABSP). The Ba'th however maintained that 
"the liberation of palestme could only been visualized in 
the integral •'•-amework of an overall struggle of the Arab 
masses" 
The Ba'thists were the first to point out clearly and 
cateQoricaii> that it would be futile to accept a piecemeal 
solution of the palestme problem. Zionism in palestme, as 
maintained, "-.as been a part of a longer plan of the 
imperialist powers to maintain a direct foot hold in the 
West Asia, so that they could only exercise a direct control 
over the oil rich Arab lands, but may also have a dominating 
position in such strategic regions as that of Suez canal, 
:i 
Golan heights, and Mediterranean sea. 
Maintenance of "Israel" thus became one o-f the most 
important parts of the imperialist strategy to maintain 
their hold for exploitation of the entire Arab World. The 
Zionists, for reasons of their own had an eye on he 
colonialist of Palestine, this might be considered only as a 
symptom and not a cause of the real problem. The Arab 
nationalists had maintained consistently that the liberation 
of Palestine could only be achieved by the struggle of the 
masses — not only for unification and independence of the 
Arab home land — but also for liberation of the Arab people 
12 from economic e;;p loi tation and social backwardness. 
According to Arab nationalists (Ba'thists) approach, 
Israel would amount to permanent acceptance of the fact of 
aggression on the Arab home land and open the way for 
further and massive penetration of the entire Arab world. 
Even if the Arabs were willing to forego their national 
right on a major part of Palestine currently under the 
Zionist occupation, it would be extremely naive to hope for 
a stable settlement with a political entity which aspires 
inccTorating areas which are more than a hundred times than 
what it occupies that too 11 legally-today. It may be 
pertinent to recall that while the United Nations resolution 
carried out through a slender majority in May 1947 had 
allocated less than 9000 square miles of territory to 
Israel, it is today occupying more than ten times that 
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area. 
The Ba'thists, analysts particularly vice Chairman 
Saddam Hussain, had repeatedly stressed the point "that it 
IS not the Zionist who have been e'.;plDiting the Americans, 
but rather American vested interests who have been using 
Zionist fanaticism as a tool bo penetrate into the Arab 
Homeland", 
Given these ideological parameters, the Ba'th party had 
been advocating a unified Arab struggle for the liberation 
of Palestine. It does not, however, mean that revolutionary 
Iraq stands for an internal overthrow of reactionary Arab 
regimes as a pre-condition to a United action on Palestine. 
On the contrary the Ba'th party, whenever the occasion has 
arisen, has been in the forefront of calling for a united 
action from all the Arab Governments against the Zionist 
enemy and their promoters and protectors. Even though it 
had differences with governments bordering the Zionist 
entity, the revolutionary government in Iraq believing 
firmly in the ideals of Arab unity had never hesitated to 
provide fullest support to these countries when ever they 
have been faced with the threat of aggressior from the 
14 Zionist enemies 
The Ba'thists rejected all the solution legitimisation 
of the so-called "Israel" as a state. According to Ba'thist 
if this state is accepted, it would open the way for further 
penetratiDn in the entire Arab Home land. It was foolish of 
the some Arab leaders to th^n^ that if properly persuaded, 
the leaders of the Western imperialism would opt for 
supporting the Arabs against Israel. Many Arabs were hoping 
that Qiven the tremendous Arab potential of oil wealth and 
their strategic position, it should not be difficult for the 
Arab lobbyists to divert the Zionists influence in 
. 15 America 
t eepincj these ideological facts, the Arab Ba' th 
Socialist Party (ABSP' had been advocating a unified Arab 
struggle for the liberation of Palestine. The ABSP, 
whenever the occasion had arisen, had been in the fore-front 
of calling for a united action from ail Arab Governments 
16 
against the Zionists enemy and their sup::orte''5 
The emphases on imperialism as the p'^incipal enemy was 
particularly strong in leftist literature and among the 
radical Ba'th. For them, the liquidation of imperialism in 
the Arab World — of Western influence — and of reaction 
took priority over the campaign against Israel, not only in 
theory, but also in the programme of a^ rtion in connection 
with the conflict 
The Arabs viewed Zionism as an extension of the European 
crusades, whose object had been to humiliate the Arab and 
7.4 
Islam. A return to the rules of Islam was thus envisaged as 
the only way for the Arabs to save itself from a total 
collapse. EKponents of Arab nationalism on the other hand, 
considered sectarian politics a threat to unity of the Arab 
Nation, and a divisive factor which tended to weaken the 
position of Arab internationally, hence paralyzed their 
1 R 
Civil and social activities 
The crusaders, either in older times or the British and 
the French in modern times - all held only superficial, and 
therefore temporary Sway. But Israel, however, is a more 
dangerous form of imperialism, since it marked the 
introduction of another nation which has been settled in 
place of the Arabs. This was frequently emphasized by 
Nasir. To him Zionism or World Zionism was a more dangerous 
enemy than Israel or imperialism for it was the source of 
19 Israel's strenqhth 
These views cjained qrowing circulation among the rising 
middle classes, including the military, and an increasing 
following among the university student and intellectual of 
Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. In latter years, this 
tendency was reinforced by t^,e rise to power of the Ba' th 
party in Syria and Baghdad, and the pragmatic conversion of 
the Egyptian military regime to the ideas of Arab 
nationalism. Equally relevant to the development of the 
political situation which emerged after 1948 and on wards. 
was the manner in which the new exponents of Arab 
Nationalism interpreted the causes and implications of the 
defeat. The intellectual activity of Arab Nationalists, at 
this stage, centered on a reconsideration of three inter-
related issue, the magnitude of the Zionist threat, the 
relationship of the Arabs with the West, and the nature of 
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the Arab regimes which evolved after the second world war 
The decisions of the Ba'th Party on the Palestinian 
issue was theoretical. The partie's involvement with this 
issue was marginal. Its attitudes towards it developed in 
two main stages. First which lasted till 1960, the party's 
stance was on the one hand to avoid any definite attitude 
relating to conflict and on the other hand to stress that a 
Palestinian entity must be based on the Pan-Arab level. 
Therefore, Ba'th party's announcement on 16 February 1960 
was a determined stand regarding the division of the Jordan 
river by Israel. The evasion of the issue of the 
Palestinian entity was interesting, since during this period 
the leaders of the Ba'th had been active participants in the 
discussion of the UAR government. Obviously at this time, 
they were all well acquainted with nasir's policies in the 
field. But tew of Ba tn leaders of Lebanon ?< Iraq made 
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criticism on the party's stand related to this issue 
The National Command's declaration of 15 May 1960 was a 
criticism of the plans for a Palestine entity by Egypt and 
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Iraq. It emphasized that any Ba'th Party position 
concerninc) these plans would have to accord with the Pan-
Arab level which saw the Palestinian issue as "Arab 
Nationalism' problems and not merely a regional one. The 
Ba'th Party held that "the problem of Palestine would not be 
solved in any way other than a revolutionary Pan-Arab 
struggle"^^. 
The second stage, began with a change in Ba'th position 
as the Palestinian entity that occurred at the 4th N.C. 
(August 1960). This was the first NC after the formation of 
U.A.R., and it was held whilst the issue of the Palestinian 
entity was assuring centrality in inter-Arab discussion. 
Two basic documents defined the party's stand on this issue, 
that the resolutions of 4th N.C, and the January 1*^ 61 
memorandum of the Ba'th National Command "Concerning the 
problems of Palestine and Algeria", which was dispatched to 
the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference. 
These two documents stated, first, "that the correct way 
to establish the entity of the Palestinian people is by the' 
establishment of a popular National Front for the liberation 
of Palestine the Algerian liberation front". Such a front 
must represent the Palestinian people in its entirely, and 
must also "Unite ail the revolutionary elements among the 
Palestinian including popular organization and rely on 
strong trade union of workers, Professionals and 
intellectuals". The Ba'th Party demanded that the Arab 
States permit the Palestinian to organize themselves freely 
in the framework of this front, and said that it should be 
regarded as "directly responsible for all matters concerned 
with the Palestinian problem". Second, this front must be 
"independent in its organization, its work and its struggle 
and must remain detached from struggles between the Arab 
States". And third, in the context of its struggle against 
the Egyptian, Iraqi and Jordanian regimes the Ba'th Party 
opposed" all initiatives from any Arab states to establish 
Palestinian organisms connected to them and constituting a 
tool for their propaganda and their Arab regional policy""^". 
After the August 1960 4th N.C., the Iraqi Ba'th opposed 
the Qasim plan for the establishment of a Palestinian 
republic. Therefore, the party stated in September, that 
"the establishment of the Palestinian republic is the 
aspiration of the Arabs everywhere". This would not be 
supported due to the enormous material means". Therefore, 
this plan would not be realized except through a .unified 
Arab plan. 
The contribution of the Ba'th Party during this period 
towards prcxnoting a Palestinian entity was insignificant. 
Its alternative plan of late 1960 did not create any 
reaction in the Arab world as did the plan of Nasir or 
Qasim. It does not even, seen to have to made an impression 
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on the Palestinians themselves. The plan was essentially 
attached to the Ba'th doctrine which itself did not stand 
the test of fulfillment. Still it was a necessary stage 
towards a more concrete stand when the issue of establishing 
the Palestinian entity's institutions became actual and 
24 practical during 1*^ 64. 
Thus, in the beginninc) of the second half of the 20th 
century, the Ba'th Party had a profound influence, direct 
and indirect, on the minds of Arab youth, and on the 
development of events in the region. However, although it 
eventually advanced a plan for a Palestinian entity, it 
failed to implement its political ideas in General or those 
concerning the Palestinian entity in particular because it 
concentrated, precisely at the height of its achievement on 
internal problems. 
The Ba'th party basically faced a dilemma on the 
Palestinian issue, which was in fact also Syria's dilemma, 
between the Pan-Arab aspiration (Qaummiyya) and the tendency 
or regionalism for its branches (Iraqi branches, other also 
even the Syria branch which controlled the National 
Coflimand). Ba'th Party leaders who were in the United Arab 
Repiiblic <UAR) government in 1958-61 took great pains in 
dealing with this dilemma, especially after they had 
realized the "Unity" as as the principle of their doctrine. 
This dilemma was the context of their resignation from UAR 
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government, and in the last analysis was also the main cause 
of the disintegration of the UAR in September 1<?61, hence, 
the solution of the dilemma by precisely strenqtheninq the 
Separatist regionalist tendency at the expense of the Pan-
0=; 
Arab principles'^". 
2.3 Impact of Nasirism in Syria and Iraq i 
The context in which West Asian politics was conducted 
was transformed once again by the consequences of second 
world war and its aftermath : notably the achievement of 
national independence in Syria and Lebanon and the Arab 
regimes; failure to prevent the establishment of Jewish 
state in Palestine. This immediately provided the setting 
for new forms of political activity including, in several 
states, the attempt by various parties and movements to 
mobilize an increasingly wide section of the population 
behind the potent slogan of anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism 
and Arab unity, as well as for and against the radical 
economic and social programme put forward by parties ll^ 'e 
26 the Syrian Ba'th or Nasir's Free officers 
After World War II, when direct control through mandate 
was replaced by indirect control through unequal treaties, 
Arab Nationalism found its major expression in Nasinsm. It 
was by degrees, and largely in response to external 
pressures, that Nasir moved into radical Pan-Arabism almost 
as thoughtlessly as the British had once acquired an empire. 
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Much has been made of the fact that neither the static 
o 
measures nor the populist rhetoric of Nasirism constituted 
real socialism which is true enoucih. But the Nasir era 
revealed most fruitfully the necessity and the limitation of 
radical Pan-Arabism as a stage in the strugqle aoainst 
27 
western imperialism in the West Asia 
It was only in the 1950s that one could begin to spea^' 
of the seizure of power by anti bouroeoise elements who were 
in theory more committed to the concept of an Arab political 
community, independent, formally and in reality, from 
external constraints. Proponents of Nasirism and members of 
the Ba'th Parties of Iraq and Syria were perhaps the best 
representatives of this anti-Bourqeoise class of 
nationalists which was more willinq to intervene in the 
affairs of other Arab states in order to achieve the Cjoal of 
Arab unity. And it was in the context of the struggle 
between the bourgeoise and their opponents that other 
formulas for unity emerged. For while the anti-bourgeoise 
nationalists activity campaigned for unity, the others spoke 
of confederations or greater regional cooperation. More 
frequent talks concerning the Nile Valley and the Greater 
Syria as natural regions within Arab World, indicated the 
presence of competing theories based on the reality of class 
control of the Arab World . 
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The military revolutionaries of 1952 were the direct 
heirs D-f the Egyptian nationalism fashioned by Mustafa 
Kamil, Saad Zaqhlul and Mustafa al Nahas. However, this 
nationalist ideology which had been the motive force behind 
the Egyptian nation-buiIding process, was becoming outmoded 
interms of the political and social conditions of mid 
twentieth century Egypt. These were traditional elites, 
operating within the confines of a traditional nationalism, 
and the absence of new ideology, hindered the socialization 
process and therefore nation-buiIding. Their conception of 
nationalism not only lacked specific context beyond the 
achievement of complete independence from imperialist power, 
but also a concrete programme to achieve this aim. Due to 
unsatisfactory achievement, one could infer that the 
attitude at lower levels was more ambivalent. Alienated 
from the West they admired, these professionals manifested 
deep feelings of self doubt and social inferiority — these 
all indicative of a serious crises in identity."^ . 
The military organizers of the July 1952 coup were fired 
essentially by the same ambiguous nationalism that had 
motivated the traditional elite group they had over thrown. 
Without any doubt their primary purpose in taJ-ing power had 
been to realize the main ideals of Egyptian nationalism — 
the building of a strong , independent nation state. The 
military incorporated its inherited Egyptian nationalism 
into the Six, principles of the revolution published in 
January 1953 by Jamal Abdul Nasir. Two of these principles 
the liquidation of imperialism and the building of a 
strong army were pursued almost immediately as a post of the 
officers nationalist creed"" . 
The subsequent shift in revolutionary action from the 
domestic to the international stage was accompanied by a 
parallel redirection of ideological development where 
Egyptian nationalism evolved into Pan-Arabism. While the 
pre requisite conditions to effect this evolution already 
e^ iisted in the Egypt in late 1954, the final and official 
adoption of Pan-Arabism was due to Abdul Nasir's subsequent 
diplomatic success. 
As Nasir's victories evoked overwhelming Arab approval, 
his policies were propagated in the name of Pan-Arabian. 
This initiated a change of beliefs and identity among 
Egyptian who started adopting their popular leaders' new 
ideology and regarded themselves as Arabs living in Egypt, 
To the extent that this transformation occurred among the 
populace, Abdul Nasir had became Charismatic"^ . 
Unlike his predecessors Nasir structured Egypts external 
pciicy around a few principles that remained constant" : 
- termination of British military presence, 
- leadership both in the Arab Unity Movement, 
- and in the Arab hostility to Israel, 
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- neutrality in the East-West Cold War 
- rapid military moderniration 
Howeyer the fact remains that eyen after the formation 
of the Arab league in 1*^ 45, Egypt was not committed to a 
yigorous Arab Policy until 1954. The neutralist tendency 
was continued during 1954 reflecting the preoccupation with 
the Nasii—Naguib power struggle. Also Egyptians had 
expectations of economic and military aid from the West. The 
Baghdad pact in February 1955 between Iraq and Turkey, 
further accerlated Egyptians toward neutralism. Viewing the 
Baghdad pact as a Western attempt to destroy the Egyptian 
led security system of the Arab League, Nasir was proyo^'ed 
into a more aggressiye policy than he had chosen to follow 
preyiously. After mid 1955, Nasir's neutralist policy 
acquired a more pro-soyiet (anti-western) orientation as the 
USSR began to eittend generous amounts of military aid 
(September 1955), diplomatic support (1956 Suez War), and 
economic assistance for Aswan dam"'"'. 
The first major address in wnicn president Nasir 
appeared to had led special emphasis upon Arab nationalism 
as opposed to Egyptian national isa took pis-ce on August 12, 
1956. According to Nasir ........ 
" Then the Voice m the Arab World began to 
say that it is not Suer Canal, but the Arab Canal. 
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Arabo Nationalism beqan to appear in its best form 
and clearest meaninq. Various <^ 'lnd5 of Support 
began to come from Arab Kings and presidents and 
Arab peoples. Arab Nationalism began to show its 
e;!i5tence and its truth. I read an article on Arab 
Nationalism in a foreign newspaper and at said 
"Arab nationalism became a danger after 1952 and 
after the writing of the philosophy of the 
revolution". Then I thought we as Arabs must be a 
single nation we must fight as for a single 
cause . 
At the end of the Suez Crisis, Nasir was no longer under 
great personal pressure. The manner in which the 
nationalization of British and French firms provided the 
basis for a new economic effort from 1957. it had been seen 
that Nasir's need for Arab allies against the Baghdad pact 
and the Arab Nationalists need for leadership combined to 
present Egypt with a Pan-Arab policy. 
The early months of 1957, which saw the defeat of Eisen 
Hower Doctrine, can be singled out as the turning point for 
Egypt, both domestical 1/ and exter-«lly. The Ba'ths ideas 
of comprehensive Arab Unity suddenly became a realistic 
possibility as one watcheo the reaction to the Suez Crisis 
in Jordan Syria Lebanon and Iraq. The fact remains that 
both super powers had supported Egypt during the Crisis, in 
opposition to their support of the Palestinian resolution of 
1947. Hence, it was from this date that one could note a new 
purposefulness in the UAR's pursuit of positive 
neutrality 
The evacuation of the canal zone in June 1956 was 
another occasion on which the Arab nationalist Movement 
B5;pres5ed its full support for Egypt. The event was 
celebrated as a qreat victory for the Arabs, because it 
terminated Egypt's long isolation from the rest of the Arab 
countries, and paved the way for its increasing 
participation in the Arab struggle for "Unity, Liberation 
and Vegeanace". The nationalisation of the Canal and its 
consequence confirm the movements confidence in the positive 
role which Egypt appeared to play against Zionism and 
imperialism. And finally, the formation of the UAR in 195B 
under Nasir s leadership displelled any of the remaining 
doubts which the Movement had earlier entertained regarding 
the sincerity o'f Nasir's regime. The Arab Nationalist 
Movement viewed t^e newly formed state as "the formal 
leadership cf the struggle for Arab Unity and liberation". 
It claimed t^at the UAR qualified for such a role because it 
enjoyed an acsolure control over its own political ana 
economic resources, and was also endowed with an exceptional 
"'•6 leadership which was "sincere determined and courgsous'"" . 
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From 1958 onwards, the movement willingly associated 
itself with the policies of the UAR, and paid absolute 
allegiance to Nasir's leadership. Consequently its notion 
of Arab Unity gained a practical dimension. It implied that 
the credibility of any process of political unification in 
the Arab world depended on Nasir's approval and his 
participation in its realization. 
In Yemen a revolution led by anti royalist army officers 
broke out and eventually led to the establishment of the 
republic of North yemen in 1962. The deposed ruler, the 
Imam Badr, who had narrowly escaped death, rallied his 
tribesmen in a counter-revolution, aided by funds and 
weapons supplied by Saudi Arabia. On the other the 
revolutionary, led by Abdullah al-Sallal, turned to Egypt 
for assistance. Egypt, which had been preaching change to 
more progressive regimes, could not avoid lending supDO-^ t tc 
Sallal, who hoped to modernize his country. Nasir however 
made the mistake of under-estimating Yemeni royalist 
resistance and sent Egyptian forces to Yemen. Had Nasir 
ever read any history of the region he would have known what 
a mistake it was to send forces to that country, for no one 
but a native ^ad ever won a war there. The Egyptian •'orces 
became embroiled in a rugged, mountainous terrain that had 
no roads and which was ideal for guerrilla warfare and 
ambushing. The Imam and his tribesmen inflicted heavy 
causalities on the Egyptian army which at one time numbered 
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70,000 men. That adventure slapped Egyptian funds, slowed 
down the country's economic growth and waisted its scarce 
resources. It also brought Egypt and Saudi Arabia into open 
animosity and nearly to the brink of war" . 
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Chapter 3 
Nationalism in Post Independent Syria 
iPoCiticaC InstaHCity in Syria 
Syria uruUr Asad 
greater Syria 
3.1 Political instability in Syria 
The newly independendent Syrian state had acquired a 
certain vitality throucih the nationalist strugcile aciainst 
the vested interest created by the various political units. 
But in terms of the dominant ideolociv there was an aura of 
uncertainty about it . 
Independent Syria had yet to define the nature of its 
political community and to integrate within it a variety of 
minorities. These tasks were made all the more difficult by 
the ambitions of other Arab states and foreign powers in 
Syria. The doctrine of Pan-Arab nationalism, the frail 
structure of the new state, and the traditional orientation 
of certain regions and groups towards neighgbouring states 
faciliated outside interference in Syrian politics. These 
factors were long to remain below the surface of Syrian 
politics, though the actual political scene was often 
dominated or coloured by other, related issues'^. 
The important development in the first period of Syrian 
independence was the continuous gradual wea^'en^ng of the 
political and social power of the old ruling class 
challenged by younger, more radical groups representing, to 
some extent, social state that until then had little 
political power. The change was catalyzed by the three 
coups that took place in 1949. They brought the military to 
an active intervention and participation in politics, which 
• j ' l 
had since remained a major aspect of Syrian political 
history. Though not necessarily conscious o„f it the 
officers who initiated this process in 1949 served to break 
the political backbone of the traditional ruling class and 
to transfer a growing share of power to new groups and 
parties-
ThesB trends were more clearly evident in and 
accelerated by Adib Shishakli when he held power in 
December 1949 to February 1954. Among other things, 
Shishakli introduced a more direct military dictatorship, a 
policy of centralization and assimilation a state organised 
single party, and a parliament in which for the first time 
younger, urban, lower middle class elements were highly 
represented at the expense of the traditional landowning 
deputies. Shishakli was closely associated with Akram al-
Hawrani who had played a prominent role in all three 
subsequent coupe of 1949. However, the differences arose 
between the two on the ideological lines which compelled 
Hawrani to join hands with the radical ideological Ba'th 
Party to take part in toppling Shishakli in 1954. 
The Ba'th Party took a role in the heterogeneous 
coalition which lei the opposition to Shishakli's regime »rr 
then toppled it in a military coup in February 1954. Active 
in this coalition were also the Druse community and f-ome 
traditional political circles, most notably the Atari 
family, based in the central Syrian city of Horns and 
C- -I 
affiliated with the peoples partv. 
Soon after the 1^54 CDUD election toot' place a civilian 
reoime in Syria. In this election there was an unprecedented 
achievement for a modern radical party in the Arab World. 
In the Syrian conte;;t the left ward trend was manifested 
primarily in the domain of foreion relations and threat or 
the riQht - wino parties. The combination of left wino 
parties the Bath ana the communists whose rivalry was 
eclipsed by the period of cooperation brought Svria close 
enouQh to the Soviet Union to maJ'e it the centre of a minor 
4 
international crises in 195/ . 
In Syria. an uneasy alliance of the Ba th with the 
communist was derived laraelv from the support of the armv. 
which after February 1^54 chose to exercise its influence 
from behind the scenes. The armv s support nowever was 
ambitious and assertive. By the Ba'th communist allies and 
of the counter pressure applied by the vested interest 
powers. all alarmed by the orowino power of the left. The 
increasmo tensions were mirrored in the armv wnere rival 
factions were on the verge of clashino. The Ba th and the 
laroe group of Senior Officers who were alliea >«^ th it or 
shared its out loot felt that thev could not cooe with this 
combined pressure. It seemed to them that the only wav to 
oet out of the crises and to stop Svria s disinteoration as 
5 
a political unit was through a federal union with Eovpt . 
The dissatisfaction of a large section of the Syrian 
with the Union contributed to its eventual fall by creating 
an atmosphere for the coup of September 28, 1961. which led 
to Syria's secession from the UAR. However in the absence 
of deep changes and sweeping reforms in the country's Socio-
economic structure, much social and political power still 
remained in traditional hands. The Process of social 
change was discernible but Ba'thists were impatient to wait 
for its results. 
The most immediate effect of the failure of this Union 
on Syrian politics was to reopen the issue of Syria's 
national identity. As stated by the members of the Ba'th : 
The errors of the ruling system in the UAR, 
however, gave they may be, do not justify 
secession, for the fact remains that the failure of 
the experiments m unity is a consequence of 
certain mistakes and that secession is a 
consequence of plannincj, designs and conspiracy. 
This vision of a world wide conspiracy against Arab 
Unity conceded the fact that the unicr. had also failed 
because of a lack of careful prepi-axion ana agreed 
procedures. New Syria had to go back to governing itself on 
some workable basis . 
In the first place the old conservatives politicians 
formed a Qovernment and held an election in which they and 
their col leagues won a majority of seats. They then began 
to dismantle some of the measures which Nasir had 
introduced. They had not much positive to offer and a 
number of cabinets floundered around looking for convincing 
policies. They couia not disavow Arab Unity although Nasir 
scorned them as an inconsiderable force. The Ba'thi were in 
no strongei' a position. The public welcome which Hawran i 
gave to the secession embarrased Aflaq and Beytar. They 
preferred to await the ne;;t opportunity for an attempts at 
Union and announced that they had expelId Hawrani from the 
party. The army was likewise suffering. There were 
officers who supported Nasir and others who bitterly 
resented the Egyptian attempts to dominate them. They 
quarreled among themselves and with the civilian politician 
over which policies should be followed. The quarrel between 
Egypt and Syria continued with each side accusing the other 
of interference, incitement and of serving the aims of 
, 7 imperial ism. 
While the separatist regime led to a new low in Syro-
Egyptian relations, it meant normalization, even 
reapprochement i^ relations with Iraq. Thus Syria's 
relations with Egypt and Iraq continued to follow the old 
pattern of the struggle for Syria when weak regimes in 
Damascus sought support from cairo or Baghdad, normally 
inverting their predecessor 5 choice. 
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The separatist recjime in Syria found itself encircled by 
radical Arab nationalist advocatinci Arab Socialism which 
had considerable appeal within Syria itself-
During the period of 1963-70, there was continued 
struggles for pov^ er and influence among several groups and 
individuals in Syria. In this situation, it was the Ba th 
party that took control of Syria. The party had been 
formally dissolved from the beginning of the (JAR period 
until 1962. Though, the Ba th Party's prominent founders, 
Michael Aflaq and Salah-al-Beytar, continued to advocate 
Arab Nationalism from their respective positions as party 
leader. But most of the leaders had been turned away from 
Arab Nationalism by the UAR expriment. They had come to 
focus their energies and interests on Syria and its 
immediate environment. 
Another fai—reaching change was in the composition of 
the Ba' th itself. Youngers began to challenge the basic 
philosophy of Arab Nationalism and joined hands with the 
members'of the military committee in their opportunities to 
the old guards. Aflaq who had written that 'Nationalism is 
love before everything else' was ill-fitted to the rsigns of 
political life. 
The new left began to get its way. At the Syrian 
Regional Conference in September 1963 the leftists won a 
majority and began to introduce a more socialist ideology, 
with notions such as class struQQle and collective forms 
which provoked opposition, particularly amongst the 
bDurqeousB. The crisis was resolved only after the 
intervention of military in which Beytar was as Prime 
Minister and Hafiz emerged as a power full figure to form 
the new Ba'th. Opposition in the regime continued, now of a 
different dimension. The Ba th government, considered by 
its opponents as both secular and minority led, was 
denounced as atheistic and non-Arab. In April 1*^ 64 a 
significant event took place. Muslim Brother(IKHWAN) and 
others provoked a not in Hama against the government which 
responded violently by shelling the town. The unrest, 
erupted, and continued students, businessmen and others 
joined together and called for a return to democratic life. 
Such was the discontent that Hafiz was forced to make some 
appeasing gestures, bringing back Beytar •for a while and 
relaxing some of has leftist policies. It was a losing 
battle, for the old Ba'th and for the opponents of the more 
radical policies. Syria was moving to the left and to a 
period of out right socialist measures. The ~regionalist' 
officers (Those who saw Ba'th policies m terms of 
Syria)consolidated their power by dismissing many Sunni 
officers and bringing Alawis and Druzes factions int D 
p 
confidence. The conflict continued, ostensibly between 
the regionalists and nationalists that is roughly between 
the new Ba'thists of rural origin and old urban-based 
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leadership. The former included Jadid and Asad and the 
letter Beytar and others. 
The regionalists responded in February 196o by seizing 
power in a violent coup that drove the party's founder into 
exile and split the Arab Nationalist into two, one centered 
in Syria and other in Iraq. The Syrian group was headed by 
the Alavi officers, Salah Jadid along with some civilians 
who dominated Syrian cabinets from 1966-70. It was 
ideologically committed to a collectivist state to run 
economy and to support the a national liberation struggle by 
Palestinians the forward policy of this faction helped the 
Arab Nationalist in the 1967 war against Israel. 
The new Ba'th leaders wanted to retain their ideological 
'purity' against the rival faction. Their opponents accused 
the Ba'th of being responsible for the defeat and called for 
more democracy and less repression. The Ba'thists reacted 
with more repression and arrests and refused to compromise 
and work with others. They were themselves in a conflict 
which became more intens because of the 1967 defeat. 
Tensions were caused inside the country by dispute over 
which military, foreign and socio economic policies should 
be pursued. The two main trends were represented by Salah 
Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad made the struggle against each other 
leading to an ideological differences arised bet»-.'een Jadid 
and Asad, whether priority should be given to socialist 
doctrine or to Arab cooperation in the struggle against 
D/ 
Israel. Jadid and his followers managed to obtain a 
majority for their policies at Ba'th Party conQresses in 
late 1968. Asad refused to accept these decisions and 
instead turned to the army in order to build up his power. 
He managed to place his supporters in many of the most 
influential positions while Jadid failed to utilise his 
influence in this regard. Asad was particularly keen to 
ensure his base in his home Alawi area around Latakia. His 
military supporters virtually seized power there in February 
1969 and left the civilians helpless. 
The dual system of control between civilians and 
military continued for another year until September 1*^ 70 
(Black September). This was the month in which f-ing Hussain 
of Jordan finally decided that the Palestinians residing in 
his country are a threat for his regime. They therefore had 
to be crushed. This was done bloodily in September 1970. 
Syrian leaders with their commitment to Palestinian felt 
that they could not stand ideally. On 19th September 
armored units crossed the ,Jordanian frontier but with drew a 
few days later, having suffered severe causalities. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Asad had opposed its intervention of Jordan 
and was strongly criticized b^ , the continuous civilian of 
Syria. When the civilian tried to depose Asad his military 
preparations bore fruit and the chief of the staff. Mustafa 
were able to take counteractions. On 13th November 1970 
Asad ordered his military supporters to occupy the offices 
of the civilian party sections and to arrest prominent 
leaders including Salah Jadid and the Sunni President, 
Nural-Din al-Atasi. Political power was now monopolized by 
officers, largelv Alawi, of Asad's faction and in February 
1971 he became the first Alawi President of Syria. This 
marked the final stage of the rise, of the Alawis from a 
position of political insignificance to one of national 
dominance. It was the beginning of a new era in Syrian 
politics dominated by one man Hafir al-Asad . 
3.2 Syria Under Asad 
After coming to power in Syria Hafiz al-Asad eithausted 
enormous resources and energy in building a powerful army to 
consolidate his Presidency. Not only this he also provided 
a dynamic foreign policy which has till date contributed 
significantly in mobilizing popular support and acquaring 
legitimacy for his regime. At the same time, Asad did not 
neglect the internal challenge of rebuilding the Syrian 
state. His systematic and direct attempts for Nation-
Building are based on his new 'corrective movement' 
policies, inaugurated in November 1970, embracing the 
Ba'th's -lenets of 'Jpity, Freedom and Socialism. Asad's 
policies thus, in theory, aims to achieve national unity 
through the creation of popular democracy. He further laid 
stress on Ba'thist revolutionary philosophy of socialism to 
grant civil liberty and socialists reforms ^'. 
The core of Asad's success as widely acclaimed is due to 
his ability to establish a stable rcQime in Syria. Asad's 
immediate tas^ ' fol lowing his ta^ -eover in November 1970 was 
to widen his domination to fetch poDular support. A series 
of steps were taken to achieve this goal such as the hoiding 
of election for parliament (the Peoples Assembly), lifting 
over the ban to various leftist parties allowing them to 
operate alongside the ruling Ba'th Party. The motive behind 
the induction of the parties was to bring an economic 
liberalization and change in Syria's foreign policy, thus 
enabling him to consolidate his regime at a very crucial 
stage of its ev;istence 
Internally, Asad's coming to power marked a relaxation 
in the political atmosphere. Some political prisoners were 
released and he promised restoration of cavil liberties. A 
lew Regional Command of the Ba'th was formed by Asaa's 
supporters and the old leaders were removed from their 
posts. He also got instituted and upgraded people's council 
the first legislative body since 1966 with 173 members, of 
which 87 were Ba'thists, 8 Communists and 36 representatives 
of the formers- Further the amendments introduced in the 
constitution to facilitate his reform programme gave hi» 
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enormous power . For many years, Asad had been imbued 
with the notion of Arab Unity. This notion, although 
strongly interrelated with the struggle against Israel, went 
beyond that strategic goal. As a real Syrian leader, Asad 
b'J 
attempted to form an inter-Arab cooperation to help Syria 
strengthen his military mignt, political position and 
economic conditions in his strugqle against Israel, (the 
arch-enemy of the Arabs^, Within this process Asad tried to 
implement his combined personal ambition and national 
mission to become a Pan-Arab leader lit-e President Nasir in 
Egypt. Asad's first Political actions after his ascendancy 
in November 1970 were to join the newly established 
Federation of Arab Republics (with Egypt Libya, Sudan) and 
to sign a military pact with Egypt. While considering Egypt 
as the major and senior partner in the new intra-Arab 
cooperation, Asad also made great efforts to improve Syria 5 
relations with all other Arab countries regardless of their 
domestic regimes and external orientations. 
These new Arab solidarity or^ iented politics of Asad bore 
fruit during the 1973, Asad succeeaed in attracting a wide 
range of Arab cooperation and assistance. Military forces 
from Iraq, Jordan,Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were also 
despatched to the Golan Heights on his requests. Generous 
financial aid was promised to Syria by wealthy Arab states, 
and the oil embargo was emplovea by oil-producing Arab 
countries to extent diplomatic r-essure on T-^ e US and West 
Europe. Yet, this highly impressive demonstration of Arab 
Solidarity with Syria started to collapse within weeJ^ s of 
Sadat s unilateral decision to accept the cease-fire with 
Israel on 22nd October 1973- Syria was subsequently left 
di. 
alone to tight Israel m the war of attrition. Shocked from 
this policy move Asad initiated an Arab summit conference in 
Algeria in late November 1973- With the eitception of Iraq, 
Libya and Jordan, all Arab leaoers attended, and endorsed 
Asad's proposed strategy : to strengthen Arab Solidarity 
with Syria and Egypt, to liberate all territories occupied 
by Israel in 1967, including Jerusalem, and not to give up 
any part of it, to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian Arab people to continue 
the oil embargo against the countries which supported 
Israel 
These decisions, which did not rule out a political 
settlement, were apparently designed by Asad to link Egypt 
to Syria in further interim agreements with Israel and to 
prevent Sadat from taking more unilateral steps towards 
Israel. This line was pursued by Asad in another Arab 
summit convened in Algeria in February 1974. Again in late 
October 1974 the seventh Arab summit meeting was convened m 
Rabat at the request of Asad and other Arab leaders. In 
this conference, Asad succeeded in mastering the support of 
the Arab states for a decision to oppose any Egyptian 
agreement with Israel, regarding further withdrawal of 
Israely troops from the Sinai, but this agreement was not 
linked to Golan. Further in tne next conference in 1975, 
Both Asad and Sadat decided that 'the political action 
during the next stage requires close cooperation between 
Syria and Egypt as a basis for the common Arab action 
o 
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against the common enemy . But Sadat deviated from his 
alliance with Syria because he was able to convince Israel 
to withdraw from Sinai. Asad not only criticized Egypt 
against his separate deal with Israel but he also tried to 
build an Arab consensus against President Sadat. Who on his 
own travelled to Jerusalem to meet Israeli leaders and 
actually to address the Kneset (Parliament). Asad was 
furious at this betrayal and joined with other states to 
oppose Egyption compromise. The Syrians declared, 'We will 
not attened any conference in the presence of Sadat', Asad 
visited Baghdad in October and the two Ba'th parties agreed 
to bury their differences. The euphoiria of rapprochment 
led to another attempt at Arab Unity. In 1979 moves were 
announced towards union between Syria and Iraq. With their 
common Ba'thist ideology the two states agreed to set-up 
committees to study the project. But rivalry and suspicion 
proved stronger than brother hood and all the talks and good 
will gave nothing. The two leaders Asad of Syria and Saddam 
Hussain of Iraq, mistrusted each other. The two wings of 
the Ba'th were led by very different groupings - the Alawis 
(Shia Sect) in Syria and the Tikritis <a Sunni Sect.) i'-
Iraq. In August there was an attempted coup against Saddam 
and Asad was immediately suspected. That finally put an end 
to the unity moves among the two countries ^ '. 
In the Presidential elections of Feb., 1978, Asad aoain 
came as President with a large majority for, a second seven 
year term. But the traditional rivalry amono the different 
groups of the different parts of the country continued and 
this was intensified by opposition to the Alawi predominance 
in the government. But during this period of recession the 
Muslim Brothers stepped up their activities. They were 
against the secularist policy of the Ba'th Party. At the 
same time the initial policy in Lebanon for which Syrians 
seemed to be fighting against Muslims and the PLO added to 
the anti-Alawi feelings. Finally, the depressed state of 
the economy, deepened the opposition. Assassination of 
Aiawis became a new problem to President - Asad. In June 
1979 Gunmen entered into the Aleppo artillery school and 
massacred over 60 cadets. This act probably proved that the 
Ikhwan had infiltrated the army. Many activist opponents 
were arrested and imprisoned. In Pans July 1980 Saian ai-
din Beytar, was assassinated who represented Syrian 
opposition forces in Iraq and had just published a series of 
newspaper articles analyzing the Syrian regime. 
Once again, external events conspired to disturb the 
course of Syrian politics. The Syrian army was stat:::?-ing 
in Lebanon when in September 1980 war broke out between Iraq 
and Iran. Syrian antagonism towards Iraq was strong and 
Asad surprisingly moved to support the Non-Arab side in the 
Iran-Iraq war. The official Syrian justification was : We 
^^ A 
support the Islamic regime of Iran because it is anti-
Israel. We have a pact of unity with Iraq. Let Iraq 
announce its commitment to this pact and the war will stop 
immediately because Iran cannot fight Syria and Iraq 
combined 
The secret of Asad's success laid in the 'Balance he 
tried to create between Pan-Arab Nationalism (Qawmiyya) and 
Syrian nationalism (Wataniyya;; he could satisfy strong 
Syrian aspirations in both directions instead of swaying 
uncertainly between them. This 'balance was also expressed 
pragmatically in implementing Ba'th doctrine internally and 
in the intei—Arab arena, to the point of distancing himself 
from Ba' th doctrine itself. Having e-tperienced the Ba ths 
internal struggles from February 19t)3, Asad concluded that 
the Ba'th doctrine could not be implemented in existing Arab 
and internal Syrian conditions. The attempts to do so by 
using "narrow socialistic slogans' created a long-term 
statement in Syrian political life. The internal 
instability was liable to burn the bridges between Syria and 
other Arab State'. Asad described his regime as a 
'rectification movements. (TAS-HIH). His regime has been 
marked by a transition from Party Rule' to a personality 
cult of the leader, Asad has held the highest posts : 
President, Supreme Commander of the army and secretary 
general of the Ba'th Party. He has also tried to give his 
regime a 'democratic' image in order to blur its sectarian 
b'Z' 
\Alawite) and military character. In short, Asad has tried 
to be a socialist without resortino the socialist dogmatism, 
to be democratic without his personal rule being pulled from 
under his feet. 
Asad tried to realize these principles in his conflict 
with the Jadid faction. His Strategic aim did not differ 
from that of his predecessor, namely, "the liberation of 
Palestine and over the Arab occupied territories and the 
establishment of a single Arab State". These missions were 
to be realized in three stages : 
— "the complete liberation of the territories occupied 
in June 196"7, liquidation of the Zionist entity and 
establishment of a Progressive, Secular, democratic 
Palestinian state on her ruins and the realization of 
Arab Unity". This entailed the restorarion, "of the 
full rights of the Palestinian people, above all its 
right to self determination and realization of total 
sovereignty on ail of its national land". 
Uniii-e the previous regime, Asad adopted Nasir's concept 
of stages and the resolutions of the Khartaum Summit. The 
distinction between the stage cf iiae^ation of the occupied 
territories and that of "the liberation of Palestinian" gave 
Syria felexibility and opened a door for itself for 
settlements in stages, provided it did, not go against the 
strategic goal. For Asad "Israel's withdrawal for Sinai and 
t)0 
the Golan will only settle the problem of the June, I'^ o? 
aggression but the essence of the problem remeins-the 
Palestinian people, therefore we shall continue to fiqht 
alonqside them whether Israel withdraws from the Golan or 
not. There is no difference between the Golan, Smai or 
West Bank. Syria was against any partial or separate 
settlement with Israel or any of the three fronts. He 
further added we have no hope in political action, the basic 
and concrete solution lies in military action 
The principles of Syrian policy were, first the "armed 
struggle" is the only way of setling the conflict. This 
became the essence of Syrian Ba'th ideology. The slogan 
"the popular liberation war" was pushed aside. The regime 
presented "the armed struggle as the strategic point of 
departure for the strategy of action in the areas of 
internal, including economic, Arab and international 
policy". The existing stage of the conflict was 
characterized as "the stage of national liberation". Asad 
followed Nasir's vi^w that victory in the war required 
"mobilizing all the states and resources of the Arab Nation 
to prepare military and economic strength which will be 
capable of deciding the str--yle in the best way for us". 
The second Syrian principle was political action as a 
supportive factor. Asad did not rule out "political 
action', as distinct from a "political solution" which he 
o/ 
totally rejectee. Already in March 1971 he declared his 
support for Sadat's political activity, arQUing that 
political activity is an important aspect m the 
confrontation with Israel, its aim being the violation of 
Israel in the international arena in order to facilitate the 
activation of the military option". 
Asad s rejection of 242 resolution was conditional 
"Since it does not include two essential requirements, 
recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people to 
return to its homeland and total and unconditional Israeli 
withdrawl from all the occupied Arab territories". In other 
words, for Asad the interpretation' of the resolution and 
its meaninq were most important. 
Third, that "all differences of opinion between the Arab 
States should be secondary contrary to the previous regime, 
Asad actecl" to improve the atmosphere between Syria and the 
other Arab States as an essential prerequisite for the 
campaign", and "without taking into account the nature of 
their internal regime". He viewed Arab Unity "as a 
revolutionary dream which is not realistic", and strove 
instead to achieve "Arab Solidarity". Since the "armed 
struggle" -as the tea: or-iority, "Arab solidarity should be 
put before the struggle for the realization of socialism". 
This IS the background to Syria's joining the Federation of 
Arab Republics, its military alliance with Egypt and its 
attempts to improve relations with other Arab States^^. 
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3.3. Greater Syria : 
The notion of Greater Syria which directly influenced 
the Ba'thist leaders in the 1940s, and has continued to 
influence the LEVANT in general namely the Greater Syria s 
theory which was propounded Antun Sa deh. He did not 
totally invent the Greater Syria theory, which may already 
be found in the wirtings of Henri Lammens and others. But 
it was undoubtedly Sa'deh who orQanised thery and indeed 
established the political party to promote it. In 1936 
Sa'deh wrote the book NUSHU-AL-UMUML. The Birth of Nations, 
his best I-nown wori , while he was imprisoned by the French 
for subversion and his ideas throughout thia boo^' were in 
circulation before Ba'thism was formulated. The foundation 
of the Pati popular Syrian (PPS) was also laid down because 
of his personal efforts to promote the cause of Greater 
Syria in 1934.^'' 
Latter the concept of 'Greater Syria' was qiveri by Amir 
Abdullah during the second world war to promot the Arab 
unity. The object was the reunification of the four 
20 territories '. Under his leadership. Firstly, the problem 
of the Palestinian Jews should be solved by granting them 
administrative autonomy. Secondly, an extensive measure 
should be chalked out by uniting Syria and Transjordan to 
form a union on the model of the United States of America or 
the Swiss confederation. As may be seen, the heart of 
<b9 
Abdullah's proposals and their only practical feature was 
the immediate merger of transjordan and Syria. This was the 
plan which he put forward, with minor variants in speeches, 
official memoranda, and private communications to Syrian 
Politician and instruction on Arab Unity to which Egypt's 
Prime Minister Mustafa al - Nahhas, invited the Arab states 
in 1<?43 and which resulted in the Arab Leaoue Charter of 
1945^^. 
Abdullah got little encouragement from the British 
Government to which he first advanced his proposals, raised 
after the fall of France. The question was braouched again 
when Mr. Oliver Lytttelton. Minister of State in the West 
Asia, visited Amman in 1941 and on a number of subsequent 
occasions. Abdullah's first concern in the war years was to 
ensure that the British Government would not invoke its 
treaty rights in Transjordan to prevent him from discussing 
the matter with the Syrian and other Arab Governments. The 
British Governments attitude through out war period 
suppressed to the "Greater Syria' until the stable condition 
of the Arab World was restored. Abdullah did, however, 
secure British agreement for the view that there could be no 
harm in the project beini studiea, oending a suitable 
occasion for it to be put into execution. 
On 28 March 1946 Abdullah ::!e-ured its full independence 
from Great Britain and felt free to promote his long 
cherished expansionist plan. Soon after on 11 November this 
, () 
idea of Greater Syria was formally proclaimed. Accordino to 
him there is neither great nor little Syria but there is 
only a single country bounded to the West by the Sea. to the 
north by Tur^ 'By to the East by Iraq and to the South by the 
Hejar - which constitutes Syria'"'^ . 
In AuQUst 1<?47 Abdullah put his plan before 'regional 
Syrian governments in Amman. As in Amman this plan was 
also rejected by other regional government. lake Cairo, 
Riyad, Beirut, and Damascus. Each capital questioned about 
the guarantee of its independence and expressed surprise at 
Abdullah's persistence. President Quwatli of Syria publicly 
denounced Greater Syria on his re-election in 1947, while 
the newly elected Syrian Chamber protested against 
Abdullah's plan which threaten Syria's independence, 
sovereignty and her republican regime's. ">— 
Although rejected by the Ba'th Party which advocated 
Pan-Arab Unity, the notion of Greater Syria had been revived 
in a different guise by President Asad. He had apparently 
adopted a parallel approach to the idea of Greater Syria 
that was, the Union of Syria, Lebanon Jordan and Palestine. 
It was no more th^- a loose 'j-ri-DCi with different regimes, as 
long as it was under Asad's leadership. In Asad's view 
Greater Syria lies in a geogrpahically strategic area which 
15 at the core of any potential Arab Unity. It should thus 
serve as the focus of an Arab Political Military network 
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aciainst Israel, for both defensive and offensive 
24 purposes. 
One can thus conclude that these three interrelated 
notions of Greater Syria Arab Unity and the struggle aqainst 
Zionism and imperialism constitute the cornerstone of Asad's 
political philosophy and strategy. 
Asad may well believe that it was his life's mission to 
achieve those grand, historic goals of the Arab people. At 
the same time, however, he shrewdly propagated those goals 
and concepts to broaden his power base as the legitimate 
ruler of all Syrians by obtaining the consent of the Sunni 
Muslim majority as well as of his own Alawite group. By 
e;;tolling Arab unity Asad is trying to erase the image of a 
sectarian military regime, sei::ed power by Arms Force has 
damaged and suppressed political institutions, religious 
feeli'-gs. social prestige and economic interests of many 
fellow Syrians. To diffuse the strong opposition to his 
regime, Asad simultaneously seeks to build a new order 
resting on the under privileged rural population, urban 
workers and younger generations. For this he took support 
of the above sectors of the population who were linked by a 
shai-er Dassio^- -'r- Arab Unity for Breater Syria. His 
primary purpose was to continue ruling his country as a 
legitimate and popular leader. Hence his aim was to draw 
his regime as a nationalist, socialist progressive 
government " . 
The notion of Ereater Syria again has been revived in a 
different guise by Asad. In a text boo^ - for the Syrian 
school system published in early I'^ SOs. the term Bilad Ash-
sham (the land of Syria^ is cited as a QeoQraphicai 
historical term, as a region "lint-ing the two parts of the 
Arab homeland'. Accordincj to this text book, Bilad Ash-Sham 
divided after the First Word WAr into four mini-sates 
(Duwaylat) namely, Syria. Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, and 
in 1967 it lost that territory to Israel. This concept of 
Greater Syria was openly propagated over Damascus Radio and 
in the Ba'th daily Al~Thewra for several months during 1976-
77, by Shawqi Hhayrallah, a leading figure of the Syrian, 
Social Nationalist Party <SSNP). The Party's leader, Ihsan 
Mahayan, stated in 1984 that Asad's regime is nationalist 
and that there were no contradictions between this regime 
^ 1 26 and our ideology 
When Asad came to power late in 1970, he worked more 
systematically to employ the PLO as an instrument of his 
domestic and regional policies, notably his Greater Syria 
Strategy. The shifting of PLO head quarter from Jordan to 
Lebanon, after September 1970, considerably helpec Asad to 
extend his influence over the Palestinian r-esistance 
movement. To achieve this goal Asad also used the remaining 
PLO base in Syria as well as the Syrian controlled 
Palestinian organization : the popular front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Asad had consistently 
endeavored to demonstrate himself as the great champion for 
the Palestinian cause among his countrv men and to the other 
Arab nations. Regarding the palestine on integral part oi 
Syria, Asari said in his speech in March 1^74 that 
Palestinian is not only a part of the homeland but 
constitutes that ma3Dr part of southern Syria. 
Despite these statements, it is conceivable that Asad, 
the realistic and contiDUS politicians has been aware of the 
enormous difficulties involved in unifying the countries of 
Greater Syria under his leadership. It is more likely that 
his strategic goal has been (and still is) to achieve a 
(federal^ union of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the 
Palestinians under his leadership. Peeping in mind that 
Syria would be the biggest and strongest power in such a 
Union. Damascus could manover among her partners and take 
the predominant role in shaping its pciiticai and military 
strategy. Indeed, it would seem that Asad's more concrete 
aim would be to establish a political military structure of 
Greater Syria to serve his two interrelated goals. He is 
creating a new regional power centre and other is to 
extended its influence, which can shade its impact over 
intra-Arab politics vis-a-vis his twc s^ -c-^ q A-at -ivais, 
Egypt and Iraq along with his political struggle against 
Israel. 
Hence the 'liberation of Palestine would become integral 
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parts of the Syrian territory. Asad thought in terms of the 
Syrian region or Greater Syria encompassing Syria, Jordan 
Lebanon and Palestine in one political frame wori' centered 
on Damascus. Withm this framework one could solve the 
problem of the economic viability of a 'Palestinian State „ 
including the refugee p^-oblem, and also the differences 
between the FLO and Jordan. Asad saw in this region a 
single defence unit against either Israel or Iraq under the 
rule of the Ba'th- This unit would also guarantee the 
security of the Southern and eastern flan^ '. Lebanon was 
considered part of Syria s defence belt in the West and 
Jordan in the south, since it is difficult to distinguish 
between Lebanon s security and Syria s security in the 
widest sense. In I'^Jb Fatah (and the other organisations'* 
described the Syrian invasion of Lebanon as "the fulfillment 
of the Syrian regime's dream to control Lebanon, Jordan and 
part of Palestine and to establish a confederation. 
Regarding the conflict, Damascus in this Syrian perception 
seems as a centre of Power of radical nationalism, as 
op 
against the political and military strength of Egypt^ . .pa 
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Chapter 4 
Nationalism in Post Independent Iraq 
VagliiCad (Pact and tfU Ovtri^rozu 
of 9^onaTchy 
Civil Mititartf ^Cation 
iJu (Kurdish Qjustion 
4.1. Baghdad Pact & Overthrow of Monarchy : 
Soon after independence Iraq started takmrj lead for 
the cause Df Arab Unity. In the mid I'^ T.Os it had seen 
loD^'ed upon by many Arab naxionai ists as a emercfinc) nation 
which would unify Arab land to create a union or federation. 
The military upriEinC) in 1''41, provof-ed by exiled Pan-Arab 
leaders in Baghdad was one of the attempts made to eliminate 
foreign influence and unify the region of the Fertile 
crescent. Further attempts was made by Iraq to achieye some 
Iind of unity of the Fertile Crescent by peaceful Methods, 
with the help of a moderate leaner friendly to the west. 
After the establishment of the Arab league in 1945, 
Egypt tool' more interest in Arab affairs. Simultaneously 
Iraq's influence in inter-Arao relationships was gradually 
reduced. The position of the Iraqi rulers became more 
insecure when Syria began to fail under Egypt's influence'^. 
During the years of the i^50s Iraq's political forces 
were diyided into two major camps tc capture power, the 
ruling conservatiye group, lee py Nuri-al-said derived most 
of its strength from the iand-owning elements. The 
Nationalists and Socialists ccrcsition relied on support of 
the Urban Population. The relatively peaceful period was 
unmarked by violence as evidenced by an abortive coup by 
army in February 1950 (attempted by the Baghdad Chief of 
Police) who was promptly arrested by th lent, 
f^. ' y u 
Official circles in Iraq under the leadership of Nun si-
Said, either in or out of office a premier, were staunch 
pro-West during the early I'^ SOs'" . 
In late 1<?53, the West Asian Defence Orqaniration by 
the adyice of U.S, Secretary of State John Fersta had taken 
into consideration of the concept of Northern Tier. The aim 
of this concept was to work primarily with Turkey and 
Pakistan to safeguard its interest from the Soviet threat. 
The initiative was tai-en by Turkey and military assistance 
pact was signed with Pakistan on 2nd April 1954. 
In the same year General Nun al-Said embarked on a 
policy of military alliance and began to cultivate the 
company of prominent officers in order to enlist their 
support. In 1^53 he gave a lecture to a group of leading 
officers, including military generals in which he expounded 
his views on the international situation and stressed the 
role which Iraq might play in defence of the West Asia. 
Nun's interest in the reorganiration and enlargement of the 
army, especially after the formation of the Baghdad pact in 
1955, appealed to Senior Officers, but the younger officers, 
though outwardly supporting him, showed no enthusiasm for 
his policy. Nun was unaware of the widespreao 
dissatisfaction with Western policy towards the Arab world 
4 
among the young officers, but he paid no attention to it , 
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The Government of Iraq in 1954 was faced with two basic 
problems as a result of above arrancjement which was bacf-ed 
by the U.S. 
First whether Government should join or not to join the 
Northern Tier defence Pacts. 
Second how to change her relationship with Great 
Britain, to whom it was still linked by the 1930 treaty-
Prime Minister Nun al~Said in a press interview on 
November 1, 1954 stated : " We are not strong enouQh to 
be able to assist others, but we are trying to find a 
means to correlate our foreign policy with the provision 
of the Turi ish - Pat'istani pact. All that we are can do 
at present to organise the defence of Iraq through 
cooperation with neighboring states . 
Finally, Nan al-Said, the Prime Mmiste- was convinced 
that Iraq's best interest-could be served by joining a 
Western sponsored security system. Nun was the defence aid 
foreign Minister during the time preceding the conclusion of 
the Baghdad Pact. 
To achieve this objective. Nun virtually directec; the 
foreign policy of Iran towards closer collaboration with 
Turkey. Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes and Nun al-Said 
consulted in Baghdad and announced that a mutual assistance 
pact would be signed in January 1955. Arab reaction was 
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immediate, especially on the part of the Egyptian premier, 
Jamal Abdul Nasir, who called a conference of Arab heads in 
Cairo to discuss the Arab League s relationships with the 
West. He insisted on a resolution concluded by ieaque 
members which was in consistent with the league s charter. 
He further also condemned Iraq with her expressed desire to 
sign a pact with Turkey . 
On February 24, 1955, Baghdad pact was signed between 
the President of Turkey and the king of Iraq. It was 
guaranteed that the two countries would cooperate for mutual 
security and defence and also would not inter-*?re in each 
other :, .^iberoc •^+-*--i .. :he treaty left open the 
possiu^ 1A t \' O'*' , u ^ •"ticipat ion by othe" states. On 
April 4, 1955 Great Britain and Iraq concluded a --r-ial 
agreement in Baghdad through which 1' '"-.'eat Britain accede'-' 
to the February 24 pact of -tual cooperation bet • TTI Iraq 
and Turkey, 2) the 1930 Treaty of Alliance between the two 
countries was terminated, ana 3i Britain agreed to give Iraq 
military aid in the event of armed attack or the threat of 
armed attack endangering the security of Iraq. 
Pakistan and Iran joineo "T-e pact in vr-.e end of the year 
and with this the Northern Tier defence concept became a 
reality in a very short period. Thus the member states 
could proceed to set up the required machinary for the 
operation of the pact. An Iraqi, Awni Khalidi became the 
Ru 
first Secretary General and a permanent secretariat was 
established in Baohdad. This was the remar^able achievement 
for Nun ai-Said, who had maintained a pro-western position 
8 
in the face of serious opposition from Egypt . 
Ir^ aqi's opposition criticized the pact-and labeled that 
it was nothino but the instrument of British control ove'--
Arab. In the meantime. President Jamal Abdul Nasir too^ the 
unprecendented step of purchasina arms from the Soviet 
Blocf', showing that Egypt was no longer dependent on western 
arms suppliers, which had previously received inadeouate 
supply from the West, Nasir s position rose high in Arab 
eyes because he had challenged Western power and obviously 
became the leader of Arab cause for unity and complete 
independence. After nationalization of the Suez Canal the 
tripartite attach' tooi' place. Due to this attach', Pan-Arab 
leaders conducted a campaion ecainst the western power and 
were almost successful in raising an uprising against the 
regime in Iraq and Syria. Syria threatened the Iraqi regime 
to blow up the oil pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC), crossing through Syian territory in favour of Pan-
9 
Arab support . Further, the dramatic development in West 
Asia during the pericr : =5:: - 5r eipt?sed Iraq to further 
attack from Arab States hostile to the pact which were now 
rallying around Nasi,^ as a result of the ill fated invasion 
in Suez in 1<?56. 
in 
This Suer crisis created the fear in Iraq that Egyptian 
Israeli hostilities might expand beyond Sinai. This 
pressurized Iraq to send troops to Jordan at the latter's 
request. In Novemoer 1956 Baghdad brD^ 'e off diplomatic 
relations with France and decided to boycott Baqhdad pact. 
This crisis qavfr opportunity to the Pan-Arab leaders to 
shame the Nun government internally and public opinion 
aroused against western Imperialism. This led to protest 
demostrations and serious riots in Mosul, Nagef and Lut. 
The government responded by arresting time of the main 
opposition leaders and on December 1, it proclaimed martial 
law in Iraq 
At this explosive situation the United States issued an 
official statement in support of the Baqhdad Pact. Even 
then. Nun's opposition gained momentum despite the strong 
measure taken by his government to curbs the internal 
uprisings. Further Pan-Arab feelings was strengthened when 
president Nasir of Egypt - turned military defeat into 
political victory. Due to public opinion, the Iraqi 
Government had no choice but to fight the Cairo inspired 
Pan-Arabi5ffi, and allies were sought in this struggle from 
among t->e -Tionarchicci regimes remaining in the Arab world. 
To this, efforts was made and monarchical regime issued 
joint - communiques to condemn Communism, Imperialism and 
Zionism. Further steps were ta^ 'en that the federation 
between Iraq and Jordan came into existence. During this 
entire period. Nun al-Said remained in power and was 
appointed premier of the federation on March 3, 1958 
Nun al-Said, on the other hand, was considered the "stroncj 
man" of the regime of Iraq. He always tool-' 1-een interest to 
t'eep the army well equipped with the latest and best tool. 
Until 1958 the army leadership refrained from political 
maneuvenncj and was considered a stronc) supporter of the 
crown. However, the intensive issues concerninq Arab 
Nationalism, which showed anti-Israeli and anti-British 
feelings were not isolated from its officers, since thev 
shared the opinions and emotions of the civilian population 
from which the sentiments originated ^. A sizable number of 
officers, tried to overthrow the Monarchical regime, maoe a 
National pact which was based upon the fundamental 
principles and aims of the revolution. First of all, the 
fourteen officers decided to adopt a republican form of 
government based on parliamentary democracy. The 
unpopularity of the ruling dynasty and the corruption 
associated with the old regime made inevitable the decision 
to replace the monarchy by a republic. Divergent views were 
expressed on the fate of '^ang Faisal II, crown Prince 
Hodulia. and General Nuri al-Said, the bulworr of the ruling 
oligarchy. The officers seem to have agreed that the crown 
Prince and General Nun must be liquidated, whether by trial 
or outright execution, but the majority held that the fing's 
life should be spared since he was so young. No final 
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decision seems to have been taken about his fate, but Qasim 
and Anf must have decided, shortly before the revolution 
that ail three should be put to death in order to avoid anv 
possible foreign intervention that miqht be provoked by them 
or a future uprising in favour of restorinci the monarchy "'. 
In the second plane the fourteen officers decided to 
establish a genuine form of parliamentary democracy, based 
on a representative government only this type of government 
would ensure liberty and safeguard the national interest of 
the country. However, the officers maintained that in the 
intern between the over throw of the monarchy and the 
establishment of a Parliamentary democracy a transitional 
period would be necessary under a temporary civilian 
government supported by the fourteen Officers. The head of 
the government, to be selected by the fourteen Officers, 
should be a civilian. With the advice of these officers, he 
would choose the other civilian members of his government, 
presumably from among the leaders of opposition parties. A 
Council of Sovereignty, consisting of three members, was 
agreed upon to replace the post of head of state until the 
question of nature of that post would be decided in a 
14 National Assembly during the interim period 
The actual events proceeded where the 20th Army Brigade 
which was considered safe, had been ordered to move because 
of events in Jordan and Lebanon. Under the command of 
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Brigadier General Abdul ^arim Qasim, it moved to Baghdad 
o 
during the early morning hours of July 14, 1958 and tool-' 
control of the City, Within a short period of time all 
members of the royal family in Baghdad, including i-'ing 
Faisal and the Crown Prince, were put to death. Cabinet 
ministers and key oovernment officials were all apprehended 
and arrested, with the e-;ceptiDn of General Nun. He was 
discovered a few days later disguised as a woman and 
^'liled^^. 
New revolutionary authority was then established by a 
Council of Sovereignty. IT had three members and a Cabinet 
headed by General Qasim. who also retained supreme command 
of the armed forces. on the day following the coup. General 
Qasim issued a public statement in which he 1) Proclaimed 
the liberation of the "Country from the domination of a 
corrupt group which was installed by imperialism". 2) About 
the formation of "an Iraqi republic which will preserve 
Iraqi Unity" and 3' brotherly ties with the other Arab 
16 
countries 
4.2. Civil Military Relation : 
The conflict between Abdul Kareem Qasim and Abdul Salam 
Arif led to a friction between Bathists and communists. 
While Abdus Salam Arif demanded for Arab Union i.e. Iraq 
with Arab Republic of Egypt, Qasim was opposed to the idea 
and sought the support of groups likely to oppose 
BathiBts . Due to sharp differences between these two 
groups, the communists e-;tended their support to Qasim. 
Initially Qasim tried to enlist the support of the other-
moderate groups in order to counter the Bathists plan of 
Arab Unity. He, talked about the Iraqi Unity ana 
cooperation, apparently recognired the divisive forces in 
operation and was conscious of the fact that Iraq was not a 
solid, nationally aware which would relegate individual or 
group interest for the sake of so-called national interests. 
On August 5, 1958 he declared : "People, I am the son of the 
people, I pledge before God that I will sacrifice myself 
for your sake. 1 shall offer my life in defense of the 
i 8 
Iraqi people." He was also a practical West Asian 
politician who realistically recognired that his basis of 
strength was the army. It was Qasim's aim to establish a 
modern state based on the Sovereignty and independence of 
Iraq. He did not want that Iraq would be dependent on 
Western support, nor under the political union with UAR. 
In his desire to strengthen Iraq, Qasim not only found tne 
communists ready to counter Pan-Arab propaganda, but also 
that they had greater influence over the masses, and •^ e^v 
more often paraded the streets in support of him than did 
any moderate party. However, once committed to communist 
support, Qasim was never able to reconcile the Pan-Arab, 
despite his rejection of communists ideology, and his 
bo 
subsequent measures to curb their activities. And hence, by 
February 1959, the so-called extended support ot different 
groups to Qasim was brot'en up. The nqht winq Ba thists and 
nationalists were finally withdrawn, from Iran their oartv 
alliance because they were unwilling to be associated any 
I'? longer with the growing communist influence. 
Since colonel Arif, Deputy Premier, who was closely 
associated with Bathist group, was an outstanding spokesman 
for Pan-Arab Union he praised colonel Jamal Abdul Nasir" in 
nearly every public statement. Confrontation among the 
people towards military regime became unavoidable. A month 
later Ar i f was arrested in Baghdad for plotting to over 
throw and associate premier Qasim. 
A special Military court was formed to punish those who 
Disturbed the military regime headed by colonel Fadii Abbas 
al-Mahdawi, Cousin, of Abdul harim Qasim, later this court 
was known as Mahdawi court. Many unsuccessful coups took 
place in his regime and involved people were trailed by the 
Mahdawi court. 
In the meantime, premier Qasim again atteoipted to form a 
coalition cabinet representing a composite _^ all polix^cal 
factions. He invited outstanding leaders of former 
opposition parties to join the government. Mohammad Hadid of 
the national Democratic Party was named Minister of Finance, 
Siddiq Shamshai of the Istiqial <Independent» party was 
desiqnated as a Minister of Guidance, Fuad Rl^ 'abl of the 
Arab Socialists Renaissance (Ba'th> party was named head of 
the Minister of Development and Ibrahim fubbah, a mar;;ist 
was selected a Minister of National Economy. However, the 
early dismissal of col. Arif gave clear indication by the 
Mahdawi court that members of the party were opposed to the 
revolutionary regime. Qasim although aware of this threat as 
evidenced by his constant quard, neither share his 
predecessrs " nor Nasir's belief that political parties were 
corruptible and mere tools of imperalistic forces against 
Arab Nationalism. "He believed that different political 
parties would jointly work for the overall development of 
the country". Consequenty, on January 6, I960, parties were 
allowed political freedom to function'^'. 
Qasim's cabinet, at first, represented a genuine 
national coalition including all shades of political opinion 
except the; communists. It represented an equilibrium of 
sorts. There was no misgiving in declaring that the 
communist party had been wrong in its characterization of 
Qasim as a petty bourgeoise to the extent that he was 
branded as the conscious representative cf the national 
DDurgeoise. Simultaneously he (Qasim) was fearful of the 
increasing influence of left and the upsurge of the working 
class. 
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Dissatisfied, the Bathist, tried to over throw the 
e;;istinq left dominated military government in Iraq 
particularly in Mosul and |-irkule. Qasim's reqime was 
charged with dangerous hostility towards the UAR and he was 
called an anti-Arab nationalist. These allegation were 
broadcasted from the Mosul radio and citizens of Iraq were 
asked to join is the new revolt. Though the revolt was not 
successful, the failure of the uprising gave an opportunity 
to the communists, which had the support of the government 
to go on a rampage, attacking homes of the Mosul bourgeoise 
and penetrating all sorts of atrocities.'"'" 
In 1961-62 the Ba'thist became increasingly active and 
its unlicensed newspaper " Al-Isht i raki " (the Socialist^' was 
secretly circulated in ever increasing numbers. In the 
meantime, the Bathist began to devise plans to over throw 
the regime. Several plans wee made during 1962 which were 
directly or indirectly passea on to Qasim through his chief 
of military intelligence, who kept a vigilant eye on the 
movements of the military. Meanwhile, the Bathist 
intensified their underground agitation in order to prepare 
the public for this -future action plan and to justify 
military rebellion c?- xne qrxKjrrz rtiat it was raised in 
response to popular demand. Simultaneously, students strike 
took place owing to dissatis-^action which the Bath party 
e;;ploited to create conditions favourable for the 
forthcoming military rebellion. Despite the strict secrecy 
Df Bath contacts with the military, Qasim p-eceived 
intelligence reports of an impendincj plot acjainst him in 
December 1962, but could know only the names of some 
conspirators and ordered for their arresf"". 
On February 3, 1^63, Qasim ordered the arrest of Saleh 
Mahdi Ammash, one of the active bath officers. On the 
foilowinq day Ba thist leaders met to review the situation, 
the military regime, having received intelligence reports 
about the meeting, arrested All Saiih al-Sadi and several 
others members. Two wee^s earlier Qasim thereby foiled the 
move of rebellion by arresting Ba'th leaders. 
As the revolutionary fever was totally against him, 
Qasim began to realise that the rebellion had become serious 
and tried to contact the rebel leaders to arrange an 
understanding with them, but his attempts were of no avail. 
The media had already fallen to rebel hands and the radio 
station building became its temporary headquarters. No 
sooner the national council for the Revolutionary Command 
<NCRC) was setup by the Bath party and its allies to replace 
the Qasim regime, tnar the council in 1963 appointed Abdul 
Salam Arif as transitx^r-al president of the Republic. The 
NCRC adopted no new revolutionary principles but tried to 
turn public opinion against Qasim, who had betrayed the 
goals of the July 1958 revolution. E;;cept Arif, who was 
identified as the symbol of Pan Arabism, the Bath party of 
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its leaders was not on the fore front in its „revolutlonary 
24 
up heavals which toov place in 1*^ 63. 
President Abdul Salam Arif, as the result of the coup ot 
November 18, l<^t>3 and of the support ciiven him by the army, 
emerged as Iraq s strona man- The communique that announced 
the coup said that the national council of revolution, " in 
response to the people s appeal and to the demands of the 
army "elected Arif as a President of the council. appointed 
him commander in Chief of the armed forces, and qave him 
full powers for a year that could be e>! tended 
automatically"^ . 
Arif'E military- regime abandoned the idea of collective 
leadership in favour of the new president's personal rule 
based on support of the army. Through the regime there was 
a revolutionary turmoil. The period was demarcated by 1 
the creation of a one party system dedicated to the concepx 
of Arab Socialism. 2) attempted rapprochement with the UAF. 
3) formation of an Iraqi Republic with a new constitution, 
and 4) development of plans for economic reform"^ . 
Arif had to follow the trend of announcing --^ w 
provisional constitution that seemed to be an vogue in tre 
spring of 1964 under the revolutionary military regimes. It 
declared that the Iraqi republic was a socialist and 
democratic state "during its democracy and socialism from 
'"vi 
Islam". In the new Ministry Arif appointed General Tahir 
the as premier of the Iraqi republic. 
On various occasions, the new regime promised elections 
and the civilian government, but e-;actly on the line of the 
previous regime but di1 nothing honour its promises in this 
regard. On the question of Arab unity, pro-Nasivist and 
Ba'thist came into conflict, and in July 1^65, a nuclear of 
minister resigned. As far as the economic reform was 
concerned which could produce the derived results only under 
a stable government. Before Arif's death in April 1966, he 
entered the premier to civilian politician presumably in an 
attempt to tat'e the army out of politics. This incited some 
of the army officers to rebellion which was quickly 
suppressed by the army chief of staff. Who was the 
Presidents' brother and his subsequent successor. The army 
continued, however, to be a force in the sTruggie for power 
in Iraq, i-urdish problem gave the opportt^ r 11 / to erupt armed 
clashes in northern Iraq. The army became dissatisfied with 
the civilian premier, and Cressed for his resignation^ . 
After Arif's death, his brother, Abdur Rehman Arif was 
succeeded and the new cabinet again *r^re of plans for 
parliamentary election. On thereby parliament introduced 
certain measures for electoral reform on Jan. 28, 1967. In 
the meantime, a new phase began after the Si>; Days War of 
June 1967 when the educated elites no longer satisfied with 
the QDvernment began to press for the restoration of 
parliamentary democracy. Until the end of Arif's regime and 
the coup of July, 17, 19^8. the establishment of a 
constitutional democratic regime remained as one of the main 
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On July 17, I9t)8, the Arif regime was overthrown for the 
fourth time by the military which shows that the 
revolutionary process had not yet reached its full 
development. The reasons given for the change were due to 
premier yahya's corruption, l-urdish protests and 
dissatisfaction, submission to foreign Pressures but still 
the root cause was that regime haa neither been sufficiently 
consolidated nor attained legitimacy by popular consent. 
The regime was not prepared to tolerate the opposition. 
Therefore, depended on the loyalty of the Army. The army on 
its part became disloyal tc ~^ -e e-isting regime due to its 
own opportunist views. 
Taking lessons from the past after the July coup, when 
Hasan al-Bakr and his supporters ca^e into power, they 
asserted in public and private pronouncements to have 
derived their mandate to gov*'- the country from the people. 
Further they sought popule'- support to achieve their 
objectives on the ground tnar these objectives serve not 
only Iraq interests but the interest of the Arab World as a 
whole 
However, the Bath s leaders continued to invoke militery 
intervention when ever the oppoEition challenged their rule. 
But their ultimate objective was to establish a popular 
regime and to legitimize it through democratic process. To 
achieve this objective, they had approached young men who 
responded more readil> to their appeal than older people"'. 
At the same time, the Ba thjst hold its control over the 
central leadership council, more firmly and through 
participation of the armed forces according to the Ba'thist 
ideology. 
The war of words over Palestine waged on Baghdad radio 
in the mid of 19'7'Iis accompanied, and to some extent 
concealed, the bitter struggle for supremacy within the 
higher echelons of the Ba'th that had been continuing 
intermittently since July i<?t8. This struggle centred 
primarily around Saddam r-iussam the then President for Iraq 
Ba'th Party to the e-'itent that xhose who disagreed with him 
or who posed a threat, actual or potential to his position 
were either summarily dismissed, or, if they had a major 
power base of thier own gradually easec out.^ 
In view of these highly personalisea politics, it 15 of 
course absurd to analyse the struggles that accompanied the 
rise of Saddam Hussam in loeological terms. However, 
although Saddam Hussam had evidently managed to establish 
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himself as the strDng man of the regime well before 
September l"??! when Amma&h and Sishatli were dropped. 
Neither the degree to which he had succeeded in aoing so nor 
the means that he had employed to +-his end wei-e entirely 
obvious to the majority of Iraqis, including most members of 
the Bath party. This was because al~Ba^r, Hussain and their 
immediate circle always contrived to present their rule as 
the rule of the bath party as a whole, and to foster the 
image of the RCC as a collegiate body in which collective 
decisions were arrived at in a democratic fashion. Ihis 
image of party in government was further reinforced both by 
the systematic penetration by partv members of all 
governmental and military institutions and all masses 
organisations and also in the media by the constant use of 
the party s ideological cadet to legitimate the various 
pronouncement issued by the regime. Thus it was always the 
party that was hailed as having brought the regime to power, 
and in whose name the totality of its actions were carried 
out of course, the leadership tool-- great pains to build upon 
and improve the ev.iEting party status, with the result that 
by 1^76, when the regime had been in power for eight years 
the party could claim 10.000 activist and half a million 
sympathizers. While the Bath was still trying to secure 
itself in power in the years after July 1968, fairly strict 
melting procedures were imposed upon aspiring members, but 
such restrictions had virtually ceased to be applied by the 
end of 1973. 
In the subsequent years the Iraqi Communist Party 
continued its propaganda wor!- inside the militarv 
establishment. The two congress, in l'?70 and 1"^ 76, discussea 
the issues and its incorporatea policy in their tinal 
documents. Ba'th Party organ 1 rat ion was used as rubber 
stamp by its leadership of the national socialist ideology 
that led the ICP to adopt armed struggle as thfe main form of 
political opposition. This meant more emphasis was done to 
mobilize military to cope up with the ideology of ICP. In 
19B4, a declaration published bv the ICF on the t>r rd 
anniyersary of the foundation of the Iraqi army spelt out 
its immediate tasks : increased cadre based organisation 
within army, and popular army. With the development of 
appropriate forms of organisation to encourage soldiers and 
members of the armed forces to reject the war and establish 
the relations with the patriotic Democratic Front and to 
join the armed partisan with their arms, ammunition and 
other militry provisions, securiing contact with deserters, 
and destroying the Bath Party structures in the army. 
Further the ICP's approach was to wor^ ' inside the armed 
forces to unite its pciitical and organizational activities 
with civilian life especially among the worV-ing class'". 
On the eleventh anniversary of the Ba'th coup, in July 
1979 president al-Bat-r (Army man) resigned due to ill 
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health, behind him stood clearing way tor the Vice-
President, a Etrono ally Saddam Husain usually •^•nDW^  as the 
strong man of Iraq. President Hussain found himself as the 
head of the state which demanded much of his constructive 
abilities. The economy was booming. An interestino 
development was the cooling of Iraqi Soviet relation, as 
the new regime came to power, obviously the communist party 
of Iraq was partly responsible because it could not come to 
terms v;ith F-<a th. '' . To strengthen the Ba' th Party oT 
Iraqi Armed forces the Strategy adopted by the Ba'th Leader 
Saddam Hussain thus be described as follows. Admission to 
military colleges and institution was restricted to members 
of the Ba th Party. Those accepted had to sign on a 
condition to work for the interest of the Ba'th Party and to 
accept the death penalty if they bro^ -e the condition. All 
military officers had to join the Ba'th organisation. Those 
who refused were able to be removed from military service. 
Discrimination in recruitment and promotion on religious and 
national grounds was made more severe, and later all senior 
posts were restricted to officers related to Saddam Hussain. 
The military intelligence Department was expanded to include 
informers in ever- unit, covering the military and civilian 
life of army personnel. A comprehensive programme of 
propaganda and Ba thist ideological doctrine was introduced 
into every sector of military life.'' 
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The process of Ba'thization of the army was aimed to 
build the ideoloQical army for the protection of the regime. 
The officers had firms convictions about their elitist rule 
as the leading patriotic force in Iran society. It was an 
army inspired by "national ideas' and carried on the 
historical mission . 
4.3. The Kurdish Question in Iraq 
By tar the most critical problem that has faced modern 
iraq is the ^urdlsh question. The Aryan Purds because of 
their different ethnic origin, speak Kurdish language, 
inside Iraq and always wanted to haye a free hand in dealing 
with their own affairs. They argue that in order to 
preserve this freedom, as well as their national identity, 
the P:urdi5h areas should be granted antonomy, the t-urdish 
language should be recognised as the official languages and 
Kurds shouln be given government appointments in these 
areas. 
The l-urds had been throughout their history, subserviant 
to the ruling class that dominated the area. This, however, 
did n=T prevent some Kurdish tribal leaders from taking 
advantage of the weakness of the central government to 
establish their own autonomous principalities. These 
principalities were always short lived as the central 
government, depending on Kurdish tribal divisions and feuds. 
<?e 
were able to crush them and assert direct rule. In 1920, 
the Hurds hope for independence was boosted by the 
declaration of the Treaty of sevres, which promised them 
autonomy and independence. This hope aoain was short, 
lived, as in 1<?23 the Treaty of Lousanne replaced that of 
sevres. As a result of the new treaty, i'urdish reciion was 
divided between Turkey, Iran Iraq, Syria and the USSR. In 
Turkey and Iran, where the majority of the ^urds lived, 
immediate measures were taken by the central government to 
suppress hurdish nationalism. Only in Iraq could the furds 
claimed to have a consistent potential movement."' . 
The inability of the Iraqi qovernment to create anew 
national identity with which the majority of Iraqi Arabs and 
l-urds could identify contributed greatly to the emergence of 
the I'urdish problem, which became exceedingly difficult to 
'-esDlve. The Arab Shi is were concerned that the t<urds, the 
majority of whom are Sunni, would merge with the Sunni 
Arabs. The rise of Arab nationalism following world war I 
encouraged the Sunni Arabs to see^ a wider Arab.Union. The 
failure to create a new Iraqi identity, the emphasis on Arab 
nationalist positions by the government following l«MDrid War 
I, t*~~ imposition of restrictions on l-urdisn pDiitical 
activities, and external influences as well all contributed 
to the growth of Kurdish nationalist activity among Iraq s 
l-urds. The Kurdish question remained the most serious 
problem confronting the Iraqi government."" 
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The Bath party recognized the need to resolve the 
question of ethnic and reiicjious mmoratieE. Then 
minorities groups from a substantial percentage ot the 
population in Iraq and they have legitimiate aspirations and 
demands that must be tal-en seriously. 
The f-urdiBh problem was one of the questions mentioned 
in the newly bathist programme which came in to power in 
i*?63. The new regimes goals was to achieve national unity 
by the strenthening of l-urdish Arab brother hood which would 
safe the national interest, strengthen the common struggle 
against imperialism, and respect for the t- iqht of minorities 
T O 
by allowing them to participate in the national life"' . 
Immediately after the new Bath government came into 
power, Mustafa Barzani prominent furaish leader sent a 
telegram to it e;;pressing his support to the newly appointed 
Government and demanding self rule for tne Kirds. He also 
ordered his followers to cease armed activities against 
government forces. On the other side, the government issued 
orders to the Iraqi forces to cease fire, release of hurdish 
prisoners, and allowed former government officials who had 
joined the rebels to return to work. Two f-urdish leaders 
who had not taken part in the rebellion were appointed to 
39 the cabinet 
These gestures of good will on both sides contributed to 
i ^  >'.' 
a better atmosphere for negotiationB and encouraQed the 
belief that a peaceTul soiution to the t-urdish question was 
possible. Jn this connection moetinQ was arranged just after 
revolution between gov'ernment representative and Barzani 
which resolved the fol lowing points of agreement as foilovjs 
: general ammesty for ail hurdish rebels, the purging of 
Iraqi officials guilt/ of misconduct in the north, the 
immediate lifting of the economic bloc^ade of the t-urdish 
areas under Barzanis control, general amnesty for all 
participants in the i-urdish revolt, and withdrawal of Iraqi 
military units from rurdistan. It is important to note that 
autonomy or self rule, was not mention at this stage, 
although ~decentraliration was under stood and accepted b^ 
both sides as the recognition of the rights of the Hurds to 
self administration 
These declaration, however, failed to satisfy some 
Kurdish leaders wno were critical of the government s 
decision to negotiate with Barzani, claiming that Barzani 
did not represent all of the t-urds. Barzani responded to 
this criticism by holding a Kurdish Democratic party 
conference on me'-ch 17-19, 1963 in Poisangaq in order to 
consult with fu^riSM represer.Tat ives on the agreement 
reached with the government delegation. The conference was 
attended by about 2,000 people , of whom 168 were official 
delegates, including leftist faction of the PDF', 
representatives of the Purdish armed forces, and 
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representatives of i-urdish tribe and minorities° . 
A committee of 35 members was formed to prepare a new 
set of demands. Another committee, formed of fourteen 
(-urdiEh figures amonq them seven were selected to continue 
negotiations with the government as adviser headed b^ the 
Jaiai Talibani ^. 
Apart from regimes general reluctance to grant the rurds 
self rule, successive military governments made use of the 
Kurds ambiguous concept for autonomy and accused them of 
see^ 'lng separation the lurdish demands to maintain the 
peshmarga forces, tne demarcation of the Hurdish areas and 
the inclusion of the oils rich province of l•lrl•u^  in the 
autonomous regions were the issues, the military relied on 
to justify their point of view. On the other hand, the 
Kurdish leadership justified their e;;ces5ive demands as 
guarantees against the increasing military desire to crush 
their movement. The failure to find a peaceful settlement 
to the Question, of which the two sides sharea 
responsibility, complicated the issues and increased tne 
lack of trust between the two sides 
As a result. Kurdish revolt progressed, Mustafa s 
leadership over whole of the Hurdish national movement 
became undisputed. Only challenge to his position came from 
the politibureau of the KDP headed by Ibrahim Ahmad and 
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Jalal Talban\, In 1964, however, ta^inq aavantaae of the 
conflict with the Qovernment, Barzani expelled the Ahmad 
Talbani faction from the oarty and from Iraqi t-urdistan. He 
replaced them by the people loyal to him. Despite the 
subsequent cooperation of the Ahmad Talbani faction with the 
central qovernment against Barzani, the latter's domination 
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over the movement remained unaffected 
Negotiation between president Arif and Barrani were 
continued within the frame worl- of the existing 
constitution- However, when Dr. Bazzaz assumed the 
premiership in that vear. an amendment to article 19 of the 
constitution confirmed the national rights of Hurds within 
the frame wor^ of the national unity of the Iraqi people:e 
Hence forth on June 29, 1966 Dr. Bazzar announced a twelve 
Doint peace plan to end civil war which was going on in 
northern Iraq 
Despite these concessions, the P.urdish war continued in 
intermittently in Iraq. Four temporary cease fire were 
announced. The t'urds sought full autonomv as their primary 
objective. Iraq governments, while accepting some measure of 
self rule, regulated the idea of an excanded aiitonomy 
regarding this as a step towards seperation. In this 
connection, two points of view developed within governing 
circles as to how the l-urdish problem could be solved : a 
group favoured a military solution maintained largely by 
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army officers, the other favoured a peaceful approach 
mvolvinq granting the l-urds basic right . Civilian people 
argued that the problem could be peacefully settled by 
giving the f-urds a aegree of self rule to enable them to 
deal with their own local affairs. There views wee already, 
represented by Dr. Bazaz when he came into power in 1960. 
But before Dr. Bazzar, could put the agreed 12 point 
programme into practice, he was forced by the military 
officers to tender his resignation Dr. Barraz e^^perience had 
failed because he had neither organised popular base nor the 
power needed to enforce his position. Moreover, Dr. 
Barza:::'5 views antagonized and in the end deprived him from 
the support of the other radical political groups in the 
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country 
When president Abdur Rehman Arif came to power, he said 
initial steps must include "releasing democratic freedom, 
ending the extraordinary situatiof-- and holding free 
democratic election". He appealed particularly for general 
amnesty for political prisoners and to detaines who had not 
yet been released. The Iraqi Gcv'e'-nment was granting 
amnesty, but on a limited basis, first for four months, then 
for one year. These views of barza- »*ere mace cuoiic in 
the newly authorized Kurdish news papers, al-Taakhi, which 
was issued on April 29, 1967 for the first time. Although 
secessionist demands are often expressed by various Kurdish 
factions, it seemd certain that the predominant demand here 
lu4 
was fDr^an Iraqi unity which held that the "Republic is a 
partnership, the integrity of which can be safe guarded only 
if it spells out and guarantees full equality for and the 
existence of the J'urds as another distinct nationality in 
that Republic."'^" 
In July 1968 the Arab &ath Socialist party again came 
to power. With a young leadership and a new vision, the 
Bath party leaders saw in the Ktrdish problem a major threat 
to the existence of the Iraqi state and a threat for outside 
elements to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. 
Conflict with Purds would keep the new government weat and 
unable to check the further military coup against the Ba'th 
Party (as had occurred in 1963), so that the Bath Party 
declared its intention to find a fundamental solution to the 
l-urdish problem. This intention, however, met with the same 
old obstacles. First there was the increasing confidence of 
the kurdish leadership under Barrani. He was determined not 
to come to terms with the central government before 
obtaining all his demands. Second, there was the problem of 
convincing the party members and the Iraqi and Arab Public 
opinion that autonomy was not equivalent to separation. 
Finally, there ***« the ctDntirvuing opposition by the 
military to a peaceful settlement. With the good intention, 
the Ba'th government began to implement the outstanding 
twelve point programme of Dr. Ba:::2a2. The other positive 
steps was to open the issues for public and open discussion 
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by pubiishiriQ in the official newspaper a series of articles 
about the t-urdish question its developments and the ways to 
settle it. An important change was tal-ing place that the 
official attitude towards the i-urdish question was the 
gradual replacement of the military by civilian influence, 
and the continuing outside power attempt to take advantage 
of this issue to weaken Iraq. Therefore,the need of the time 
led the new government to conduct a series of negotitions 
with ^urdlsh people, resulting in the issuing of the 
Manifesto of 11 March 1*^ 70. This manifesto gave a 
considerable boost to the i-vurdish national movement, it 
accepted fundamental t urdish demands which previous 
governments had rejected. The Manifesto began by declaring 
that the i-urds of Iraq were part of the divided i-urdish 
people, and that rurdish national movement promised the 
hurds full recognition of their nationality and autonomy 
within four years. The t-urds were permitted to form their 
own political organization, end a certain number of the 
I-urdish armed men were allowed into the Iraqi armed forces 
as border guarcs. More important was the government's 
declaration that the Hurds we»-e part of the divided P^ urdish 
people and Kirdistan, and thar the hurdish national movement 
was part of the general Iraqi national movement- One of the 
important issue which was not solved satisfactorily was that 
of Kiri'uk 
iOo 
However, between 1974-75 the Kurdish Peshmarga too}' to 
arms aqain, despite the tact that the oovernment had 
declared, in March 1<^ 74, the Kurdish areas as an autonomous 
recjion. Differences over the interpretation of the 
Manifesto and the Hurdish claims that the plan for autonomy 
did qet their approval were the main reasons behind the 
eruption of ficihtino. Other reasons were the Kurdish 
continuino claim for the oil rich province of l-irf'ui' to be 
included in the autonomous region, and over the Hurds 
participation in the central government"'' . 
On 11 March 1*^"74 the government announced the autonomy 
law for Iraqi lurdistan. The HOP rejected this as 
incomplete and lactinq the ^DP's prior consent. On the 
following day Barzani ordered his peshmarga to occupy border 
ports and strategic points. This four years of peace were 
endea and war raged again over Iraqi H urdistan""' . 
Due to the sophistication of the weapons used, the new 
war was tough and intensive. Both sides were better 
equipped and organised, but the Iraqi army retained the 
upper hand. After the initial success of the peshmarga, the 
Iraa: eray staged its counter offensive and in a few months 
managed to remove m e peshmarga's threat to Zakho and Mosul, 
together with clearing the routes leading from and to the 
plan. In August 1974 the army launched its mam offensive 
with a view to concerning the peshmarga forces and pushing 
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them towardE the Iranian border. But the continuous supply 
of the arms to the i-urds from Iranian side made situation 
worst. Gradually it became evident that it was only the 
Iranian support which was enebleing the I-urds to hold out. 
To maintain the Iraqi sovereignty, Iraqi Government secretly 
taH-ed to the Slah on the Iranian aid to I-urds. 
After a series of secrets contacts, the Iraqi vice 
President, Saddam Hussain and Shah of Iran met in Algiers m 
March 1*^ 75, during an OPEC summit. The two official agreed 
to solve the problems between their countries peacefully and 
promised that their states would refrain from interfering in 
each other s internal affairs""^. 
As a result of this agreement Iran immediately stopped 
all aid to the Peshmarga and withdrew its troops from Iraqi 
Hurdistan. Within days of the Iraq-Irar. unaerstanding, the 
Kurdish revolt collapsed. The Iraqi Government declared a 
general one-month amnesty to all f-y^ ds and asked the 
Peshmarga to lay down their arms. Most Kurds feared 
reprisals and crossed the border into Iran rather than 
submit to bhe Iraqi government, Barzani. his famiy and 
prominent members of the KDP were amonc f^ e first tc cross. 
At the end of the amnesting period the Iraqi army moved 
almost unharassed into the heart land of the t-DP, gaining 
control of all Iraqi Kurdistan. By May 1975, armed activity 
in Iraqi Kurds had came to an end""'. 
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Followinci the =CQ1 lapse of the Hui-dish insurgency the 
Iraqi qovernment fol lowed a poiicv combinincj leniency with 
toughness in dealing with the ^urds. The most controversial 
aspect of the government's policies involved the deportation 
and resettlement of tnousands ot t urds in areas other than 
their original places of residence. 
The number of people involved in the resettlement scheme 
were hard to count but they range from as lower 40,000 to a 
high of 100, 000, depending on the sources. And while pro-
govt. Hurdish leaders had supported the establishment of 
strategic ai-^ eas and the transfer of some of the former hard 
core insurgents to the south, they had, nevertheless, 
opposed the resettlement of large numbers of Hurds in the 
south. ICP leader Mukarram Talbani, rDP leader Aziz Aqrawi, 
had opposed the resettlement policies and finally succeeded, 
with the help of Saddam Husam. in putting and end to the 
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resettlement policies 
Hence in a statement published in the Kurdish newspaper, 
al-Iraqi, on July 5, 1976, Saciam Husain admitted that the 
authorities had ta^ 'en Several "seasures suc*^  as changing the 
residence of furdish people z:;''tjer viiiaoes ana strategic 
areas, as well as changing the residence of some individuals 
such a3 civil servants, workers, and other-s. But Husain 
declared that the government had decided "to stop such 
measures completely", because "national unity, stability, 
iO-^  
and security had been established in the area". 
Furthermore, Iraqi leaders and foreign observers said that 
the policy had been reversed and that most of the resettled 
i-urds had been allowed to return to new areas m the Hurdish 
region. The only large groups that remained in southern 
Iraq were several thousand Barzanis \5,000 to 7,000) who had 
been resettled in Diwaniya. In September 1979, the Banranis 
were allowed to return to the Kurdish region. 
In 1979, a unique chapter in l-urdish history was closed 
wnen Mullah Mustafa Barrani died. Barrani s last years 
revealed the tragic end of a man who became a myth in his 
own life time. However, accordino to Barzani the Kurdish 
nationalist movement "does not die because I am Tinished" he 
further aidea that one's actions are determined by what 
appears to be The -^ight thing at a certain time and place"*"^ . 
Barrani = departure and the extent of the defeat created 
a vacuum among the Pvurdish opponents of the Iraqi 
government. The r DP bro^ -e into several factions. One 
faction heaaed by Habib Muhammad i areem and Dare Tawfiq 
returned to Baghdad. Another faction led by Mahmood Uthman 
had brorer m-.tt BB'-ZS-i ar-d formed the ^ DP preparatory 
committee which criticized both the Bath and the Barzani 
leadership. A third faction remained loyal to Barranis sons 
idris and Massud, who were surrounded by a small number of 
intellectuals led by Muhammad Abd al- Rehman. A fourth 
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group, the patriotic union of Kurdistan (F'LIK> , was bacJ ed by 
All al-Askari who was widely respected as one of the 
56 Peshmargas and most able commanders. 
The turmoil in Iran and the collapse of the Shah s 
regime provided a new opportunity for the Iraq Kirdish 
leadership, particularly as relations between the secular 
Arab nationalist goyernment in Baghdad and the islamic 
government an Tehran deteriorated sharply. The quarrel 
between the two reqimes was deep and comple^; and had its 
roots in historic, territorial, ideological. Strategic and 
political difference" . 
Syria and Iran, while united in their opposition to 
Iraq, disagreed on the issue of support to rival factions in 
Iraq. Syria appeared to be backing a loose coalision of 
Talibani's P\J\ , Nisirite elements, Pro-Syrian Ba'tnists and 
the ICP, while Tehran backed al-Wawah party led by Haoastai 
Islam. Munammad al-Halier, an Iraqi Shii religious leader 
who was rhomanis choice for leadership in Iraq ano Barzani 
led F\DPPC. Tehran was reported to have interceptec arms 
shipments sent by Syria to Talibani."" . 
Within this scheme of internal and external the 
regional enemies of the Iraqi Government became useful 
allies, regardless of the lack of any other points of common 
interest. Actually, the apparent distraction or weakening of 
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the Qovernment in Baghdad ,causinQ ;it to relax its military 
control of hurdistan, was seen as an opportunity to reassert 
the Kurdish demands which the Iraqi military presence was 
designed to suppress. Consequently following the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 and the subsequent deterioration oi 
relation with Iraq , both the main Kurdish parties the 
t-urdish Democratic party (h.DP) and the patriotic Union of 
t-urdistan <PUH ) saw a chance for the revival of their 
fortunes.The KDP consolidated it self successfully in 
cultivating the new regime in Tehran, partly by offering its 
services in Tehrans campaign to eradicate the Iranian 
Kurdish autonomous movement.The PUI-, whose origin vOfS: due 
partly to communal and ideological difference among the 
Kurds and partly to a bitter fend between its leader, Jalal 
Talabani, and the Barrains who lead the KDP, could not bring 
itself to collaborate with Tehran in this respect.When war 
broke out between Iraq and Iran in 1980, the situation in 
Kurdistan was sufficiently confused to allow the Iraqi 
Government to feel freely relaxed about its position 
there.Indeed this confusion lasted for the first two years 
of the war promoting Saddam Hussain to spea^' much that the 
Kurdish organisations would never be apie to achieve 
anything since they were hopelessly divided against each 
other and subservient to foreign powers. As a result he 
claimed, the government was reducing its military p^^esence 
in the region and putting Kurdish units of the people's Army 
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59 in charge of I'ui^ di tsn's security 
In the year 1963 .Hurdish guemJla Drganization became 
active and also attached on other Hurdish orcjaniration .In 
the Kurdish conte-tt these constitute a double threat not 
only did they significantly wea^en the iraqi armed torces 
capacity to resist Iranian offensives in the area, they also 
had an alternative political and military orQanisation to 
join, in the shape of the Kirdish guerrilla movement. 
For the PUI-, which was negotiating with Baghdad during 
1983-84, it was cleared that even the pressure of war and 
their own threat to resume guerrilla operations would not 
win substantive concessions from Saddam Hussain. The latter 
firmly resisted PUI demands that fixed percentage of oil 
reveues should go to ^urdish developments proaects, that the 
hurdish militia under the government control should be 
disbanded, that the area of furdistan should be extended, or 
that there should be any meaningful political autonomy. 
Political power was clearly indivisible for Saddam Husain 
and this had been the rock on which any negotiation with the 
Hurds had foundered. As a result, the PUt' was to join the 
KDP in armEd operation against I^ a^qi government targets in 
1985^ ''-'. 
The aim of Kurdish guemiia was nothing but the 
campaign of harassment against Iraqi forces, equally 
important had been the intention displayed by both the PDP 
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and the PUP to create areas in which they could be fr?ee of 
Iraqi QDvernments intef erf erence, thereby establ ishincj a 
form of defacto autonomy. When the activities of the 
t-urdish groups strategically approached vital resources such 
as the high way and pipeline to Tur^'ey, the Iraqi government 
displayed considerable ruthlessness and tenacity in 
thwarting the aims of the Purds. 
This was, indeed, a problem for the Kurds and had given 
them some difficulties in the definition of their political 
aims. Nevertheless, as the PUh seemed to recognise in 1987, 
the call for an independent t ur^distan was the more inspiring 
rallying cry, an attempt to reconcile the various ideas on 
the desirability and practically of independence, while not 
alienating their Iranian hosts, was evident in September 
1987, when all the t-urdish parties united in affront which 
called for a future separate Kirdish state, confederated 
with a future democratic Iraq . Politically, ^urds tend to 
be excluded from considerabation by those who were closer to 
the centre of Iraq and might, therefore, to able to affect 
its future. Towards tne end of 198'7, it was noticeable that 
the leaders of both nva;or furdish guerrilla organisations 
attempted to remedy this, by urging all patriotic Iraqi's to 
overthrow the regime. Masua Barrani stated that the 
responsibility for the liberation of the Iraqi nation... 
falls on the shoulders of every patriotic Iraqi. Jalal 
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Talabani, meanwhile adaressinq himself directly to the Iraqi 
officer corps, warned them aoainst believino Sadaam 
Hussain's slogan that they are defending the country. On 
the contrary, he stated, they were merely defending the 
regime and defence of Saddam 5 regime, this is treachery 
against the ascirations of the Iraqi nation and treason 
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against the country 
The l-urds, however, believed that by gaining territory 
they can achieve a number of aims : they can gain time and 
freedom from government control, they can establish 
themselves in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the 
government, it mav be their success, contribute towards the 
weakening and eventual overthrow of that government. These 
are in many respects the traditional goals of all Kurdish 
political ffiovements. The war had given them the opportunity 
to pursue them with greater vigour than before, but it haa 
not caused them to see themselves or their relationship to 
Baghdad, or the modalities of that relationship, m a 
radically different light. Much the same can be said of the 
government of Saddam Hussain. War with Iran might have 
placed constrains on the available resources with which to 
confront thre perennial problem of the Kurds. Hov»e-««^ . it 
had not changed his perspective on that problem, nor his 
belief about the intolerable nature of the h.urdish groups 
aspirations to political power. Equally. it has left 
unaltered Saddam Hussain's views on the utility of the means 
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by which central Qovernment had souqht to address the 
problem. Force, bribery, intimidation, the exploitation of 
intei—rurdish rivalries, and the appeal to a ranqe of self-
interested motives would continue to be the major 
instruments in the hands of the novernment. These seem 
ll^elv to remain more effective ways for the government to 
enlist the support of l-urds aqainst their fellow r urds and 
against the letters Iranian allies, than anv of Saddam 
Hussain s attempts to inculcate a sense of specifically 
Iraqi nationalism among the inhabitant of Hurdistan "'. 
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Chapter 5 
The Syrian and Iraqi Ba^ th Ideological 
Differences and Tactical Disputes 
iiroB Umty 
Arab SodaCism 
Inter-SlraB stations 
5.1 Arab Unity t 
The Arabs, founders of the Islamic Empire m the middle 
of the seventh century, ceased to control it as a single 
empire by the middle of the eicihts century. Since that time 
the Arabs have remained disunited, althoucih Arabs by 
lanquacje and culture constitute the majority in all 
countries form Iraq to Morocco. When the calls to unity 
beqan to be beared aqain in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, Arab spokesmen were m fact divided 
among champions of Arab supremacy among Muslims, Champions 
of Islamic Supermacv in Arab States and of Arab Nationalism. 
These differences persisted until after World War II. The 
Arab Leaciue founded in 1945 as the first collaborative 
association among Arab nations, remained ineffective as 
quarrels persisted between the Hashmite dynasties of Iraq 
and Jordan and the non-Hashimite dynasties and rulers of 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria . 
The increasing appeal of Arab as opposed to local or 
regional nationalism - at least at the level of discourse — 
may be gauged from the concept of Greater Syria adhered to 
by the Syrian National Party (SNP), now recaptized as the 
Syrian Social National Party <SSNP). The two rival 
Hashemite schemes of Greater Syria and of fertile crescent 
unity remained in the air. Abdullah, who under the terms of 
his 1946 treaty with Britain was promoted from Ameer to ^ ing 
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of Trans-Jordan, immediately used his new independence to 
relaunch his Greater Syria Scheme which was elevated to a 
principle of his qovernment's foreion policy. His Iraqi 
competitor moved more subtly but also more ruthlessly to 
promote their own Fertile crescent project. They cultivated 
an important clientele amonq the politicians of Syria, but 
when conspiracy failed to yield tangible results, 
subsequently was discarded, and with the connivance of pro-
Hashemite forces in Syria military attacks were twice 
2 planned, although they were not carried out. . 
The constitution of the Arab Ba'th Party, approved at 
its first congress in Damascus in April 1947, contained a 
clear commitment to the political unification of the entire 
Arab World. Indeed this document declares the struggle to 
gather all the Arabs in a single independent state "co be the 
partys mam goal. This state should be coejdstent with the 
Arab fatherland (WATAN) which was that part of the globe 
inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches from the Taurus 
Mountain, the Pocht-i-Kouch ftountains, the Sulf of Basra, 
the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara the 
Atlantic Ocean, and the Medite'-r«nean. 
Michael Aflaq and Salah al-dm Beytar were the founding 
father of the new party and the constitution, which was 
retained when the party merged with Akram Howrani's Arab 
Socialist Party in 1953 to become the Arab Socialist Ba'th 
121 
Party, remains the latter'5 basic document of this day, in 
both Iraq and Syria. . 
However, in the early 1950s and early i960s divisive 
tendencies were absent in the party. On the contrary, the 
Ba'th increasingly and clearly emerged as the driving force 
-for Arab Unity. In this early period nothing yet portended 
the future paradox of Ba'thi rule in two countries that 
instead of bringing about unity, it led to further division. 
Certainly, previous Arab Nationalist Movements had succumbed 
to division but conditions then seemed altogether different 
and far from being as promising as in the days of newly 
acquired independence. 
The Ba'th saw in itself the culmination of the history 
of Arab nationalism, and considered itself to be the one 
movement that would finally drive home the Arabs secular 
dream of political unification, and so fulfill their supreme 
aspirations. This claim accurately situates the party in 
its historical context of political thought and action, but 
otherwise is more a political programme than a statement of 
facts. For many of those embracing Arab nationalism as an 
ideology it did not culminate in the establishment of a 
state cD-extensive with the entire territory inhabited by 
Arabs; nor did Arab nationalists ever all subscribe to a 
definition of the Arab nation as large as he Ba'ths. And 
quite apart from that, not all of those defined by the Ba'th 
as Arabs were Arab nationalist but adopted other locally 
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more constricted nationalism instead . 
The Iraqi coup of 1956 served to dramatize that the 
major remainino obstacle to Arab Unity was no longer foreign 
influence but disaqreement amonq the Arabs themselves. Under 
General Qasim a nationalist regime came to power although 
was inspired and stimulated by many of Nasir's ideas, yet 
refused to join with him in a common Arab states. People 
who agreed at least on the social context and purpose of 
nationalism found themselves interpreting in different 
fashions, the national interests of each separate Arab 
state. An earlier generation of Arab nationalist had 
adjusted itself to an unresolved tension between Arab 
nationalism and dynastic interests. To the new nationalist, 
the clash between nationalism and national interests seemed 
to come as an unexpected shock . 
In Iraq itself after 1958, the clash among nationalist 
provoked repeated bloody disorders and attempts on the life 
of Beneral Qasim. There were many factions advocating their 
own sets of ideas regarding the move for Arab Solidary. The 
more moderate supporters of Iraqi solidarity with the Arabs 
(as opposed to Arab Unity^ argued that Iraq had not yet got 
an opportunity freely to develop its own political 
institutions or freely plan the full development of its own 
national economy. Why not build up a multy party democracy 
that would reflect the qenuine differences of opinion and 
cultures that e);ist in Iraq", and discover first the true 
measure of Iraq's wealth and power instead of forcing Iraq 
prematurely into the centralized structure of another Arab 
State -•• Radical Iraqi nationalists sought to unite Arabs 
under Iraqi hegemony by laying claim to the oil-rich 
Sheif'hdom of f'uwait and pressing Syria and Jordan to Unite 
with Iraq. 
The pro-Nasir faction in Baghdad were not all of one 
mind either. The Iraqi branch of Syrian Socialist 
ResurrectioniBt (Ba th'* Party fought hard to bring Iraq into 
the Egyptian-Syrian Union. At first glance, that policy 
seemed merely a continuation of its established line. The 
Ba'th Party had been chiefly responsible for tying Syria to 
Egypt, After the Egyptian-Syrian Union had been consummated 
Nasir had not trusted this Syrian basec Fartv either to 
become the core of the 'National Union', the sole political 
movement of the United Arab Republic, ar to survive as the 
National Unions competitor. If the Ba'th now strive for 
Iraq's inclusion in the UAR, its hope see«ed to be that its 
victory in Baghdad would allow it to strike a new and 
different bargain with Nasir regardinc rrje iist-it^ u'rian of 
power an a United Arab State. The Arab nationalists in 
Baghdad who fought unhesitatingly for complete unity with 
the UAR in 1958 had by 1961 also drawn certain lessons from 
Syria's experience. Most of them expected Iraq to arrange 
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in advance that pr^oportion of its revenues which would be 
allocated to the central Arab aovernment. 
The politicallv active people in the Arab East doubtless 
recDonized by the early 1960s that the quest -for Arab Unity 
was no longer a matter merely of setting relations among 
Arab governments. Popular Movements had arisen that 
responded willingly to leaders of neighbouring Arab states 
or at least to similar programmes. Many Arabs now quite 
readily treat the struggle for unity, hegemony, or 
separatism among the Arab states, even when it involves 
political violence, as an acceptable phase of an internal 
Arab revolution rather than an inadmissible form of combat 
among sovereign states. But the simple enthusiasm of 1956, 
when Nasir was still the only successful champion of Arab 
Unity IS gone. Today, even supporters of Nasir in the most 
artificial Arab States Jordan, tend to draw distinctions 
between Egyptian hegemony ana Arab Unity. They would yield 
their separate statehood only in return for a clear 
statement of their autonomous •^ ights'^ . 
In the beginning of this ce^itury, Syrian unity with Iraq 
was mainly the interest c^ t^ .e pecv-« s party those 
predominantly Alepine constituency suffered economically 
from the Syro-Iraqi border and moreover found itself at a 
relative disadvantage vis-a-vis its bourgeoise competitors 
from Damascus. In other cases, such as Zaims, unity was a 
device = to prop up unstable rule. Thus in both countries 
unity schemes emerged from 'particularist' interests for 
whom there would be a direct economic advantage or more 
generally considerations of power which, of course, then as 
much as now were translatable into economic benefit. 
However, Syria as a whole was not well disposed towards 
Iraq. Other political actors in the country preferred close 
relations with Egypt or in some cases with Saudi Arabia, if 
only to defend their interests more effectively in internal 
conflicts with those who could count on support from Iraq. 
Iraq of course, intern considered its own external 
alliance in equally defensive terms. Syro-Iraqi relations 
consequently oscillated, depending on which group was in 
control of government in Damascus. Conflict was over Iraqi 
hegemony projects allied to material interests of a faction 
of the geographically fragmented Syrian bourgeoise, as 
opposed to the letter's inner Syrian competitors. It was 
exacerbated in 1955 when Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact, which 
was seen by Damascus as an attempt to enhance its regional 
position through an alliance with imperialist forces . In 
Syria the Bagncac =^ act split ^^aq s supporters and further 
contributed to the country's rapprochement, with Egypt. 
While none of the Arab Unity Schemes had yet been 
successful, the Ba'th's efforts seemed to be more 
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auspicious. Certainly, there had been aqreements of 
cooperation more or less limited or extensive, but no 
integration or even merger of states. The Ba'th now seemed 
to bring this services of failures to an end. When for the 
first time it achieved some representation in an Arab 
QDvernment, that of Syria, it attempted and temporarily 
succeeded in bringing about the depassement of this state a 
larger entity, the United Arab Republic (UAR) . At this 
point it should be recalled that Michael Aflaq had served as 
Minister of Education from August to November 1949 under 
Hinnawi and then, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, had 
opposed union with Iraq on the grounds that it would only 
result in increased power for the Hashemites and Britain and 
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consequently contradict Arab independence . Among many of 
his contemporaries this was an entirely acceptable stance 
that left no stains on his Arab nationalist reputation and 
record. 
In 1954 general elections Ba'th was the third largest 
group in the Syrian parliament, the Ba'th obtained two key 
portfolios. Also they talked about the merger of Syria with 
Egypt. f^inally, in 1958 the Ba'th leaders played a crucial 
role 1- =«T~5uadinc, > "^eluctant Nasir to accept the merger of 
Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic ". 
The experiment of UAR however failed to meet Ba'thi 
expectations, and when with the coup of 28 September 1961 
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the Separatist reciime came to power in Syria and put and end 
to the unitary experience with Egypt, some Bathists, amonq 
them Beytar, even signed a manifesto welcominci the move of 
the separatist. The siqnatories did not oppose the 
principles of Union, but thev were disappointed with the 
shape it had taken . Syrian, in aeneral, had been 
progressively excluded from decision making and Syria had 
effectively become an Egyptian province. 
While the regime led to low in Syro-Egyptian relations, 
it meant normalization, even rapprochement in relations with 
Iraq. This was most visible in the three day meeting in the 
border village of Albu Kamal of the new Syrian president 
Nazim-al-Qudsi and his Iraqi counter part Abdul Karim Oasim. 
Thus Syria's relations with Egypt and Iraq continued to 
follow the old pattern of the struggle for Syria when weak 
regimes in Damascus sought support from Cario or baghdad, 
normally inverting their predecessor's choice. 
The alliance came to an end when, on 8th February 1963, 
the regime of Qasim was overthrown by a Ba'th coup, 
supported by Nasirists and independent nationalists. The 
separatist regime in Syria now found itself encircled by 
radical Arab Nationalists advocating "Arab Socialism" 
whether the Nasirist or Ba'thist version, both of which had 
considerable appeal within Syria itself. And indeed, 
exactly a month later, on 8th March 1963, the Syrian regime 
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fell to a coalition of Nasinst, independent nationalist and 
Ba'thi officers. While the Iraqi Ba'th from the outset 
controlled the new reoime, the Syrian party still had to 
discard its allies in the coup, a task in which it succeeded 
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as early as July 1963 . These forces led to continue 
Ba'thi rule in Syria to the present day. In Iraq, 
ironically non-Ba'thi groups continued to survive in the 
armed forces and eventually, on 18th November 1963, 
overthrew the Ba'thist regime ". 
Soon after the coup the new regimes in Damascus and 
Baghdad started to enter into fresh negotiations with Egypt 
to bring about the Union of three states. The new Unitv 
scheme was supported, though for reason of of their own, by 
14 Nasirists and independent nationalists in Syria and Iraq 
Such non-Bathi support, however, did not eclipse the role of 
the Ba'th, and its image as the driving fcce for Arab Unity 
was confirmed and reinforced. 
The tripartite negotiations in which Ba'th leaders like 
Aflaq and Beytar took a leading role led to an agreement 
Signed in Cairo on 17th April 1963, but this schemes failed 
just after a Nasirist coup attempt in Syria on 18th July 
1963. Ba'thi Syria and Iraq decided to negotiate a 
bipartite Unity Scheme which fell into Egyptian anger. 
Although Syria was again linked to one of the two 
traditional competitors for hegemony in the Arab East, the 
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bipartite Unity achieved in 1963 differed from previous such 
alliances in the important respect that now Damascus was' 
quickly asserting itself as an equal partner. However aoain 
this Unity Scheme failed as well. The chance was 
irretrievably lost when the Ba'th regime in Iraq, after 
heavy infighting, on 18th November 1963 was overthrown by 
General Abdul Salam Arif "'. Non-Ba'thi forces had once more 
caused Arab Unity to collapse at least, so it seemed. The 
Ba'th regime in Damascus which was not affected by Arif's 
coup was now left alone, without any potential partner for 
unity as all other Arab regimes were either too far away or 
too different in their political outlooks. Consequently, it 
did not appear astonishing that Syria, despite continuous 
verbal insistence on the need for Arab Unity, did not embark 
on any new attempt to realize it correctly. 
Between November 1963 anc July 1968 the major change in 
the triangular relationship between Syria, Iraq and Egypt 
was that Syria and Iraq now tried for Egypt's sympathy, and 
no longer Egypts and Iraq for that of Syria. Vet, Egypt's 
new role was not Syria's old one as under Nasir's rule it 
continued to pursue a consistent, 'undivided' foreign policy 
contrary to that at the sa»fr time a week regime in Iraq 
competed for Egypt's favour against an ascendant but as yet 
only nascent power in Syria. In fact, the Syrian regime was 
on the ascendant only on the regional level where it sought 
to create a new dynamic in the Arab Israel conflict. This 
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strategy inevitably necessitated the vi1ification°of Arif's 
reQime in Iraq on which Nasir relied to contain Syrian 
adventuresome - Some Syrian Bathis were also resentul of 
Arif's coup against the Iraqi Ba'th regime. 
The Ba'thiet reaime again came into power in Svria and 
Iraq in 1966 and 1968 respectively, and there seemed once 
again to be two Arab countries ruled by members of the 
progressive movement. But from the very beginning of this 
second period of Ba'thi coexistence, Syro-Iraqi relations 
rapidly and sharply deteriorated. Despite transitory 
periods of detente the Ba'th regimes of the two countries 
have ever since been at odds, even at loggerheads, the 
tension was also manifested during the brief interludes of 
relative peace 
Nothing in July 1968 seemed to distinguish any longer 
the Ba'th from ail its predecessors in matters of Arab 
Unity. Ll^ 'e them the Ba' th now appeared as an actor 
verbally promoting Arab Unity but actually exacerbating Arab 
division. Either tne Unitary discourse did not correspond to 
the actual policies or it was overtaken by the pervers* 
consequences. UnnKe in previous instances, however, novf 
division and disunity occurred between two protagonists 
professing the same unitary discourse. 
The disasterous defeat in 1967, gave a heavy perhaps 
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even a fatal blow to Arab socialism, Arab Nationalism and 
the idea of Arab Unity. Indeed the clash of interest and 
ideological conflict which became hurdle in this Unity 
efforts and more precisely of the particularist interests of 
the rulers-only from march 1972 onwards. In the year 1968-
72 conflict arose less from a clash of incompatible 
interests than from compatible interests beincj 
simultaneously e-'.pressed and defended through the same Ba' th 
discourse, to be an efficient vehicle of interest this 
18 discourse,however, had to be monopolized. 
5.2 Arab Socialism : 
With the promotion of idea of Socialism in West Asia, a 
new generation of politically conscious Arabs came into 
existence with a desire to control the ruling class which 
were supported by the foreign tutelage. Elements of fc^eion 
domination remained, especially in the commercial and 
financial fields. So far they were not eager to pro(7*cte 
unity among the Arab States, they stood for a hignly 
conservative economic and social philosophy which »*ould 
preserve their interests. They represented, in fact. a 
coalition o"* serchant landowners and tribal leade*-? t«-ie 
traditionally dominant elements in Arab Society who tend 
naturally to consider their interests as synonymous with 
19 
those of the society at large 
It was natural, therefore, for the new intel1igensia to 
13: 
demand thoronQh reforms in Doiiticai, economic and Eocial 
fields, along with independence and Arab Unity. In more 
concrete terms, the new middle class wants planned economic 
development with all of its ramifications, a raisino of 
living standards, state control of the means of production, 
broad social welfare, land reform, educational e^joansion and 
dignity for all, especially in the eyes of other nations. 
Bivincj an impetus to these demands and to the role of 
the new middle class is the rapidly changing socio-economic 
structure. The increasing urbanization of the Arab World, 
albeit far behind that of the West, is expanding the 
reservoir of malcontents to be activated by the new 
generation of politically conscious. Also, the very fact of 
urbanziation has brought new problems which cannot be 
allieviated within the rapidly decaying traditional Social 
Structure. The rise of labour unions, the imoortance of tne 
ever expanding student body and the existence of vast 
numbers of unemployed and under-employed living m and 
•aro-und the cities have brought new forces to be reckoned 
with. Arab socialism was born of these dissatisfaction and 
under conditions which have left distinctive mai-ks on t^e 
20 poov CT its doctrine and on its methods 
Afiaq 15 quite specific in stating his belief that "Aran 
Socialism" can only be reali::ed completely in one United 
Arab State. In his writings, Aflaq defined Arab socialism 
\z: 
as an indigenous movementobased on an Arab heritage which 
rejected both the communist and Western Socialist 
philosophies. The communist ideology was found unacceptable 
because, among other things, it negated national ism.preached 
a mechanical economic theory and presented a threat to 
individualism. Western socialism, accordino to him. not 
only turns against capitalism but against its allies, 
nationalism and religion. 
Aflaa believed that Arabs must build, their nationalist 
jdeoloQv on the basis of Ba'thist ideology. 
More so in the post war era the Ba th Party had the 
advantages of being an organization with little competition 
beyond the several local nationalist opposition parties 
21 B;;isting in Syria and Iraq 
After the Ba' th Party came to powe-- in Srria in 1963, it 
discussed the relations of the partj and government and of 
party and populace, as well as the problems generated by the 
establishment of the national guard. It affirmed the right 
of the people to criticize the partv and made a special 
point that such organirations as t'-r^ e c-f laco^ j--. students 
and professional people should net be subject to state 
control. 
The conference decided, moreover, that the socialist 
goals of the party should be put into operation immediately. 
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Such a move would have been a reversal of Aflaq s 
traditional attitude that independence and unitv were 
necessai'v pre-conditions for the successful implementation 
of Ba'thist <Arab> Socialism. It represents the strono 
influence exerted during the conference bv the ~extremist 
winq associated with All Salih Sadi and Nun al - Din - al -
Atassi, Secretaries General of the Iraqi and Syrian regimes 
respectively. Specifically, the sixth, conference statement 
considered the establishment of collective forms on land 
processed under the agrarian reform measures as a ooal to be 
striven for uroentlv. The constitution aims at free 
compulsory education and free medical care were reaffirmed 
and urcied by the conference. There were only a few 
references to industry in the statement and no mention let 
alone any threats of national izatic- of foreign companies'"". 
The constitution envisions a United Arab Society 
encompassinci all Arab States, in wr.ich social .lustice will 
prevail and political liberalism will persuade the people to 
choose the Ba'th path. The ooal of a just and equitable 
society, in which extremes of weait^. and poverty do not 
exist, is a cardinal one for th-e Ba'th. The Ba'th 
constitution, for example, calls for the redistribution of 
land holdinqs amonci the citi::ens on a just basis (Art. 27) . 
for the nationalization of utilities and large industries 
(Art 29), for sweeping guarantees of wages, wor^ ing 
13? 
conditions and old age insurance (Art. 40> for complete free 
medical care (Art Z"^) and for free compulsory education 
through the secondary level (Art. 45 ?•' 46). The 
constitution is G;;plicit in saying that the educational 
policy of the party aims at creating a new Arab generation 
faithful to the unity of its nation and the perpetuity of 
its mission"^ "'. 
Article 4 of the 1947 Ba'th constitution States that 
socialism is necessary for Arab Nationalism. being the 
system which would allow the Arabs to develop their inherent 
potentialities. Socialism will enable the Arab nation to 
increase its production and strengthen its bonds. Believing 
that wealth in the Arab countries is un.iustly distributed, 
the programme calls for its "fair distribution" among the 
citizens. However. there is no call for a general 
nationalization of capital. In line with the generally 
accepted view among socialists, public utilities, major 
national resources, and large scale industrial and transport 
services would be nationalized. Foreign owned concessions 
and company rights would be cancelled. Land reform is 
envisioned with the sire of plots limited to that which the 
owner can work without 'exploitation of the efforts of 
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others'. 
It IS significant that the Ba'th has declared that 
although it believes in socialism because it would realize 
13i 
social justice, the party would embrace another social 
system if it found a better one, 
Aflaq claimed that his socialism does not have the 
waterialistic objective of feedina the hungry and clothino 
the na^ 'ed, 'but the hioher one of freeino man's talents and 
abilities. This means a destruction of the influence one of 
freeinci man's talents and abilities. This means a 
destruction of the influence of the traditional aristocracy 
of wealth which has ruled the Arab countries for 
DGnerations, so that lower classes may breal- out the 
economic orio which has held them in a depressed state and 
which has blocked their Dolitical influence. Here again he 
rejects the communist definition of socialism in the wor^s 
of Marv, and Lenin. The Ba'ths socialism is proclaimed to be 
0'=; 
a new form of nationalism'^'". 
In its vision of Arab Unity Ba'thist Socialism envisions 
brinqing together those Arab countries whose progress is 
obstructed by their lacf- of capital and natural resources 
with their better endowed brethren who would share their 
wealth. 
The Ba'ths st'tT'ude toward real estate holdings -T 
spelled out in the party's programme, ownership of buildings 
IS to be limited to what can be personally used. 
'Exploitation' by means of renting is forbidden. A 
reference in the constitution to the state guaranteeing a 
minimum ownershio of landed property for all citirenn would 
seem to indicate that private home ownership, as well as 
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agricultural plots, is to be encouraged 
Usury, so prevalent in most parts of the Arab World, is 
to be abolished. However, interest on money at a reasonable 
rate is to be allowed. A Qovernment bank for aoricultural 
and industrial projects is envisioned, it would issue a 
currency bac^ed by "national production". 
Trade, in all of its forms, is to be controlled bv the 
State. A reference to the maintenance of equilibrium 
between E'lports and imports seems to hark back to economic 
nationalism, or nierely shows a lack of economic 
sophistication. Following on the path of trade restrictions 
is the concept of a directed economy for the Arab countries 
and their industrialisation. Another interesting, aspect of 
the Ba'th's economic policy is worker participation and 
profit sharing in the management of factories. 
The internal disarray in the Arab world necessitates a 
far reaching social revolution, according tc Ba'thist 
tea£:*"'inc) the Arabs do not have time to wait fo- evolutionary 
proc'^ess, especially since the more advanced countries will 
continue their rate of progress and make catching up 
impossible. Aflaq lays great stress on a revolution of 
spirit, especially in the moral and intellectual realms. 
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The 5i;;th articlf of the prooramme endE with the ringinq 
e!;hortation "to raise in revolt aqainst corruption in all 
spheres of intellectual, social and political life". Thus, 
the Ba'th is not only pushino for a resurrection of Arabism, 
but for revolution, no evolution, in the fullest sense of 
the term, a forced reformation of the social and political 
structure of the Arab countries which ousts old ideas and a 
decadent spirit. As Aflaq States, "the gap and 
disfiDurement in the Arab nationalist structure can only be 
bridqed by a violent wrenchincj away from the present 
SI tuat ion"'"' . 
In Aflaq's eyes the Arab nation's interior is rotten 
filled with social in.iustice e;:ploi tat ion, ignorance, 
weakness in thought, and lacking in tolerance and love. 
Thus the Arab people must rcr r-1- struggle against 
imperialism and Zionism but agsi-st Tnemselves-
Absolute equality before f-e law is guaranteed to all 
citirens, as is freedom o-*" e-ipression. However, these 
appear to be abridged by the addition of the clause so often 
found in West Asian political aocuments - "Hthin he limits 
of the law. "' 
In a social level, marriage is a natic--al duty to be 
encouraged and facilitated bv the state. This probably 
refers to breaking down some of the e^tisting barriers to 
1 " . < = • 
marriacje. 
In conformitv with the Bs th s thesis of awakenina the 
Arab people, the programme includes a special article 
relatinq to the encDuraoement of Arab culture in all of its 
aspects. Likewise, private organisations and political 
parties to be piven opportunities to function. The 
consitiution also reiterates a continued theme in Ba'thist 
rhetoric, namely freedom of expression by the individual 
and the press. However, this may be circumscribed by the 
29 
hiQher Arab national interest 
As in the case with socialist docjma ever/ where, 
class difference and their distinctions, are to be 
abolished- This applies, not only to economic classes, but 
to those paragons of Arab civilization - the Bedouin. In 
Ba'thist eyes they are an embarrassment which retards 
progress and they must be el: nir.ated by sedentari rat ion. In 
order to bring the new Qr:lE:r to the Arab World the Ba' th 
envisions the creation of a new generation by means of 
education. 
Carrying further these concept of enlightenment, "Aflaq 
has stated that even those -s-r r,o-v oc^rse the Ba'th'e ideas 
poses a "hidden will" to Arab nationalism that has not yet 
been revealed to them. Also, underlying Aflap's thinl-ing 
seems to be a suffering motif. He has stated that "The 
driving factor in the Arab world is suffering, which he 
i 4 0 
reoards as a boon which makes more certain the attainment of 
ideals." Another radical departure from current Arab 
nationalist thouqht has be Aflaq's ideas on the sub.iect of 
the "new Arabs". He called on the Arabs to stop blamino 
imperialism for ail of their ills and to reaard it as a 
result of our own inaction indirectincj a change in our 
rotten intet^ nal situation and not as a cause for this 
situation and its persistence. 
The first step towards freeing the agricultural sector 
from the pattern of absentee landlord exploiting share 
cropper peasant come during the UAR period. Though this 
pattern had been criticized by the political forces, due to 
the land reform in Syria followed Egyptian practice. 
The notion cf land reform, putting farmers on their own 
land, 15 appealmgly simple. carrying out is a lengthy and 
complex task. The oovernment had to establish which land to 
take devise mechanisms to get it into peasant hands, and 
arrange to provide the services — Seed, tools, fertili::ers 
— that land lores nad proviaed. Again when the Ba'th came 
into power l^hZ, once again the land reform programme was 
restarted and '-^ -:sed t*-e li3=at on holdings to between 37 
and 125 acres of irrigated a-s 200 to 750 acres of rainfed 
land, depending r- its location, quality and productivity.'' 
During the last half of the 1960s, Ba'th ideologues were 
in control of domestic economic policy. In the countryside 
143 
their approach was to concentrate on the establishment of 
state farms and cooperative societies as agricuiturai 
production units. The latter gave peasants usufruct rioht 
to land but not ownership. The cooperative provided seed, 
fertilirer and machinery, but thev also imposed restrictions 
on crops to be planted, mar^'eting and purchases of material. 
About two thousand cooperative were in e>;istence by 1^70. 
Not all were production units some farmers found these 
associations beneficial in terms of oettinct needed services. 
All in all, however, the system of state farms and enforced 
-TO 
cooperatives was unpopular amonp the farmino population"". 
Further changes took place after Asad came into power in 
1970. 
The regime opted for better performance at the expense 
of ideoloical ourity. Many state farms were converted to 
CDoreratives and the state farm as a significant 
agricultural sector virtually ceased to e;;ist, there were 
fewer than ten in 1978. Naturally, there has been arqument 
wit^ :^'- the coui-'try as to the proper direction of the 
agricuiturai sector. The argument focuses on whether 
cr'rr*-atives sno-.-cr grew or shrink, i.e. whether they shoulc 
be converted int= agricultural production units or their 
role should be confined to providing seed, fertilizer, 
marketing assistance or whether they should be allowed to 
decrease further. Through the 19705, the advocates of the 
latter views have had the upper hand. Pragmatism, not 
ideolDqy has been the quidinq principle of the country s 
aqronomists"'"'. 
Syria's effort to convert itself from a predominantly 
agricultural country to an urban one offerinq to its people 
0 
a variety of nonagricultural ways of earning a livelihood 
has involved the expansion - indeed, almost the creation -
of many areas of the economy. Industry is a sector that 
scarcely existed half a century ago. In 1^80 manufacturing 
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and mining provided 20 percent of GDP 
Suitably for a country with a large agricultural base 
and great further potential, a substantial element in Syrian 
industrial development has involved the processing of 
domestic agricultural raw materials. Te,(tiles, once a major 
handicraft business, are a growth industry in the form of 
both cloth and manufactured garments. To achieve self 
sufficiency in sugar the government has built sugar beet 
refineries. 
Asad'5 liberalized policy toward private enterprise in 
certain sectors of the economy, the removal of rigid 
ideologues from positions of influence, and good weather set 
Syria on a new path of rapid growth during the first half of 
the 1970s. E;;ternal aid, which began to flow to Syria from 
its oil-mch neighbors, developed an erratic quality. It 
dropped in 1976 because some donors objected to Syrian 
intervention m Lebanon that year, was restored in 1977, 
took a quantum jump in 1979 after the Baghdad summit of late 
197B, and dropped off sharply by 19B0, again due to 
political disacireements. Syria continued to try to push 
forward with projects planned on the assumption of large 
amounts of aid, the results were added to negative balances 
of payments and budget deficits. Inflation added to the 
problem, it has averaged about lO'/l, rising to more than 15'/. 
in 1980.^ '"' 
In the case of Iraq, radical agrarian reform was one of 
the main tasks which the revolution tac^ed in the early 
stage. As a preliminary changes had to be made in the 
institutions concerned, and the party's control of them had 
to be strengthened. The existing agrarian reform law of iP58 
needed drastic amendment, which were issued on 20th May 
1969. The revolutionary regime also issued Agrarian reform 
law 117 of 1970, reducing maitimum laud holdings and 
providing new principles for the distribution of land. To 
conform more closely to the conditions and requirements of 
production and to secure the rights of poor peasants. The 
expropriation and redistribution of land were effected 
throughout the country, except in some parts of the north 
where exceptional circumstances prevailed"' . 
Under the revolution, the party's leadership and 
democratic practices were extended and developed in rural 
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areas, and the peasants contribution to the political life 
of the country has qrown. Peasant associations have 
acquired political and economic importance. New patterns of 
production have emerged, and the old ones are in decline. 
But. the present forms of rural ownership, though much 
advanced from feudal and capitalist forms are still not 
socialist. 
Despite the radical reform law, reducmo the limits of 
ownership and thus providino extra land for distribution to 
poor peasants, there are still many peasants, who own no 
land and are compelled to hire out their labour to small and 
medium land owners, or to migrate to the towns in search of 
employment. The natural increase in population, new 
families setting up house, and the growing mechanization of 
farming will raise their number still further. As a result, 
SKploitation in rural areas will increase, promoting a new 
sort of class conflict, while at the same time unemployment 
worsens. Moreover, the break-up of large land holdinos 
though in itself progressive and democratic, reduces 
productivity and harms the general development of 
agriculture. The previous agrarian reforms law led to 
declining agricultural production rather than to its 
37 increase 
The revolution has made great progress in establishing 
state, collective and cooperative farms. However, this 
i4J 
sector does not yet lead in production. 
Despite the cjreat achievements made in industrial sector 
du^ 'in?! the period 1974-1981, it still suffers from certain 
obstaclBB and draw backs which neqatively affects its course 
of progress and the achievement of the objective assioned to 
it. Some of these obstacles and drawbacf's are caused by the 
level of economic prooress of the country, the lack of 
experience m industry and the problem of socialist 
application'^ . One basic problem facing the industrial 
sector was the imbalance between the size of its horizontal 
expansion and provision of basic structure projects such as 
transportation, roads, railways, communications and 
Industrial housinc). Despite the fact that important progress 
has been achieved in these fields, they remained below the 
level demanded by the high investment rate industry. 
In the last few years, the national economy has made 
great strides towards the objectives set by the leadership 
of the party and revolution. 
Through reviewing what has been achieved in the main 
sectors, one can say that the Iraqi economy has developed in 
•7,9 
two basic line" . 
1. Making material progress in the basic branches of 
economy shown by the large investments, the high rates 
of growth of the production and the domestic product. 
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and the new fields of production and services it has 
entered. 
Expandincj the area of socialist sector and oivinq it 
primacy ensurina the promotion of socialist relations of 
production in various activities of national economy. 
Along these two lines, the national economy has achieved 
CjDod results. The socialist sectors contribution to the 
whole national economy has made a big rise. Its 
contribution to the GDP rose from 24.5 percent in I'^bB 
to 68.1 percent in 1974, and to 60.3 percent in 1981 in 
the same periods. 
5.3 Intel—Arab Relations : 
In the Arab World inter-Arab relations on bi-lateral as 
well «» on the basis of Pan-Arab level have remained 
concentrated larpely on two basic issue i.e. Palestine and 
Arab Nationalism. 
But there are other factors in inter-Arab relations 
which, despite the lacl- of visible short-term results, play 
a fundamental part in strenqtheninc) line's with the masses in 
other Arab countries and in laying the foundations for Arab 
Unity. The domain of Bconomic, cultural and human relations 
as a whole constitute the material, social, economic and 
psycholoqical basis for Arab Unity. 
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Most Arab qovernmentB, however, have been concentrated 
solely with political questions, and aoreement or 
disagreement on them, and have shown indifference to these 
vital aspects of the life of the Arab nation, its future and 
the Union of its different parts. The party and revolution 
have done all they could to overcome this situation, in 
order to facilitate the attainment of Pan-Arab objectives, 
by atrffnQthening relations between different parts of the 
nation, between the masses every where, and in all fields. 
However in the Fertile Crescent relations especially 
between Syria and Iraq have assumed a sionificant importance 
especially after 1970 where the issues of nationalism Vs. 
localism have been repeatedly debated and discussed. 
After the coup of November 1970 in Syria, Baghdad more 
often ignored the new rulers' continuous, though slowly 
abating, insistence on Ba'thi legitimacy. And when voicing 
its criticism vis-a-vis Syria it again acf-nowiedged the 
existence there of a Ba' th Party. Even Saddam Hussain did 
so when he declared : 
Our relations with Syria are good but, as far as 
the Syrian Ba'th Party is concerned the case is 
different. None of the Crisis this party went 
through after 1963 revealed a change in its 
mentality. As to us, we refuse to admit that 
tan^ (5, guns or fighters planes can replace normal 
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party methods 
The softer line is also illustrated by a rather 
friendly conciratulatory teleoram that Hasan al Bakr sent to 
Hafiz al-Asad after his election as president of Syria in 
March 1971. Perhaps this more lenient attitude also in part 
resulted from the fact that Aflaq shortly after Asad's take 
over finally settled in Bacihdad, thereby conferrinci 
additional legitimacy to the Iraqi Ba'th. Even so, till 
early 1972 the issue of Ba'thi legitimacy progressively 
disappeared from Iraqi statements as much as it did from 
Syrian ones. With it the war of word subsided for a while, 
giving way to a marledly quieter atmosphere. 
The aim which Iraq pursued in Syria's internal conflict 
IS reflected in the timing of its reply to her propaganda. 
That Iraq denied the Ba'thi legitimacy of the Syrian regime 
only when the latters internal divisions had clearly 
emerged, but there after denied it vehemently, points to ^  an 
Iraqi interest in replacing Jadid by Asad. Apart from that, 
Iraq obviously had to deny the Ba'thi legitimacy of its 
Syrian counter part if it did not want to risk its own 
legitimacy and position being endangered. Although Iraq in 
thBBtP early years was poorer than after the l'?73 rise in oil 
prices it was wealtheir than Syne. Thus from e material 
point of view as well there was no need to rally its 
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apparatus by insisting on Ba'thi legitimacy. 
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Secondly motives \n the arciument over Ba'thi legitimacy 
were differences over what Ba'thism should stand for an 
personal hostilities. However, the coup of 23rd February in 
Syria advocated a different version of Ba'thism than that of 
the Qauwmmiyya, and a few of them lit'e Jadid, seemed to have 
some ideological motivation, their main objective was simply 
to ta^ 'e power. The stronger emphasis on socialism 
presumably served largely to mobilize supporters who could 
not be reached with more moderate arguments. The Iraq 
B«'th, for its part, had no actual programme at all, and 
indulged in complete ideological vagueness. As far as 
ideological differences had a bearing on the conflict this 
was largely due to the preferences of the Syrian nationalism 
for the rulers in Iraq which threatened to erode the basis 
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of the Syrian regime 
Ba'thism in Iraq and Syria certainly diverged at the 
verbal level : whereas the Iraqi party continued to stlc^ to 
the traditional Ba'thi discourse and vocabulary, Jadid and 
his supporters borrowed Marxist Leninist terms and concents. 
Both sides, however, claimed to recognise the constitution 
of the Ba'th Party, passed by its first congress in Damascus 
in 1947, as the theoretical basis of their political 
practice. 
During the and after the October war of 1^73 Syria 
embarked on a more ambitious policy, Iraq, despite its 
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rapidly cirowing oil revenues, was still impeded by its 
conflict with the Kurds and with Iran. After this war 
tension gradually rose again as Iraq used Syria's acceptance 
of the cease-fire to question its Arab legitimacy and to 
counter its quest for regional influence. However, rather 
than stepping up the argument, Syria insisted on its own 
achievement in the war with out mentioning those of Iraq. 
Regional ambitions in those years appeared more clearly 
in the policies pursued by Syria. The Syrian regime 
enhanced its regional position mainly by waging, together 
with Egypt, the October war in 1973. Though the benefits 
had to be shared with Egypt, which moreover fought more 
successfully, the \^ar increased Syria's political prestige 
and influence and thus facilitated its access to resources, 
including political support. In contrast, Iraq, despite its 
important contribution, obtained little or nothing from this 
war as both Syria and Egypt, each for reasons of its own, 
pushed it out; from the outset it had been a game that they 
AT, 
had wanted to play without Iraq ". 
In addition the temporary rapprochement with Iran after 
May 1974 seems to have been intended to- enhance Syria's 
position in the region. This move might more specifically 
be directed against Iraq, then close to war with its eastern 
neighbor. Improved relations with Iran increased Syria's 
maneuvarability due to the Shah's close relations with the 
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USA and Iran's military strength in the Gulf, moreover, an 
Iranian credit of some US $ 150 million for reconstruction 
after the October War made the rapprochement profitable even 
in the short term. Thoucjh Saudi Arabia and the other Arab 
repairer of the oulf may have been apprehensive about Syria 
moving closer to Iran, there could be little objection to 
44 the move in the aftermath of the October War 
It micjht be objected that, with the increase in oil 
pfnce after the October war in 1973, Iraq was less compelled 
than Syria to bargain over resources and influence which to 
some extent it now obtained by the mere fact of beinci an oil 
country. However, to play a role in the politics of the 
reoion Iraq had to mobili::e not only a certain absolute 
amount of resources but also a certain relative part of the 
o 
over all resources available in the region and which, 
following the increase ]n oil prices, had increased as much 
as Iraq's own resources. Consequently, Baghdad had to 
continuR to struggle for access to these additional 
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resources 
Another conflict during this period intensified or 
receded chiefly according to the two rows of the trans 
Syrian pipeline. Of the two pipeline disputes the first 
concerned the amount of royalties to be paid by Iraqi for 
oil exports via Syria and was exclusively motivated by 
considerations of short-term material advantage. The second 
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dispute, fflliohtlv more complicated, arose when in reaction 
Iraq decided to build alternative cipelines enablmo it to 
discontinue oil e^ jports via Syria. While in this case Syria 
was again concerned about immediate economic advantaqes, 
Iraq was motivated by the lonp-term desire to ensure its 
economic and political independence, in addition, the wish 
to curb Syria's regional ambitions may have played a minor 
role in aS much as Iraa was ready to incur small losses in 
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order to create relatively bigper ones for Syria 
With the agreement of 6th March 1975 between Iraq and 
Iran, '^nown as Algiers agreement, the stage was definitely 
set (or an open competition for regional influence and 
resources between the regimes ruling Iraq an Syria. Since 
then and Indeed till today their bilateral relations have 
dominated by this competition, even though for a few months 
in 197B and 1979 it seemed to have given way to a rather far 
/\~r 
reaching rapprochement. 
The Algiers agreement, at least for a time, ended the 
long-standing conflict between Baghdad and Tehran that had 
been exacerbated after the Ba'thi takeover in Iraq in 1968 . 
Under the term of the accord the two sides would proceed to 
a precise delineation of their common border in accordance 
with the Constantinople protocol, of 1913. fi;; the bordei" in 
the Shattai Arab along the "Thalwag", that is where the 
river is deepest, and strictly control movements across the 
It'. 
border in order to end or prevent all subversive actions in 
the respective neighboring country. While the second 
provision satisfied Iranian wishes, the third one maihlv 
served Iraq as it meant an end to all Iranian support for 
the Kurdish resistance. 
Ironically, by recoanizmQ Iran's dominant position in 
the Gulf, this agreement enabled the Iraqi reqime to 
strengthen its own internal and reoional position 
economically as well as politically and finally to challenoe 
their Irani claim over Shatt-al-Arab. In the long term 
Iraq, by ciivinci a little, qained more. At the regional 
level the agreement with conservative and pro-American Iran 
greatly contributed to ma^ 'lng Iraq-So far considered as a 
'radical' and a trouble-maker - more acceptable as an ally 
to the conservative Arab States in the Gulf and thus 
enhanced its opportunities to vie for Arab support. It 
became much easier for these states to side with Iraq to 
counter balance Iranian Dower in the Gulf and after 1980 to 
support Iraq in its war against Iran. Without the 
moderation symbolized by this agreement the Arab Gulf 
states,though frightened by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
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might not have extended their support to Iraq 
In the meanwhile Iraq tried to e^ ;tract political 
support from other actors, mainly the wealth-' oil countries 
of the Gulf. By obtaining such support, Iraq 
i_i^ 
surreptitiously trapped the supporters in its own resources, 
but also to those of its new dependents. To get its way, 
Iraq very much lil-e Syria, illustrated its usefulness as 
well as its disruptive capacities, the former often through 
the latter, and the latter mainly by highlighting its 
different stances in Arab Israeli affairs. 
In 1975 the prospect of Iraqi prosperity consolidation 
and strength worried the regime in Damascus, which sought to 
enhance its regional position and to mobilize Arab 
resources. But although Syria aimed et enhancing its 
regional position, it did so perhaps less than Iraq in order 
to become the main interlocutor of the great powers in the 
West Asia; possiblv its ambitious, especially from 1979 
onwarrifi, were more limited and remained withm the red line 
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set hy f tirael. 
Due to their regional competition relations between 
Syria and Iraq greatly deteriorated till the process in the 
aftermath of the Camp David accord seemed to be re/ersed in 
an almost spectacular volte-face. 
The period from 1975 to 78 can be divided into three 
phases, each distinct from the others, though not always by 
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the same criteria ". 
i. From March till early 1975 bilateral relations were 
dominated by the argument over the Algiers agreement. 
reflecting the reciionai competition, and by the row over 
the p&rtition of the Euphrates water vjhich was 
essentially a narrow conflict of interest, that is a 
conflict over the allocation of clearly defined 
resources. Open hostility somewhat decreased in the 
autumn but Alqier and the Euphrates continued to 
dominate bilatef-al relations till December 1<?75. 
2. From then till mid Seotember \97t Syria's policy and 
interyention in Lebanon became the main issue, aoain 
reflectinci the competition for regional influence. For 
some time this competition too was paralleled by a 
narrow conflict of interest, this time to Iraq = 
decision to discontinue its oil exports via Syria. 
3. Starting with Syria's most serious attempts to control 
l.e»banon, in late September 1<?'76 till October 1^78 
rislatlons continued to be dominated by regional 
competition, but this was expressed far more violently 
th«n in the earlier phases. 
Thus, Asad his major speech delivered on 20th July i9"76 
not only presented Syria as a defender of the Arab cause by 
asserting that the intervention in Lebanon served to thwart 
an imperialist plot staged to cover up the Sinai agreement 
between Egypt and Israel, but also specifically as the 
defender of bhe Palestinians and of Lebanon. Threatened by 
partition,Lebanon had to be defended and maintained as a 
Secular state to prove, to Israel and its supporters, the 
viability of mul ti-rel icjious states in the West Asia, but 
al»o because bound bv specific historic ties. 'Throuoh 
history, said Asad, Syria and Lebanon have been one countrv 
and one psople, genunine joint interests ensured. A oenuine 
joint security also ensured. 
After a month of Camp David agreement in 1'^'79, Syro-
Iraqi relations seemed to have undergone a complete chanoe. 
The Egyptian - Israeli agreement had apparently induced a 
swift transition from deep hostility to close cooperation. 
The rapprochement of October I'^'^s was basically the 
repetition of similar- attempts in the past, the only 
difference beinq that this time Syrian vulnerability was 
critical enoucih and Iraqi fle-tibility sufficiently str'ono to 
bring about the temporary of the two regimes. After Egypt 
and Israel had concluded the accords, Syria found itself in 
an extremely delicate position- It could no longer count on 
Egyptian help m the event of Israeli aggression on Syrian. 
So that Syria badly needed support from other sides to 
compensate the new strategic imbalance, and Iraq was the 
only country which could replace the loss of the Syria. An 
accommodation with Ir-aq thus was indispensable for the 
Syrian regime. This does not mean that Damascus at anv time 
thought of sacrificing its long term ambition in the region 
for short term assistance from Irsq. Rather, Iraqi aid was 
to be used against Iraqi interests, not only to qive the 
regime in Damascus some temporary respite, but also to 
realize these ambitions under more propitious circumstances 
in the future. 
The Iraqi side, for its part, tried to tai'e advantaae 
of Syria s new vulnerability and offered its assistance in 
the hope of reducino Syrian sovereignty and independence. 
To enhance its chances of success, Iraq this time was 
careful to adopt a more flexible attitude than m its 
previous attempts, by omitting an e;;plicit demand for Syria 
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to reject UN resolution 242 ?/ 338. 
Syro-Iraqi relations, in 1*?80 returned to the state of 
open conflict that had characterized them prior to l'?7B-79 
rapprochement. Though the means resorted to largely 
resembled the pre-rapprochement period, a few differences 
can be distinguished. Foremost among these differences was 
the establishment of a firm alliance between one of the 
conflict parties Syria - and another regime in the region 
Iran that served to combat Iraq a= their common enemy. In 
the aftermath of the raDprochement, Iraq initially continued 
to be the stronger side and accordingly provoked the 
deterioration in relations in and after spring l^ i'SO. Syria, 
on the contrary was still wea^ when the conflict bro^ 'e open 
again and would have to preserve with Iraq a relationship as 
cooperative and free from conflict as possible. However, 
the initial Svro-Iraqi imbalance of strenqth, first 
'rebalanced to the bottom', was temporarily reversed after 
Iraq, havinci lost the initiative in its war aoainst Iran, 
found that from Julv 1^82 onwards it had to defend its own 
52 territory instead of attaci-mo that of its neighbor 
Further reports affirm that bv summer i<?81 General 
Naqib the rallying force of what they call the Islamic 
National Front in Iraq, presumably more or less identical to 
the National Democratic Front but rebaptired to better 
accommodate its Islamic members. At the same time the 
Syrian did not stop qrantinq direct support to the furdish 
Democratic Psrty (KDP^ and the patriotic Union of Kurdishtan 
<PLIK) . Continued Syrian support for the Iraqi Communists 
around Azis Mohammad was apparent when Azir publicly 
expressed his gratitude to the Syrian government in February 
1*T*82; in the same month he was moreover reported to have 
5" been received bv president Asad 
hurdish leader Talabani momemtarilv incurred the 
displeasure of the 5vrian regime in late 1987 when . it 
transpired that since l^BI he had been in secret 
negotiations with Baghdad. However, when the talks failed 
in 1984, the PUl- and the Syrian reoime reconciled 
themselves. The price the PU^  had to pay was a marl-ed "and 
lasting improvement in the relations between the Syrian 
-14 
reoime and h^e-: I-DP, its old rival.' 
E;!CBDt for the PDF' which received most of its suDPort 
from Iran, none of these oppositional fronts and groups had 
any siCjnificant influence within Iraq, not least because 
thev were busy ficihtino each other. 
The official Iraqi assessment of Syrian policy in the 
Iran-Iraq War was the statement released on 27th June 1982 
by the Regional Conqress of the Iraqi Ba'th Party. It 
stated that 'the alliance between the regimes of Iran, 
Syria, and Libya .. has stabbed Arab solidarity in the 
bac^ ' ; and that it had also destroyed the results of the 
Paqhdad Summit, Syria and Libya, the statement continued, 
had committed one of the most ser-ious crime in modern Arab 
history by supportsnq Iran, because they thus prolonged the 
war and prevented Iraq from fighting Israel. At the end of 
the statement the conaress e-ipressed its confidence that the 
Syrian and Libyan ^-eqlme5 will certainly receive their 
55 punishment at the hands of the Arab masses . 
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C O N C L U S I O N S 
The Ba'th regimes of Syria and Iraq have been in 
conflict since the verv beoinninct of their coexistence °in 
July 1968. Until early March 1972 this conflict chiefly 
resulted from the desire of the Syrian rulers to monoDolize 
Ba thi Ipgitimacy to prevent certain categories of their 
Ba'thi supporters from shiftina their political alleoiance 
to the regime in Baghdad. Although the Syrian rulers partly 
overestimated the danger. Such tendencies did e;;ist among 
certain members of the Syrian apparatus, that is among those 
who occupied key positions in the army and the party, threa-
tening to erode the regime in Damascus from within. 
But after Syria's victory in the Arab-israeli October 
War of 1973 and then definitely after the Algiers agreement 
passed in March 1975 between Iraq and Iran both regimes felt 
strong enough to pursue more ambitious regional policies. 
Ever since, the resulting competition for regional resources 
and influence has dominated their bilateral relations, even 
during the short-lived rapprochement of 1978-79. 
Having described Syro-Iraqi relations since 1968 as 
developing from a consolidation conflict into a competition 
for regional influence and resources, this evolution has vet 
to be analyzed in its relevance for the views according to 
which the contemporary Arab state is a territorial state 
rather than a nation-state, and inter-Arab relations are 
characterized bv a blurred distinction betv^ een internal and 
external affairs. 
Over the twenty years coyered by the present analysis 
it 15 manifest that Syrian and Iraqi actors increasinolv 
distinguished between internal and e^ tternal affairs, 
althoucih the two domains remained blurred to some B;;tent. 
Put qf?n9rellY actors do less and less conceive of the Arab 
world afj of an overarchinci polity, and the strenqth of 
cross-border solidarities at the level of other ties such as 
between Sunnis of different countries has also decreased. 
The increasincj distinction between internal and 
external is most obvious from the dwindlino instances since 
March 1^72 of shifts in oolitical alleoiance of Syrian 
Ba'this to the reoime in Iraq and correspondino fears bv the 
Syrian rulers, which have ceaved to be larcje-scale 
phenomena. This is clearly apparent from the qreatlv 
reduced reference to Ba'thi legitimacy in the mutual propag-
anda onslaughts. 
This tendency towards greater distinction is not contr-
adicted by the co-operation in the late 1^70s and early 
19BOs between the Iraqi regime and the Islamist opposition 
m Syria. Co-operation between the two sides was purely 
pragmatic or utilitarian and by no means based on any kind 
of Sunni solidarity that might have lln^ed the regime in 
Iraq to the opposition in Syria- In part, this success 
IS again based on the expectanc/, or rather "fear, that 
intet' Arab politics continue to function 111-e communicating 
vessels. Yet, the expectations and fears have often been 
based on actual events and interactions that provide more 
real indications for the persisting tendencv not to disting-
uish between internal and external affairs. While these 
eitamples first of all provide evidence of centrifugal tende-
ncies in third countries there are also indications that 
shifts in political allegiance and changes in preference 
have continued to recur between Syria and Iraq, again mainly 
in favour of iraq. Sympathy for Baghdad increased in Syria 
in 1^76 after the regime in Damascus intervened on the side 
of Maronites in Lebanon, and more strongly durinp the Iraq-
Iran war, especially when it continued to side with Iran 
after Iranian troops had occupied Iraqi - and therefore Arab 
- territory. 
Syrian policy in Lebanon and towards Iran also affected 
the loyalty of Syrian Ba'this towards their regime. More 
generally, loyalty of Syrian Ba'this towards their regime. 
More generally, the surv'ival of a clandestine pro-Iraqi 
Ba' th organization in Syria throughout the period after 
1^72, though of a much reduced and sometimes minimal sine, 
testifies that outside and inside remained partly confused 
in relations between Iraq and Syria. This is confirmed by 
the temporary successes of the Syrian Ba'th to mobilize 
support among Iraqis. 
Such pcDlitical loyalties that are not contained within 
the borders, of a qiven state have remained of relatively 
minor sionificance since 1<572, and may remain a maroinal 
•feature of Arab politics. But althouoh inter-state 
relationa in the Arab v^ orld have tended to develop into a 
pattern more similar to those between European nation-
states, thjs need not necessarilv become a definite and 
irreversible state of affairs. 
As a result of this attitude, but also partlv because 
of factors outside the control of the Syrian regime, the 
country's economy started to slump in the second half of the 
19705 and continues to decline. When the reoime is no 
longer able to provide the material advantages it disburses 
to its apparatus, their support ma/ falter and allegiance 
o 
shift to alternative recipients. Then again actors from 
beyond the country s borders but eligible to be considered 
1^5 mtei-rirU may be rediscovered and play a more significant 
role as political partners or allies. Obviously in Iraq 
too, where shifts of allegiance to external actors had 
always posed far less of a problem than in Syria, -the 
regime's ability to grant material benefit has enhanced its 
internal stability, particularW with the increase in oil 
prices after 1973. 
However, should co-operation and alliances between 
Syrian and Iraqi actors increase in the future it will be 
difficult to determine how far this will be due to a renewed 
blurrino of the internal-external distinction between the 
two states : shifts of alleqiance from Syria to Iraq may 
instead be caused by very material considerations Iraq 
reaches favourable agreements with its international 
creditors, despite the debts and damages incurred from its 
war with Iran, it may be able to attract Syrian actors by 
means not of legitimacy but of finance. 
In the late l<?60s and early 1^70s such a qolicy of 
financial inducement was open to Iraq only to a limited 
extent, eyen though its annual qross national oroduct oer 
capita exceeded that of Syria more than 20 per cent. At 
that time the Iraqi regime had to operate within narrower 
financial constraints and, unll^ 'e today, within an extremely 
hostility international environment, especially at the time 
of the nationalization of the Iraq petroleum Company whose 
success was not completely certain. Moreover, of course, 
Iraa s rBOiLonal ambitions durinp this early period were 
generally far more limited. After the increase in oil 
prices in 1*^?73 Iraa clearly had the means to buy allegiance 
abroad, and the regional ambitions which required it. But 
either it did not use its new resources to this end, or the 
Syrian apparatus was already too much under the spell of the 
prospering infitah. 
Since the increase in loyalty to the state, especially 
in Sytia, seems dependent on immediate economic benefits it 
mav well turn out to be fraoile and reversible, thus leavino 
unfulfilled a main condition for makinci the state a nation-
state. Indeed it remains doubtful whether Syria, as well as 
several other Arab countries, has become sufficiently conso-
lidated in itself not to fall victim to centrifucial 
tendencies in times of crisis when the cement of 
distribution and enrichment networl-'s starts crackino. 
Certainly, no nation-state, however solidly establish, is 
immune to the disintegratinq effects of orotracted economic 
breakdown and crisis. But many states, such as in Europe, 
have acquired far more raison d'etre, independent of 
immediate material returns, then Syria. Doubts about 
Syria's nation-state character are reinforced by the absence 
of political participation that - in the simultaneous 
absence of total mobilization - is the precondition of 
internal leoitimacy and thus of the inhabitants loyalty to 
the state. 
This of course, is not to deny a priori that, since 
about 1*^ 70, Syria mev have become less of a ter^ i^ tonal and 
more of a nation-state, and that despite all adversities it 
will turn out to be a political entity accepted by its inha-
bitants and a polity of its own rather than part of a wider 
one comprisinc) the Fertile Crescent. 
In the post Cold War period thus the advocates of Pfrab 
Nationalism in both the countries i.e. for Syria ?' Iraq 
resDectively realised the impracticability of a 
comDrehenBivB Arab Movement under the unstable oolitical 
conditions in the Arab World. Consequently, its Pan-Arab 
character oave way to an increasinq tendency to participate 
in reciional politics. The new Ba'thist Qoyernments were 
more successful in accommodatinq by compromise and more 
often by coercion the political ambitions and economic 
inerests of the more influential seaments of society, such 
as the landed gentry, royal families and more recently army 
officers and bureaucrats qeneratino the feelino of Wataniyya 
oyer Qaumiyya. Consequently the call to abolish boundaries 
between Arab States, and the demand to eradicate social and 
economic differences wei-^ e fiercely countered by the adamant 
resistance of those who had vested interests in preservino 
the state of political fragmentation in the Arab World. 
Today the conflict between the Ba'th Government in Syria and 
Iraq cannot be entirely attributed to ideoloqical 
differences. Underlyinq this conflict ars the concrete 
state interests of the two countries, in which no amount of 
rhetoric on Arab Unity and brotherhood can dispel. 
L ' ' . I 
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APPENDIX - A 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BA'TH PARTY 
Adopted in April 1947 
Arab Nationalism : An Antholoov, ed. Sylvia G. Haim. 
233-41. CoDvriQht iO 1962 by the 
Regents of the University of 
California; reprinted by permission of 
the University of California Press. 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
First Principle : Unitv and Freedom of the Arab Nation 
The Arabs form one Nation. This nation 
has the natural rioht to live in a 
single state and to be free to direct 
its own destiny. 
The Party of the Arab Ba th therefore believes that : 
1- The Arab fatherland constitutes an 
indivisible political and economic 
unity. No Arab country can live apart 
from the others. 
The Arab nation constitutes a cultural 
unity. Any differences ©jjisting among 
its sons are accidental "and 
unimportant. Thev will all disappear 
with the awa^'ening fo the Arab 
consclousness. 
The Arab fatherland belongs to the 
Arabs. They alone have the right to 
administer its affairs, to dispose of 
its wealth, and to direct its 
destinies. 
Second Principle : Personality of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation is characterized bv 
virtues which are the result of its 
successive rebirths. These virtues are 
characterized bv vitality and 
creativeness and bv an ability for 
transformation and renewal. Its 
renewal is always linked to arowth in 
personal freedom, and harmony between 
its evolution and the national 
interest. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore believes that 
1. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of belief, as well as artistic 
freedom, are sacred. Ho authority can 
dimnish them. 
The value of the citizens is measured -
once all opportunities have been 
Diven them — by the action they take 
to further the progress and prosperity 
of the Arab nation, without reoard to 
anv- other criterion. 
Third Principle : The Mission of the Arab Nation : 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission. 
Thi" mission reveals itself in ever- new 
and related forms through the different 
stages of history'. It aims at the 
renewal of human values, at the 
Duic^eninQ of human prooress, at 
increasing harmony and mutual help 
among the nations. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore believes that 
1. Colonialism and all that goes with it 
15 a criminal enterorise. The Arabs 
must fight it with all possible means, 
lust as they must taJe it on themsleves 
to helD, accordiDQ to their ohvsical 
and moral abilities, all oeooles 
fiohtinci for their freedom. 
Humanity constites a whole, the 
interests of which s.re solidary and the 
values and ciyiliration of which are 
common to all. The Arabs are enriched 
bv world civilization and enrich it in 
the3r turn. They stretch a fraternal 
hand to other nations and collaborate 
with them for the establishment of Ktst 
institutions which will ensure for all 
the peoples prosperity and peace, as 
well as moral and spiritual advance. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article I The Party of the ''Arab Ba th" iSo a 
universal Arab party. It has branches 
in all the Arab countries. It does not 
concern itself with regional politics 
except in relation to the hioher 
interests of the Arab Cause. 
Artjrle 2 The headquarters of the party is for 
the time being located in Damascus. It 
can be transferred to any other Arab 
city if the national interest should 
reauire it. 
Article 3 The party of the Arab Ba'th is a 
national party. It believes that 
nationalism is a living and eternal 
reality. It believes that the feeling 
of national awal-ening which intimately 
unites the individual to his nation is 
a sacred feeling. This feeling has 
within itself a potential of creative 
power; it binds itself to sacrifice, it 
seed's the e;;ercise of responsibilities, 
and It directs the individuals 
personality m a concrete and active 
manner. 
The national idea to which the oarty 
appeals is the will of the Arab people 
to free themselves and to unite. It 
demands that the opportunity be ciiven 
to it to realire in history its Arab 
personality, and to collabore with 
given to it to realize in history its 
Arab personality, and to collaborate 
with all the nations in all the fields 
which will ensure the march of humanity 
toward welfare and prooress. 
Article 4 The Party of the Arab Ba th is a 
socialist oartv. It believes that 
socialism is a necessity which emanates 
from the deph of Arab nationalism 
itself. Socialism constitutes, in 
fact, the ideal social order which vn 11 
allow the Arab people to realise its 
possibilities and to enable its oenius 
to flourish, and which will ensure for 
the nation constant proaress in its 
material and moral output. It makes 
possible a trustfu] brotherhood amono 
its members. 
Article "5 The Party of the Arab Ba th is a 
popular party. It is believes that 
sovereionty is the property of the 
people, who alone is the source of all 
authority. It believes that the values 
of the state is the outcome of the will 
of the masses from wnich it issues and 
that this value is sacred only to the 
extent that the masses have e;;erc ised 
their choice freely. That is whv, in 
the accomplishment of its mission, the 
party relies on the people with whom it 
seeks to establish intricate contract, 
the spiritual, moral, material, and 
physical level of whom it is trying to 
raise, in order that the people may 
become conscious of its personality and 
that it may become able to e^iercise its 
riQht in private and public life. 
Article 6 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is 
revolutionarv. It believes that its 
mam objectives for the realization of 
the renaissance of Arab nationalism or 
for the establishment of socialism 
cannot be achieved except bv means of 
revolution and struaole. To rely on 
slow evolutuion and to be satisfied 
with a Dartial and suDerficial reform 
15 to threaten these aims and to 
conduce to their failure and their 
loss. 
This IS whv the party decides in favor of : 
1. The struQQle aoainst foreion 
colonial ism, in order to liberate the 
Arab fatherland completely and finally. 
The struQQle to gather ail the Arabs in 
a sinole independent state. 
The overthrow of the present faulty 
structure, an overthrow which will 
include all the sectors of 
intellectual, economic, social and 
political life. 
Article 7 The Arab fatherland is that part of the 
olobe inhabited by the Arab nation 
which stretches from the Taurus 
Mountain, the Pocht-i-i'ouh Mountains, 
the Gulf of Basra, the Arab Ocean, the 
Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the 
Atlanitic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. 
Article 8 The official lanquaqe of the state, as 
well as that of all the citizens. is 
Arabic. it alone is recognized in 
correspondence and in teachino. 
Article 9. The emblem of the Arab state is that of 
the Arab revolution begun in l^ ifc to 
liberate and unifv the Arab nation. 
Article 10 An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, 
who has lived on Arab soil. or who, 
after having been assimilated to Arab 
Life, has faith in his belonoing to the 
Arab Nation. 
Article 11 To be e;;cluded from the Arab fatherland 
: whoever has fought for or has 
belonged to a factions anti-Arab 
association. whoever has lent himself 
inside the Arab fatherland to colnial 
ends. 
Article 12 The Arab woman eniovs all the riohts of 
ci 11 i^ enshiD. The oartv struQoles to 
raise UD woman's level in order to maf-e 
her fit to evercise these riohts. 
Article 13 The partv strives to Qive all the 
citizens the same opoortunties in the 
field of schooling and livelihood in 
order that, in the various aspects of 
human activity, everyone should be 
equally able to show his real abilities 
and to develop them to the maximum. 
THE WAY : INTERNAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 14 The reoime of the Arab state will be a 
constitutional parliamentary regime, 
E;;ecutive power is responsible before 
the legislative, which is directly 
elected by the people. 
Article 15 The national tie is the only tie that 
may e\ist in the Arab state. It 
ensures harmony among all the citizens 
by melting them in the crucible fo a 
single nation and counteracts all 
religious, communal, tribal, racial, or 
regional factions. 
Article 16 The administrative system of the Arab 
state IS e system of decentralization. 
Article 17 The partv strives to mai'e popular 
feeling universal and to mal-e the power 
of the people a livino reality in the 
life of the individual. It undertal-'es 
to oive the state a constitution 
guaranteeing to all Arab citizens 
absolute eaualitv before the lavj, the 
riciht to e^ !pre=s their oDinions in 
absolute freedom, and a true choice of 
their representatives. thus ensur^ino 
for them a free life within the 
framwDr^' of the law. 
Article IB A sinole code of laws is to be 
established freely for the whole of the 
Arab nation. This code will be in 
conformity with the sDirit of the times 
and will take into account the oast 
experiences of the Arab nation. 
Article 19 The ludicial power will be independent. 
It will be free from interference by 
other powers and emoy total immunity. 
Article 20 The rights of citizenship are granted 
in their totality to every citizen 
liyino on Arab soil who is devoted to 
the Arab fatherland and who has no 
connection with any factious 
association. 
Article 21 Military service is compulsorv in the 
Arab fatherland. 
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 22 The foreian policy of the Arab state 
will be guided by the interests of Arab 
nationalism and of the eternal mission 
of the Arabs which seeks to establish 
in corporation with other nations a 
free, harmonious, and secure world, 
continuously advancino in prooress. 
Article 23 The Arabs will struggle with all their 
DDwer to destroy the foundations of 
colonialism and of foreign occupation 
and to suppress all foreign political 
or economic influence in their countrv. 
Article 24 Since the Arab people is the sole souce 
of power, all treaties, pacts, and 
documents, concluded bv ciovernments 
which detract from the total 
sovereicini ty of the Arab will be 
abroQated. 
Arab foreign policy seeks to oiye a 
true picture of the will of the Arabs 
to liye in freedom, and of their 
sincere desire to see all other nations 
enjoy the same liberty. 
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 26 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a 
socialist party. It belieyes that the 
economic wealth of the fatherland 
belonos to the nation. 
Article 27 The present distribution of wealth in 
the Arab fatherland is uniust. 
Therefore a review and a ntst 
redistribution will become necessary. 
Article 28 The eauality of all the citizens is 
founded on human values. This is why 
the party forbids the exploitation of 
the wDr^ of others. 
Article 7P Public utilities, extensive natural 
resources, big industry, and the means 
of transport are the property of the 
nation. The state will manage them 
directly and will abolish private 
companies and foreion concessions. 
Article !(") Ownership of agricultural land will be 
so limited as to be in proportion to 
the means of the Droprietor to e-ploit 
all his lands without exploitation of 
the effotrts of others. This will be 
under the control of the state and in 
conformity with its ovet—all economic 
plan. 
Article 31 Small industrial ownership will be so 
limited as to be related to the 
standard of livina of the citizens of 
T^ B 
the state as a whole. 
Article 32 Wor)-ers will oarticioate in the 
manaDement of their factory- In 
addition to their waoes - fi^ed by the 
state - they will receive a proDortion 
of the profits, also fixed by the 
state. 
Article 33 Ownership of immoyable property „ is 
allowed to all the citizens so lono as 
they do not e^ tploit it to the harm of 
others, and so lonci as the state 
ensures for all citizens a minimumn of 
immovable propertv, 
Ar-tic'lP 34 Property and inheitance are two natural 
riDhts. They are protected within the 
limits of the national interests. 
Article 3fi Usurious loans are prohibbited between 
citirens. One state bank is to be 
founded to issue currency, which the 
national output will back. This ban^ 
will finance the vital aoricultural and 
industiral plans of the nation. 
Article 36 The state will control directly 
internal and external trade in order to 
abolish the exploitation of the 
consumer by the producer. The state 
will protect them both, as it will 
protect that national output agains the 
competition of foreign foods and will 
ensure equilibrium between exports and 
imports. 
Article 37 Benenral planninq, inspired by the most 
modern economic idea, will be oroanired 
so that the Arab fatherland will be 
industrialized. national production 
developed, new outlets opened for it. 
and the industrial economy of each 
region directed accordino to its 
potential and to the raw material it 
contains. 
SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
Article 38 Family, Procreation, M a m a o e 
The family is the basic cell of the 
nation. It is for the state to orotett, 
to develop, and to help it. 
Procreation is a trust given in the 
first place to the family and then to 
fche state. Both must ensure its 
increase. and look to the health and 
education of the descendants. 
Marriaoe is a national duty. The state 
must encouraoe it. facilitate it. and 
control it. 
Article 3*7 Public Health. The state will build, 
at its expense, institutions of 
preventive medicine, dispensaries, and 
hospitals vihich wil] meet the needs of 
all citizens. For whom the state 
ensures free medical treatment. 
Article 40 
1, 
Labour 
Labour is an oblioation for all those 
who &re capable of it. It is for the 
state to ensure that work is available 
to every citi::en, whether intellectual 
or manual. 
The employer must ensure at the least a 
decent standard of livinp for his 
emplovee. 
The state sees to the maintenance 
all persons in capable of worK 
of 
4. Just laws will be Dromulgated to limit 
the worl-'man's daily hours of worl-, to 
Dive him the riDht to paid weekly and 
annual holidays, to protect his riohts, 
to ensure social security for him in 
old age, and to indemnify him for any 
cessation of work, whether partial or 
total. 
Free workmen's and peasants unions 
will be established and encouraged, so 
that thev may constitute an instrument 
efficient in the defense of their 
rights, in rasing their standard of 
living, in devloping their abilities, 
in increeing the opportunities offered 
to them. in creating among them a 
spirit of BDlidarity and in 
representing them in ,ioint worl-s 
CDunciIs, 
6. Joint works councils will be created in 
which the state and the unions of 
workmen and peasants will be 
represented. These councils will have 
power to decide the issues arisinci 
amono the unions, the works manaoers, 
and the representatives of the states. 
Article 41 Culture and Society. 
1. The psrtv ssefs to develop a General 
national culture for the whoe Arab 
fatherland which shall be Arab, 
liberal, proaressive, extensive, 
profound, and humanist; it attempts to 
dissemnjate it m all sections of the 
population. 
2. The state is responsible for the 
protection of the liberty of speech, of 
publication, of assembly, of protest, 
and of the press, within the limits of 
the hiqher Arab National interest. It 
15 for the state to facilitate all the 
means and the modalities which tend to 
realize this liberty. 
3. Intellectual work is one of the most 
sacred kinds. It is the state's concern 
to protect and encourage intellectuals 
and scientists. 
4. Within the limits of the Arab national 
idea, every freedom will be Ciiven for 
the foundation of clubs. associations, 
parties, youth groupincis, and tourist 
orqanirat ions, as well as for obtainino 
profit from the cinema, radio, 
television, and all the other 
facilities of modern civilization in 
order to spread generally the national 
culture, and contribute to the 
entertainment of the people-
Article 42 Separation of the classes and 
differentiation amono them Are 
abolished. The separation of the 
classes is the consequence of a faulty 
social order. Therefore, the party 
carrries on its struggle amono the 
laboring and oppressed classes of 
society so that such separation and 
differentiation will come to and end 
and the citizens will recover the whole 
of their human dignity and will be 
enabled to live in the shadow of a lust 
social order in which nothing will 
distinguish one citizen from another 
e';ceot intellectual capacitv and manual 
skill. 
Article 43 Nomadism, Nomadism is a primitive 
social state. It decreases the 
national output and mal-es an important 
part of the nation a paralyzed member 
and an obstacle to its development and 
propress. The party strupgles for the 
sedentarization of momads by the grant 
of lands to them, for the abolition of 
tribal customs, and for the application 
to the nomads of the laws of the state. 
POLICY OF THE PARTY IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING 
The education policy of the party aims 
at the creation of a new Arab 
Generation which believes in the unitv 
of the nation, and in the eternity of 
its mission. This policy, based on 
scientific reasoning, will be freed 
from the shackles of supersitions, and 
reactionary traditions; it will be 
imbued with the spirit of optimism, of 
struggle, and of solidarity among "all 
citizens in the carrvino out of total 
Arab revolution, and in the cause of 
human prepress. 
Therefore, the partv decides as follows : 
Article 44 A National Arab stamp will mark all the 
aspects of intellectual, econDmic, 
political, architectural, and artistic 
life. The party establishes once again 
the links of the Arab nation with its 
glorious history and urges it toward a 
future even more glorious and more 
exemplary. 
Article 45 Teachinci is one of the exclusive 
functions of the state. Therefore, all 
foreign and orivate educational 
institutions are abolished. Article 46 
Education at all stages shall be free 
for all citizens. Primary and 
secondary education shall be 
comDulsory. 
Article 47 Professional schools with the most 
modern equipment shall be established, 
where education shall be free. 
Article 48 Teachina careers and all that relates 
to education are set aside for Arab 
citizens. An e^ceDtion to this rule is 
made in the instance of higher 
education. 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Single Article The fundamental and general Drincigies 
of the Constitution cannot be amended. 
Other articles may, however, be 
amended, provided that two-thirds of 
the General Council of the party aoree 
thereto, on e motion put by the 
E;;ecutiye Council, or by the Executive 
Council, or by a quarter of the members 
of the General Council. or bv ten 
members of the Party Qrganiration. 
IB: 
APPENDIX - B 
TWELVE POINT PROGRAMME FOR PEACE 
WITH THE KURDS AS BROADCAST BY PREMIER 
ABDUL RAHMAN AL-BAZZAZ 27TH JUNE 1966 
<BRIEF SYNOPSIS ONLY) 
furdiBh nationality would be recoanired 
in the law on decentralization of the 
adminiBtration, in a provisional 
Consbitution then beinQ prepared, and 
in a future permanent Constitution. 
l-urdish would be reoroanized as an 
official lanauaae, alonci with Arabic, 
in the predominantIv Purdish areas, and 
would be tauDht at the baohdad 
Un1versitv. 
I- urdish districts would have their own 
elected councils, which would be 
responsible for education, health and 
municipal affairs. 
4. Civil servants in Hurdish areas would 
be !-urds, unless local needs reauired 
other personnel. 
Parliamentary election, would be held 
within a period to be laid down in the 
provisional Constitution and military 
services in proper Judiciary, and the 
diplomatic and military services in 
proportion to their numbers in the 
population. 
The t-urds would be free to form their 
own political oroanizations and to 
publish their own newspapers. 
A oeneral amnesty would be proclaimed 
after the conclusion of a cease-fire 
aoreement. 
!• Lirds who deserted from the ArmN and 
the DO]iCB force would report bac^ to 
their units within two months. 
The other I-urds under arms would be 
formed into an orcjanirst ion attached to 
the Government, which would help them 
to return to civilain life. 
10. i'urdish civil servants and workers who 
had been dismissed would be reinstated 
in their former Dosts. 
11, Money beinci spent on the campaion 
aoainst the hurds would be used for 
reconstruction of the Kurdish areaz, 
for which a special Mini&terv would be 
responsible. 
12. The Qovernment would compensate, as far 
as lay in its powers, widows, orphans, 
the disabled and other war victims. 
Acl-nowledoements to heesinq's contemporary Archies, 
li-z 
Appendix - C 
TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 OF 
NOVEMBER 22, 1967. 
Adopted Unanimously at the 1382nd meetino 
The Securitv' CQuncil. 
E-Dressinq its contmuinq concern with 
the Qrave situation in the Middle East, 
EmohasirinQ the inadmissibi1itv of the 
acquisition of territory by war and the 
need to work for a lust and lastinq 
peace in which every state in the ef^ ea 
can liye in security. 
Emphasi::inQ further that all member 
states in their acceptance of the 
Charter of the United Nations have 
undertaken a commitment to act in 
accordino with Article 2 of the Chrter. 
Affirms that the fulfi]ment of Charter 
principles reauires the establishment 
of a lust and lastino peace in the 
Middle Edst which should include the 
application of both the follDwino 
principles : 
1- Withdrawl of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent 
conf1ict: 
11. Termination of all claims or states of 
belliperenc- and respect for &nd 
ac^nowledoement of the soyereiontv. 
territorial inteoriH-y' and political 
independence of everv state in the area 
and their rioht to li.e in peace within 
secure end '-•^ Bcoani red boundaries free 
from threats or acts of force. 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
a. For QuaranteeinCi -freedom 0"f navioation 
throucih international waterways in the 
area; 
b. For achievinD a lust settlement of the 
refugees oroblem; 
c. For DuaranteeninD the territorial invi-
olability and political indeoendence of 
very state in the area, throuoh 
measures includinq the establishment of 
demilitarized zones. 
3. Requests the Secretary - General to 
desionate a special roDresentatiye to 
proceed to the Middle East to establish 
and maintain contacts with the states 
concerned in order to promote aoreement 
and assist efforts to achieve a 
peaceful and accepted settlment in 
accordance vnth the provisions and 
principles of this resolution. 
4, Reauests the Secretary General to 
report to the Security Council on the 
progress of the efforts of the special 
representative as soon as possible. 
TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 
338 OF OCTOBER 22, 1973 ADOPTED 
AT THE 174/TH MEETING 
The Secui^itv Council 
Calls upon all parties to the present 
fiohtinci to cease all firino and termi-
nate all military activity' immeditelv, 
no later than 12 hours after the moment 
of the adoption of this decision. in 
the positions they now occupy; 
Calls upon the parties concerned to 
start immediately after the ceasefire 
tc< 
the implementation of Security Council 
resolution 242(1^67^ in all of its 
Darts: 
Decides that, immediately and concurre-
ntly with the ceasefire. neaotiations 
start between the oarties concerned 
under approoriate auspices aimed at 
establishino a ,iust and durable oeaco 
in the Middle East. 
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